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TS.1 Introduction and framing
‘Mitigation’, in the context of climate change, is a human interven-
tion to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs). One of the central messages from Working Groups I and II 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is that the 
consequences of unchecked climate change for humans and natural 
ecosystems are already apparent and increasing. The most vulnerable 
systems are already experiencing adverse effects. Past GHG emissions 
have already put the planet on a track for substantial further changes 
in climate, and while there are many uncertainties in factors such as 
the sensitivity of the climate system many scenarios lead to substantial 
climate impacts, including direct harms to human and ecological well-
being that exceed the ability of those systems to adapt fully.
Because mitigation is intended to reduce the harmful effects of climate 
change, it is part of a broader policy framework that also includes 
adaptation to climate impacts. Mitigation, together with adaptation to 
climate change, contributes to the objective expressed in Article 2 of 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) to stabilize “greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmo-
sphere at a level to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system […] within a time frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt […] to ensure that food production is not threat-
ened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner”. However, Article 2 is hard to interpret, as concepts such as 
‘dangerous’ and ‘sustainable’ have different meanings in different 
decision contexts (see Box TS.1).1 Moreover, natural science is unable 
to predict precisely the response of the climate system to rising GHG 
1 Boxes throughout this summary provide background information on main research 
concepts and methods that were used to generate insight.
Box TS.1 | Many disciplines aid decision making on climate change
Something is dangerous if it leads to a significant risk of consider-
able harm. Judging whether human interference in the climate sys-
tem is dangerous therefore divides into two tasks. One is to esti-
mate the risk in material terms: what the material consequences of 
human interference might be and how likely they are. The other is 
to set a value on the risk: to judge how harmful it will be.
The first is a task for natural science, but the second is not [Section 
3.1]. As the Synthesis Report of AR4 states, “Determining what 
constitutes ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the cli-
mate system’ in relation to Article 2 of the UNFCCC involves value 
judgements”. Judgements of value (valuations) are called for, 
not just here, but at almost every turn in decision making about 
climate change [3.2]. For example, setting a target for mitigation 
involves judging the value of losses to people’s well-being in the 
future, and comparing it with the value of benefits enjoyed now. 
Choosing whether to site wind turbines on land or at sea requires 
a judgement of the value of landscape in comparison with the 
extra cost of marine turbines. To estimate the social cost of carbon 
is to value the harm that GHG emissions do [3.9.4].
Different values often conflict, and they are often hard to weigh 
against each other. Moreover, they often involve the conflicting 
interests of different people, and are subject to much debate and 
disagreement. Decision makers must therefore find ways to medi-
ate among different interests and values, and also among differing 
viewpoints about values. [3.4, 3.5]
Social sciences and humanities can contribute to this process by 
improving our understanding of values in ways that are illustrated 
in the boxes contained in this summary. The sciences of human 
and social behaviour — among them psychology, political science, 
sociology, and non-normative branches of economics — investi-
gate the values people have, how they change through time, how 
they can be influenced by political processes, and how the process 
of making decisions affects their acceptability. Other disciplines, 
including ethics (moral philosophy), decision theory, risk analysis, 
and the normative branch of economics, investigate, analyze, and 
clarify values themselves [2.5, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6]. These disciplines offer 
practical ways of measuring some values and trading off conflict-
ing interests. For example, the discipline of public health often 
measures health by means of ‘disability-adjusted life years’ [3.4.5]. 
Economics uses measures of social value that are generally based 
on monetary valuation but can take account of principles of 
distributive justice [3.6, 4.2, 4.7, 4.8]. These normative disciplines 
also offer practical decision-making tools, such as expected util-
ity theory, decision analysis, cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness 
analysis, and the structured use of expert judgment [2.5, 3.6, 3.7, 
3.9].
There is a further element to decision making. People and 
countries have rights and owe duties towards each other. 
These are matters of justice, equity, or fairness. They fall within 
the subject matter of moral and political philosophy, jurispru-
dence, and economics. For example, some have argued that 
countries owe restitution for the harms that result from their 
past GHG emissions, and it has been debated, on jurispruden-
tial and other grounds, whether restitution is owed only for 
harms that result from negligent or blameworthy GHG emis-
sions. [3.3, 4.6]
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concentrations nor fully understand the harm it will impose on indi-
viduals, societies, and ecosystems. Article 2 requires that societies bal-
ance a variety of considerations — some rooted in the impacts of cli-
mate change itself and others in the potential costs of mitigation and 
adaptation. The difficulty of that task is compounded by the need to 
develop a consensus on fundamental issues such as the level of risk 
that societies are willing to accept and impose on others, strategies for 
sharing costs, and how to balance the numerous tradeoffs that arise 
because mitigation intersects with many other goals of societies. Such 
issues are inherently value-laden and involve different actors who 
have varied interests and disparate decision-making power.
The Working Group III (WGIII) contribution to the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment 
Report (AR5) assesses literature on the scientific, technological, environ-
mental, economic and social aspects of mitigation of climate change. 
It builds upon the WGIII contribution to the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment 
Report (AR4), the Special Report on Renewable Energy Sources and Cli-
mate Change Mitigation (SRREN) and previous reports and incorporates 
subsequent new findings and research. Throughout, the focus is on the 
implications of its findings for policy, without being prescriptive about 
the particular policies that governments and other important partici-
pants in the policy process should adopt. In light of the IPCC’s mandate, 
authors in WGIII were guided by several principles when assembling this 
assessment: (1) to be explicit about mitigation options, (2) to be explicit 
about their costs and about their risks and opportunities vis-à-vis other 
development priorities, (3) and to be explicit about the underlying crite-
ria, concepts, and methods for evaluating alternative policies.
The remainder of this summary offers the main findings of this report.
The degree of certainty in findings, as in the reports of all three IPCC 
Working Groups, is based on the author teams’ evaluations of underly-
ing scientific understanding and is expressed as a qualitative level of 
confidence (from very low to very high) and, when possible, proba-
bilistically with a quantified likelihood (from exceptionally unlikely to 
virtually certain). Confidence in the validity of a finding is based on the 
type, amount, quality, and consistency of evidence (e. g., data, mecha-
nistic understanding, theory, models, expert judgment) and the degree 
of agreement. Probabilistic estimates of quantified measures of uncer-
tainty in a finding are based on statistical analysis of observations or 
model results, or both, and expert judgment.2 Where appropriate, find-
2 The following summary terms are used to describe the available evidence: limited, 
medium, or robust; and for the degree of agreement: low, medium, or high. A level 
of confidence is expressed using five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high, and 
very high, and typeset in italics, e. g., medium confidence. For a given evidence and 
agreement statement, different confidence levels can be assigned, but increas-
ing levels of evidence and degrees of agreement are correlated with increasing 
confidence. The following terms have been used to indicate the assessed likeli-
hood of an outcome or a result: virtually certain 99 – 100 % probability, very likely 
90 – 100 %, likely 66 – 100 %, about as likely as not 33 – 66 %, unlikely 0 – 33 %, 
very unlikely 0 – 10 %, exceptionally unlikely 0 – 1 %. Additional terms (more likely 
than not > 50 – 100 %, and more unlikely than likely 0 –< 50 %) may also be used 
when appropriate. Assessed likelihood is typeset in italics, e. g., very likely. For 
more details, please refer to the Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report on Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties, available at http://
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/supporting-material/uncertainty-guidance-note.pdf.
ings are also formulated as statements of fact without using uncer-
tainty qualifiers. Within paragraphs of this summary, the confidence, 
evidence, and agreement terms given for a bolded finding apply to 
subsequent statements in the paragraph, unless additional terms are 
provided. References in [square brackets] indicate chapters, sections, 
figures, tables, and boxes where supporting evidence in the underlying 
report can be found.
This section continues with providing a framing of important con-
cepts and methods that help to contextualize the findings presented 
in subsequent sections. Section TS.2 presents evidence on past trends 
in stocks and flows of GHGs and the factors that drive emissions at the 
global, regional, and sectoral scales including economic growth, tech-
nology, or population changes. Section TS.3.1 provides findings from 
studies that analyze the technological, economic, and institutional 
requirements of long-term mitigation scenarios. Section TS.3.2 provides 
details on mitigation measures and policies that are used within and 
across different economic sectors and human settlements. Section TS.4 
summarizes insights on the interactions of mitigation policies between 
governance levels, economic sectors, and instrument types. 
Climate change is a global commons problem that implies the 
need for international cooperation in tandem with local, 
national, and regional policies on many distinct matters. Because 
the GHG emissions of any agent (individual, company, country) affect 
every other agent, an effective outcome will not be achieved if indi-
vidual agents advance their interests independently of others. Interna-
tional cooperation can contribute by defining and allocating rights and 
responsibilities with respect to the atmosphere [Sections 1.2.4, 3.1, 
4.2, 13.2.1]. Moreover, research and development (R&D) in support of 
mitigation is a public good, which means that international coopera-
tion can play a constructive role in the coordinated development and 
diffusion of technologies [1.4.4, 3.11, 13.9, 14.4.3]. This gives rise to 
separate needs for cooperation on R&D, opening up of markets, and 
the creation of incentives to encourage private firms to develop and 
deploy new technologies and households to adopt them.
International cooperation on climate change involves ethical 
considerations, including equitable effort-sharing. Countries have 
contributed differently to the build-up of GHG in the atmosphere, have 
varying capacities to contribute to mitigation and adaptation, and have 
different levels of vulnerability to climate impacts. Many less developed 
countries are exposed to the greatest impacts but have contributed least 
to the problem. Engaging countries in effective international cooperation 
may require strategies for sharing the costs and benefits of mitigation 
in ways that are perceived to be equitable [4.2]. Evidence suggests that 
perceived fairness can influence the level of cooperation among individ-
uals, and that finding may suggest that processes and outcomes seen as 
fair will lead to more international cooperation as well [3.10, 13.2.2.4]. 
Analysis contained in the literature of moral and political philosophy 
can contribute to resolving ethical questions raised by climate change 
[3.2, 3.3, 3.4]. These questions include how much overall mitigation is 
needed to avoid ‘dangerous interference with the climate system’ (Box 
Box TS.2 | Mitigation brings both market and non-market benefits to humanity
The impacts of mitigation consist in the reduction or elimination 
of some of the effects of climate change. Mitigation may improve 
people’s livelihood, their health, their access to food or clean water, 
the amenities of their lives, or the natural environment around them.
Mitigation can improve human well-being through both market 
and non-market effects. Market effects result from changes in 
market prices, in people’s revenues or net income, or in the quality 
or availability of market commodities. Non-market effects result 
from changes in the quality or availability of non-marketed goods 
such as health, quality of life, culture, environmental quality, 
natural ecosystems, wildlife, and aesthetic values. Each impact 
of climate change can generate both market and non-market 
damages. For example, a heat wave in a rural area may cause heat 
stress for exposed farm labourers, dry up a wetland that serves as 
a refuge for migratory birds, or kill some crops and damage others. 
Avoiding these damages is a benefit of mitigation. [3.9]
Economists often use monetary units to value the damage 
done by climate change and the benefits of mitigation. The 
monetized value of a benefit to a person is the amount of 
income the person would be willing to sacrifice in order to get 
it, or alternatively the amount she would be willing to accept 
as adequate compensation for not getting it. The monetized 
value of a harm is the amount of income she would be will-
ing to sacrifice in order to avoid it, or alternatively the amount 
she would be willing to accept as adequate compensation for 
suffering it. Economic measures seek to capture how strongly 
individuals care about one good or service relative to another, 
depending on their individual interests, outlook, and economic 
circumstances. [3.9]
Monetary units can be used in this way to measure costs and 
benefits that come at different times and to different people. But 
it cannot be presumed that a dollar to one person at one time 
can be treated as equivalent to a dollar to a different person or 
at a different time. Distributional weights may need to be applied 
between people [3.6.1], and discounting (see Box TS.10) may be 
appropriate between times. [3.6.2]
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appropriate between times. [3.6.2]
TS.1) [3.1], how the effort or cost of mitigating climate change should 
be shared among countries and between the present and future [3.3, 
3.6, 4.6], how to account for such factors as historical responsibility for 
GHG emissions [3.3, 4.6], and how to choose among alternative policies 
for mitigation and adaptation [3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7]. Ethical issues of well-
being, justice, fairness, and rights are all involved. Ethical analysis can 
identify the different ethical principles that underlie different viewpoints, 
and distinguish correct from incorrect ethical reasoning [3.3, 3.4].
Evaluation of mitigation options requires taking into account 
many different interests, perspectives, and challenges between 
and within societies. Mitigation engages many different agents, such 
as governments at different levels — regionally [14.1], nationally and 
locally [15.1], and through international agreements [13.1] — as well 
as households, firms, and other non-governmental actors. The intercon-
nections between different levels of decision making and among dif-
ferent actors affect the many goals that become linked with climate 
policy. Indeed, in many countries the policies that have (or could have) 
the largest impact on emissions are motivated not solely by concerns 
surrounding climate change. Of particular importance are the interac-
tions and perceived tensions between mitigation and development 
[4.1, 14.1]. Development involves many activities, such as enhancing 
access to modern energy services [7.9.1, 14.3.2, 16.8], the building of 
infrastructures [12.1], ensuring food security [11.1], and eradicating 
poverty [4.1]. Many of these activities can lead to higher emissions, 
if achieved by conventional means. Thus, the relationships between 
development and mitigation can lead to political and ethical conun-
drums, especially for developing countries, when mitigation is seen as 
exacerbating urgent development challenges and adversely affecting 
the current well-being of their populations [4.1]. These conundrums 
are examined throughout this report, including in special boxes high-
lighting the concerns of developing countries.
Economic evaluation can be useful for policy design and be 
given a foundation in ethics, provided appropriate distribu-
tional weights are applied. While the limitations of economics are 
widely documented [2.4, 3.5], economics nevertheless provides use-
ful tools for assessing the pros and cons of mitigation and adaptation 
options. Practical tools that can contribute to decision making include 
cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, multi-criteria analysis, 
expected utility theory, and methods of decision analysis [2.5, 3.7.2]. 
Economic valuation (see Box TS.2) can be given a foundation in ethics, 
provided distributional weights are applied that take proper account 
of the difference in the value of money to rich and poor people [3.6]. 
Few empirical applications of economic valuation to climate change 
have been well-founded in this respect [3.6.1]. The literature provides 
significant guidance on the social discount rate for consumption (see 
Box TS.10), which is in effect inter-temporal distributional weighting. It 
suggests that the social discount rate depends in a well-defined way 
primarily on the anticipated growth in per capita income and inequal-
ity aversion [3.6.2]. 
Most climate policies intersect with other societal goals, either 
positively or negatively, creating the possibility of ‘co-benefits’ 
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or ‘adverse side-effects’. Since the publication of AR4, a substantial 
body of literature has emerged looking at how countries that engage 
in mitigation also address other goals, such as local environmental 
protection or energy security, as a ‘co-benefit’ and conversely [1.2.1, 
6.6.1, 4.8]. This multi-objective perspective is important because it 
helps to identify areas where political, administrative, stakeholder, and 
other support for policies that advance multiple goals will be robust. 
Moreover, in many societies the presence of multiple objectives may 
make it easier for governments to sustain the political support needed 
for mitigation [15.2.3]. Measuring the net effect on social welfare (see 
Box TS.11) requires examining the interaction between climate policies 
and pre-existing other policies [3.6.3, 6.3.6.5].
Mitigation efforts generate tradeoffs and synergies with other 
societal goals that can be evaluated in a sustainable develop-
ment framework. The many diverse goals that societies value are 
often called ‘sustainable development’. A comprehensive assessment 
of climate policy therefore involves going beyond a narrow focus on 
distinct mitigation and adaptation options and their specific co-bene-
fits and adverse side-effects. Instead it entails incorporating climate 
issues into the design of comprehensive strategies for equitable and 
sustainable development at regional, national, and local levels [4.2, 
4.5]. Maintaining and advancing human well-being, in particular over-
coming poverty and reducing inequalities in living standards, while 
avoiding unsustainable patterns of consumption and production, are 
fundamental aspects of equitable and sustainable development [4.4, 
4.6, 4.8]. Because these aspects are deeply rooted in how societies for-
mulate and implement economic and social policies generally, they are 
critical to the adoption of effective climate policy.
Variations in goals reflect, in part, the fact that humans perceive 
risks and opportunities differently. Individuals make their decisions 
based on different goals and objectives and use a variety of different 
methods in making choices between alternative options. These choices 
and their outcomes affect the ability of different societies to cooperate 
and coordinate. Some groups put greater emphasis on near-term eco-
nomic development and mitigation costs, while others focus more on 
the longer-term ramifications of climate change for prosperity. Some 
are highly risk averse while others are more tolerant of dangers. Some 
have more resources to adapt to climate change and others have 
fewer. Some focus on possible catastrophic events while others ignore 
extreme events as implausible. Some will be relative winners, and 
some relative losers from particular climate changes. Some have more 
political power to articulate their preferences and secure their interests 
and others have less. Since AR4, awareness has grown that such con-
siderations — long the domain of psychology, behavioural economics, 
political economy, and other disciplines — need to be taken into 
account in assessing climate policy (see Box TS.3). In addition to the 
different perceptions of climate change and its risks, a variety of norms 
can also affect what humans view as acceptable behaviour. Awareness 
has grown about how such norms spread through social networks and 
ultimately affect activities, behaviours and lifestyles, and thus develop-
ment pathways, which can have profound impacts on GHG emissions 
and mitigation policy. [1.4.2, 2.4, 3.8, 3.10, 4.3]
Box TS.4 | ‘Fat tails’: unlikely vs. likely outcomes in understanding the value of mitigation
What has become known as the ‘fat-tails’ problem relates to uncer-
tainty in the climate system and its implications for mitigation and 
adaptation policies. By assessing the chain of structural uncertain-
ties that affect the climate system, the resulting compound probabil-
ity distribution of possible economic damage may have a fat right 
tail. That means that the probability of damage does not decline 
with increasing temperature as quickly as the consequences rise.
The significance of fat tails can be illustrated for the distribution 
of temperature that will result from a doubling of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide (CO2) (climate sensitivity). IPCC Working Group 
I (WGI) estimates may be used to calibrate two possible dis-
tributions, one fat-tailed and one thin-tailed, that each have a 
median temperature change of 3 °C and a 15 % probability of a 
temperature change in excess of 4.5 °C. Although the probability 
of exceeding 4.5 °C is the same for both distributions, likelihood 
drops off much more slowly with increasing temperature for the 
fat-tailed compared to the thin-tailed distribution. For example, 
the probability of temperatures in excess of 8 °C is nearly ten 
times greater with the chosen fat-tailed distribution than with 
the thin-tailed distribution. If temperature changes are character-
ized by a fat tailed distribution, and events with large impact may 
occur at higher temperatures, then tail events can dominate the 
computation of expected damages from climate change.
In developing mitigation and adaptation policies, there is value in 
recognizing the higher likelihood of tail events and their con-
sequences. In fact, the nature of the probability distribution of 
temperature change can profoundly change how climate policy 
is framed and structured. Specifically, fatter tails increase the 
importance of tail events (such as 8 °C warming). While research 
attention and much policy discussion have focused on the most 
likely outcomes, it may be that those in the tail of the probability 
distribution are more important to consider. [2.5, 3.9.2]
Box TS.3 | Deliberative and intuitive thinking are inputs to effective risk management
When people — from individual voters to key decision makers in 
firms to senior government policymakers — make choices that 
involve risk and uncertainty, they rely on deliberative as well intui-
tive thought processes. Deliberative thinking is characterized by 
the use of a wide range of formal methods to evaluate alternative 
choices when probabilities are difficult to specify and / or outcomes 
are uncertain. They can enable decision makers to compare choices 
in a systematic manner by taking into account both short and 
long-term consequences. A strength of these methods is that they 
help avoid some of the well-known pitfalls of intuitive thinking, 
such as the tendency of decision makers to favour the status quo. 
A weakness of these deliberative decision aids is that they are 
often highly complex and require considerable time and attention.
Most analytically based literature, including reports such as this 
one, is based on the assumption that individuals undertake delib-
erative and systematic analyses in comparing options. However, 
when making mitigation and adaptation choices, people are also 
likely to engage in intuitive thinking. This kind of thinking has the 
advantage of requiring less extensive analysis than deliberative 
thinking. However, relying on one’s intuition may not lead one to 
characterize problems accurately when there is limited past expe-
rience. Climate change is a policy challenge in this regard since it 
involves large numbers of complex actions by many diverse actors, 
each with their own values, goals, and objectives. Individuals are 
likely to exhibit well-known patterns of intuitive thinking such 
as making choices related to risk and uncertainty on the basis 
of emotional reactions and the use of simplified rules that have 
been acquired by personal experience. Other tendencies include 
misjudging probabilities, focusing on short time horizons, and 
utilizing rules of thumb that selectively attend to subsets of goals 
and objectives. [2.4]
By recognizing that both deliberative and intuitive modes of deci-
sion making are prevalent in the real world, risk management pro-
grammes can be developed that achieve their desired impacts. For 
example, alternative frameworks that do not depend on precise 
specification of probabilities and outcomes can be considered in 
designing mitigation and adaptation strategies for climate change. 
[2.4, 2.5, 2.6]
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Effective climate policy involves building institutions and 
capacity for governance. While there is strong evidence that a tran-
sition to a sustainable and equitable path is technically feasible, chart-
ing an effective and viable course for climate change mitigation is not 
merely a technical exercise. It will involve myriad and sequential deci-
sions among states and civil society actors. Such a process benefits 
from the education and empowerment of diverse actors to participate 
in systems of decision making that are designed and implemented 
with procedural equity as a deliberate objective. This applies at the 
national as well as international levels, where effective governance 
relating to global common resources, in particular, is not yet mature. 
Any given approach has potential winners and losers. The political 
feasibility of that approach will depend strongly on the distribution of 
power, resources, and decision-making authority among the potential 
winners and losers. In a world characterized by profound disparities, 
procedurally equitable systems of engagement, decision making and 
governance may help enable a polity to come to equitable solutions to 
the sustainable development challenge. [4.3]
Effective risk management of climate change involves consider-
ing uncertainties in possible physical impacts as well as human 
and social responses. Climate change mitigation and adaptation is 
a risk management challenge that involves many different decision-
making levels and policy choices that interact in complex and often 
unpredictable ways. Risks and uncertainties arise in natural, social, and 
technological systems. As Box TS.3 explains, effective risk management 
strategies not only consider people’s values, and their intuitive decision 
processes but utilize formal models and decision aids for systemati-
cally addressing issues of risk and uncertainty [2.4, 2.5]. Research on 
other such complex and uncertainty-laden policy domains suggest the 
importance of adopting policies and measures that are robust across 
a variety of criteria and possible outcomes [2.5]. As detailed in Box 
TS.4, a special challenge arises with the growing evidence that cli-
mate change may result in extreme impacts whose trigger points 
and outcomes are shrouded in high levels of uncertainty [2.5, 3.9.2]. 
A risk management strategy for climate change will require integrat-
ing responses in mitigation with different time horizons, adaptation to 
an array of climate impacts, and even possible emergency responses 
such as ‘geoengineering’ in the face of extreme climate impacts [1.4.2, 
3.3.7, 6.9, 13.4.4]. In the face of potential extreme impacts, the ability 
to quickly offset warming could help limit some of the most extreme 
climate impacts although deploying these geoengineering systems 
could create many other risks (see Section TS.3.1.3). One of the cen-
tral challenges in developing a risk management strategy is to have it 
adaptive to new information and different governing institutions [2.5].
TS.2 Trends in stocks and 
flows of greenhouse 
gases and their drivers
This section summarizes historical GHG emissions trends and their 
underlying drivers. As in most of the underlying literature, all aggre-
gate GHG emissions estimates are converted to CO2-equivalents based 
on Global Warming Potentials with a 100-year time horizon (GWP100) 
(Box TS.5). The majority of changes in GHG emissions trends that are 
observed in this section are related to changes in drivers such as eco-
mulate and implement economic and social policies generally, they are 
critical to the adoption of effective climate policy.
Variations in goals reflect, in part, the fact that humans perceive 
risks and opportunities differently. Individuals make their decisions 
based on different goals and objectives and use a variety of different 
methods in making choices between alternative options. These choices 
and their outcomes affect the ability of different societies to cooperate 
and coordinate. Some groups put greater emphasis on near-term eco-
nomic development and mitigation costs, while others focus more on 
the longer-term ramifications of climate change for prosperity. Some 
are highly risk averse while others are more tolerant of dangers. Some 
have more resources to adapt to climate change and others have 
fewer. Some focus on possible catastrophic events while others ignore 
extreme events as implausible. Some will be relative winners, and 
some relative losers from particular climate changes. Some have more 
political power to articulate their preferences and secure their interests 
and others have less. Since AR4, awareness has grown that such con-
siderations — long the domain of psychology, behavioural economics, 
political economy, and other disciplines — need to be taken into 
account in assessing climate policy (see Box TS.3). In addition to the 
different perceptions of climate change and its risks, a variety of norms 
can also affect what humans view as acceptable behaviour. Awareness 
has grown about how such norms spread through social networks and 
ultimately affect activities, behaviours and lifestyles, and thus develop-
ment pathways, which can have profound impacts on GHG emissions 
and mitigation policy. [1.4.2, 2.4, 3.8, 3.10, 4.3]
Box TS.4 | ‘Fat tails’: unlikely vs. likely outcomes in understanding the value of mitigation
What has become known as the ‘fat-tails’ problem relates to uncer-
tainty in the climate system and its implications for mitigation and 
adaptation policies. By assessing the chain of structural uncertain-
ties that affect the climate system, the resulting compound probabil-
ity distribution of possible economic damage may have a fat right 
tail. That means that the probability of damage does not decline 
with increasing temperature as quickly as the consequences rise.
The significance of fat tails can be illustrated for the distribution 
of temperature that will result from a doubling of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide (CO2) (climate sensitivity). IPCC Working Group 
I (WGI) estimates may be used to calibrate two possible dis-
tributions, one fat-tailed and one thin-tailed, that each have a 
median temperature change of 3 °C and a 15 % probability of a 
temperature change in excess of 4.5 °C. Although the probability 
of exceeding 4.5 °C is the same for both distributions, likelihood 
drops off much more slowly with increasing temperature for the 
fat-tailed compared to the thin-tailed distribution. For example, 
the probability of temperatures in excess of 8 °C is nearly ten 
times greater with the chosen fat-tailed distribution than with 
the thin-tailed distribution. If temperature changes are character-
ized by a fat tailed distribution, and events with large impact may 
occur at higher temperatures, then tail events can dominate the 
computation of expected damages from climate change.
In developing mitigation and adaptation policies, there is value in 
recognizing the higher likelihood of tail events and their con-
sequences. In fact, the nature of the probability distribution of 
temperature change can profoundly change how climate policy 
is framed and structured. Specifically, fatter tails increase the 
importance of tail events (such as 8 °C warming). While research 
attention and much policy discussion have focused on the most 
likely outcomes, it may be that those in the tail of the probability 
distribution are more important to consider. [2.5, 3.9.2]
Box TS.3 | Deliberative and intuitive thinking are inputs to effective risk management
When people — from individual voters to key decision makers in 
firms to senior government policymakers — make choices that 
involve risk and uncertainty, they rely on deliberative as well intui-
tive thought processes. Deliberative thinking is characterized by 
the use of a wide range of formal methods to evaluate alternative 
choices when probabilities are difficult to specify and / or outcomes 
are uncertain. They can enable decision makers to compare choices 
in a systematic manner by taking into account both short and 
long-term consequences. A strength of these methods is that they 
help avoid some of the well-known pitfalls of intuitive thinking, 
such as the tendency of decision makers to favour the status quo. 
A weakness of these deliberative decision aids is that they are 
often highly complex and require considerable time and attention.
Most analytically based literature, including reports such as this 
one, is based on the assumption that individuals undertake delib-
erative and systematic analyses in comparing options. However, 
when making mitigation and adaptation choices, people are also 
likely to engage in intuitive thinking. This kind of thinking has the 
advantage of requiring less extensive analysis than deliberative 
thinking. However, relying on one’s intuition may not lead one to 
characterize problems accurately when there is limited past expe-
rience. Climate change is a policy challenge in this regard since it 
involves large numbers of complex actions by many diverse actors, 
each with their own values, goals, and objectives. Individuals are 
likely to exhibit well-known patterns of intuitive thinking such 
as making choices related to risk and uncertainty on the basis 
of emotional reactions and the use of simplified rules that have 
been acquired by personal experience. Other tendencies include 
misjudging probabilities, focusing on short time horizons, and 
utilizing rules of thumb that selectively attend to subsets of goals 
and objectives. [2.4]
By recognizing that both deliberative and intuitive modes of deci-
sion making are prevalent in the real world, risk management pro-
grammes can be developed that achieve their desired impacts. For 
example, alternative frameworks that do not depend on precise 
specification of probabilities and outcomes can be considered in 
designing mitigation and adaptation strategies for climate change. 
[2.4, 2.5, 2.6]
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nomic growth, technological change, human behaviour, or population 
growth. But there are also some smaller changes in GHG emissions 
estimates that are due to refinements in measurement concepts and 
methods that have happened since AR4. There is a growing body of 
literature on uncertainties in global GHG emissions data sets. This sec-
tion tries to make these uncertainties explicit and reports variations in 
estimates across global data sets wherever possible.
TS.2.1 Greenhouse gas emission trends
Total anthropogenic GHG emissions have risen more rapidly 
from 2000 to 2010 than in the previous three decades (high 
confidence). Total anthropogenic GHG emissions were the highest in 
human history from 2000 to 2010 and reached 49 (± 4.5) gigatonnes 
CO2-equivalents per year (GtCO2eq / yr) in 2010.3 Current trends are at 
the high end of levels that had been projected for this last decade. 
GHG emissions growth has occurred despite the presence of a wide 
array of multilateral institutions as well as national policies aimed at 
mitigation. From 2000 to 2010, GHG emissions grew on average by 
1.0  GtCO2eq (2.2 %) per year compared to 0.4 GtCO2eq (1.3 %) per 
year over the entire period from 1970 to 2000 (Figure TS.1). The global 
economic crisis 2007 / 2008 has only temporarily reduced GHG emis-
sions. [1.3, 5.2, 13.3, 15.2.2, Figure 15.1]
3 In this summary, uncertainty in historic GHG emissions data is reported using 
90 % uncertainty intervals unless otherwise stated. GHG emissions levels are 
rounded to two significant digits throughout this document; as a consequence, 
small differences in sums due to rounding may occur.
4 FOLU (Forestry and Other Land Use) — also referred to as LULUCF (Land Use, 
Land-Use Change, and Forestry) — is the subset of Agriculture, Forestry, and Other 
Land Use (AFOLU) emissions and removals of GHGs related to direct human-
induced land use, land-use change and forestry activities excluding agricultural 
emissions (see WGIII AR5 Glossary).
5 In this report, data on non-CO2 GHGs, including fluorinated gases, are taken from 
the EDGAR database (see Annex II.9), which covers substances included in the 
Kyoto Protocol in its first commitment period.
Figure TS.1 | Total annual anthropogenic GHG emissions (GtCO2eq / yr) by groups of gases 1970 – 2010: carbon dioxide (CO2) from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes; 
CO2 from Forestry and Other Land Use4 (FOLU); methane (CH4); nitrous oxide (N2O); fluorinated gases5 covered under the Kyoto Protocol (F-gases). At the right side of the figure, 
GHG emissions in 2010 are shown again broken down into these components with the associated uncertainties (90 % confidence interval) indicated by the error bars. Total anthro-
pogenic GHG emissions uncertainties are derived from the individual gas estimates as described in Chapter 5 [5.2.3.6]. Emissions are converted into CO2-equivalents based on 
Global Warming Potentials with a 100-year time horizon (GWP100) from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR). The emissions data from FOLU represents land-based CO2 emis-
sions from forest and peat fires and decay that approximate to the net CO2 flux from FOLU as described in Chapter 11 of this report. Average annual GHG emissions growth rates 
for the four decades are highlighted with the brackets. The average annual growth rate from 1970 to 2000 is 1.3 %. [Figure 1.3]
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Figure TS.2 | Historical anthropogenic CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion, flaring, cement, and Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU)4 in five major world regions: OECD-
1990 (blue); Economies in Transition (yellow); Asia (green); Latin America and Caribbean (red); Middle East and Africa (brown). Emissions are reported in gigatonnes of CO2 per 
year (Gt CO2/ yr). Left panels show regional CO2 emissions 1750 – 2010 from: (a) the sum of all CO2 sources (c+e); (c) fossil fuel combustion, flaring, and cement; and (e) FOLU. 
The right panels report regional contributions to cumulative CO2 emissions over selected time periods from: (b) the sum of all CO2 sources (d+f); (d) fossil fuel combustion, flaring 
and cement; and (f) FOLU. Error bars on panels (b), (d) and (f) give an indication of the uncertainty range (90 % confidence interval). See Annex II.2.2 for definitions of regions. 
[Figure 5.3]
Total Anthropogenic CO2 Emissions from Fossil Fuel Combustion, Flaring, Cement, as well as Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU) 
by Region between 1750 and 2010
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Figure TS.3 | Total anthropogenic GHG emissions (GtCO2 eq/yr) by economic sectors and country income groups. Upper panel: Circle shows direct GHG emission shares (in % of 
total anthropogenic GHG emissions) of five major economic sectors in 2010. Pull-out shows how indirect CO2 emission shares (in % of total anthropogenic GHG emissions) from 
electricity and heat production are attributed to sectors of final energy use. ‘Other Energy’ refers to all GHG emission sources in the energy sector other than electricity and heat 
production. Lower panel: Total anthropogenic GHG emissions in 1970, 1990 and 2010 by five major economic sectors and country income groups. ‘Bunkers’ refer to GHG emissions 
from international transportation and thus are not, under current accounting systems, allocated to any particular nation’s territory. The emissions data from Agriculture, Forestry and 
Other Land Use (AFOLU) includes land-based CO2 emissions from forest and peat fires and decay that approximate to the net CO2 flux from the Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU) 
sub-sector as described in Chapter 11 of this report. Emissions are converted into CO2-equivalents based on Global Warming Potentials with a 100-year time horizon (GWP100) from 
the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR). Assignment of countries to income groups is based on the World Bank income classification in 2013. For details see Annex II.2.3. Sector 
definitions are provided in Annex II.9.1. [Figure 1.3, Figure 1.6]
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CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial pro-
cesses contributed about 78 % to the total GHG emissions 
increase from 1970 to 2010, with similar percentage contribu-
tion for the period 2000 – 2010 (high confidence). Fossil fuel-related 
CO2 emissions reached 32 (± 2.7) GtCO2 / yr in 2010 and grew further 
by about 3 % between 2010 and 2011 and by about 1 – 2 % between 
2011 and 2012. Since AR4, the shares of the major groups of GHG 
emissions have remained stable. Of the 49 (± 4.5) GtCO2eq / yr in total 
anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2010, CO2 remains the major GHG 
accounting for 76 % (38± 3.8 GtCO2eq / yr) of total anthropogenic GHG 
emissions. 16 % (7.8± 1.6 GtCO2eq / yr) come from methane (CH4), 
6.2 % (3.1± 1.9 GtCO2eq / yr) from nitrous oxide (N2O), and 2.0 % 
(1.0± 0.2 GtCO2eq / yr) from fluorinated gases (Figure TS.1).5 Using the 
most recent GWP100 values from the AR5 [WGI 8.7] global GHG emis-
sions totals would be slightly higher (52 GtCO2eq / yr) and non-CO2 
emission shares would be 20 % for CH4, 5.0 % for N2O and 2.2 % for 
F-gases. Emission shares are sensitive to the choice of emission metric 
and time horizon, but this has a small influence on global, long-term 
trends. If a shorter, 20-year time horizon were used, then the share 
of CO2 would decline to just over 50 % of total anthropogenic GHG 
emissions and short-lived gases would rise in relative importance. As 
detailed in Box TS.5, the choice of emission metric and time horizon 
involves explicit or implicit value judgements and depends on the pur-
pose of the analysis. [1.2, 3.9, 5.2]
Over the last four decades total cumulative CO2 emissions have 
increased by a factor of 2 from about 910 GtCO2 for the period 
1750 – 1970 to about 2000 GtCO2 for 1750 – 2010 (high confi-
dence). In 1970, the cumulative CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combus-
tion, cement production and flaring since 1750 was 420 (± 35) GtCO2; 
in 2010 that cumulative total had tripled to 1300 (± 110) GtCO2 (Fig-
ure TS.2). Cumulative CO2 emissions associated with FOLU4 since 1750 
increased from about 490 (± 180) GtCO2 in 1970 to approximately 680 
(± 300) GtCO2 in 2010. [5.2]
Regional patterns of GHG emissions are shifting along with 
changes in the world economy (high confidence). Since 2000, 
GHG emissions have been growing in all sectors, except Agriculture, 
Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU)4 where positive and negative 
emission changes are reported across different databases and uncer-
tainties in the data are high. More than 75 % of the 10 Gt increase in 
annual GHG emissions between 2000 and 2010 was emitted in the 
energy supply (47 %) and industry (30 %) sectors (see Annex II.9.I 
for sector definitions). 5.9 GtCO2eq of this sectoral increase occurred 
in upper-middle income countries,6 where the most rapid economic 
development and infrastructure expansion has taken place. GHG 
emissions growth in the other sectors has been more modest in abso-
lute (0.3 – 1.1 Gt CO2eq) as well as in relative terms (3 % – 11 %). [1.3, 
5.3, Figure 5.18]
6 When countries are assigned to income groups in this summary, the World Bank 
income classification for 2013 is used. For details see Annex II.2.3.
Figure TS.4 | Trends in GHG emissions by country income groups. Left panel: Total annual anthropogenic GHG emissions from 1970 to 2010 (GtCO2eq / yr). Middle panel: Trends in 
annual per capita mean and median GHG emissions from 1970 to 2010 (tCO2eq / cap/ yr). Right panel: Distribution of annual per capita GHG emissions in 2010 of countries within 
each country income group (tCO2 / cap/ yr). Mean values show the GHG emissions levels weighed by population. Median values describe GHG emissions levels per capita of the 
country at the 50th percentile of the distribution within each country income group. Emissions are converted into CO2-equivalents based on Global Warming Potentials with a 100-
year time horizon (GWP100) from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR). Assignment of countries to country income groups is based on the World Bank income classification in 
2013. For details see Annex II.2.3. [Figures 1.4, 1.8]
0
Pe
r 
Ca
pi
ta
 G
H
G
 E
m
is
si
on
s 
[(t
CO
2e
q/
ca
p)
/y
r]
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Pe
r 
Ca
pi
ta
 G
H
G
 E
m
is
si
on
s 
20
10
 [(
tC
O
2e
q/
ca
p)
/y
r]
0
5
10
15
25
20
LIC LMC UMC HIC
0
10
20
30
40
60
50
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
G
H
G
 E
m
is
si
on
s 
[G
tC
O
2e
q/
yr
]
2
8
6
4
10
12
14
16
22
24
18
20
Mean
Median
Total GHG Emissions
Lower Middle Income
Lower Income
High  Income
Upper Middle Income Mean
25th Percentile
75th Percentile
90th Percentile
10th Percentile
Median
46
TS
Technical Summary
Current GHG emission levels are dominated by contributions 
from the energy supply, AFOLU, and industry sectors; indus-
try and buildings gain considerably in importance if indirect 
emissions are accounted for (robust evidence, high agreement). 
Of the 49 (± 4.5) GtCO2eq emissions in 2010, 35 % (17 GtCO2eq) 
of GHG emissions were released in the energy supply sector, 24 % 
(12 GtCO2eq, net emissions) in AFOLU, 21 % (10 GtCO2eq) in indus-
try, 14 % (7.0 GtCO2eq) in transport, and 6.4 % (3.2 GtCO2eq) in 
buildings. When indirect emissions from electricity and heat produc-
tion are assigned to sectors of final energy use, the shares of the 
industry and buildings sectors in global GHG emissions grow to 31 % 
and 19 %,3 respectively (Figure TS.3 upper panel). [1.3, 7.3, 8.2, 9.2, 
10.3, 11.2]
Per capita GHG emissions in 2010 are highly unequal (high confi-
dence). In 2010, median per capita GHG emissions (1.4 tCO2eq / cap / yr) 
for the group of low-income countries are around nine times lower 
than median per capita GHG emissions (13 tCO2eq / cap / yr) of high-
income countries (Figure TS.4).6 For low-income countries, the largest 
part of GHG emissions comes from AFOLU; for high-income countries, 
GHG emissions are dominated by sources related to energy supply and 
industry (Figure TS.3 lower panel). There are substantial variations in 
per capita GHG emissions within country income groups with emis-
sions at the 90th percentile level more than double those at the 10th 
percentile level. Median per capita emissions better represent the 
typical country within a country income group comprised of heteroge-
neous members than mean per capita emissions. Mean per capita GHG 
emissions are different from median mainly in low-income countries 
as individual low-income countries have high per capita emissions due 
to large CO2 emissions from land-use change (Figure TS.4, right panel). 
[1.3, 5.2, 5.3] 
A growing share of total anthropogenic CO2 emissions is 
released in the manufacture of products that are traded across 
international borders (medium evidence, high agreement). Since 
AR4, several data sets have quantified the difference between tradi-
tional ‘territorial’ and ‘consumption-based’ emission estimates that 
assign all emission released in the global production of goods and 
services to the country of final consumption (Figure TS.5). A growing 
share of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion in middle income 
countries is released in the production of goods and services exported, 
notably from upper middle income countries to high income countries. 
Total annual industrial CO2 emissions from the non-Annex I group now 
exceed those of the Annex I group using territorial and consumption-
based accounting methods, but per-capita emissions are still markedly 
higher in the Annex I group. [1.3, 5.3]
Regardless of the perspective taken, the largest share of 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions is emitted by a small number 
of countries (high confidence). In 2010, 10 countries accounted for 
about 70 % of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial 
processes. A similarly small number of countries emit the largest share 
of consumption-based CO2 emissions as well as cumulative CO2 emis-
sions going back to 1750. [1.3]
The upward trend in global fossil fuel related CO2 emissions is 
robust across databases and despite uncertainties (high confi-
dence). Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion are known 
within 8 % uncertainty. CO2 emissions related to FOLU have very large 
uncertainties attached in the order of 50 %. Uncertainty for global 
emissions of methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and the fluorinated 
gases has been estimated as 20 %, 60 %, and 20 %. Combining these 
values yields an illustrative total global GHG uncertainty estimate 
of about 10 % (Figure TS.1). Uncertainties can increase at finer spa-
tial scales and for specific sectors. Attributing GHG emissions to the 
country of final consumption increases uncertainties, but literature on 
this topic is just emerging. GHG emissions estimates in the AR4 were 
5 – 10 % higher than the estimates reported here, but lie within the 
estimated uncertainty range.3 [5.2]
Figure TS.5 | Total annual CO2 emissions (GtCO2 / yr) from fossil fuel combustion for 
country income groups attributed on the basis of territory (solid line) and final con-
sumption (dotted line). The shaded areas are the net CO2 trade balances (differences) 
between each of the four country income groups and the rest of the world. Blue shading 
indicates that the country income group is a net importer of embodied CO2 emissions, 
leading to consumption-based emission estimates that are higher than traditional ter-
ritorial emission estimates. Orange indicates the reverse situation — the country income 
group is a net exporter of embodied CO2 emissions. Assignment of countries to country 
income groups is based on the World Bank income classification in 2013. For details see 
Annex II.2.3. [Figure 1.5]
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TS.2.2 Greenhouse gas emission drivers
This section examines the factors that have, historically, been associated 
with changes in GHG emissions levels. Typically, such analysis is based 
on a decomposition of total GHG emissions into various components 
such as growth in the economy (Gross Domestic Product (GDP) / capita), 
growth in the population (capita), the energy intensity needed per unit of 
economic output (energy / GDP) and the GHG emissions intensity of that 
energy (GHGs / energy). As a practical matter, due to data limitations and 
the fact that most GHG emissions take the form of CO2 from industry and 
energy, almost all this research focuses on CO2 from those sectors.
Globally, economic and population growth continue to be the 
most important drivers of increases in CO2 emissions from 
fossil fuel combustion. The contribution of population growth 
between 2000 and 2010 remained roughly identical to the 
previous three decades, while the contribution of economic 
growth has risen sharply (high confidence). Worldwide popula-
tion increased by 86 % between 1970 and 2010, from 3.7 to 6.9 
billion. Over the same period, income as measured through pro-
duction and/ or consumption per capita has grown by a factor of 
about two. The exact measurement of global economic growth is 
difficult because countries use different currencies and converting 
Box TS.5 | Emissions metrics depend on value judgements and contain wide uncertainties
Emission metrics provide ‘exchange rates’ for measuring 
the contributions of different GHGs to climate change. Such 
exchange rates serve a variety of purposes, including apportion-
ing mitigation efforts among several gases and aggregating 
emissions of a variety of GHGs. However, there is no metric that 
is both conceptually correct and practical to implement. Because 
of this, the choice of the appropriate metric depends on the 
application or policy at issue. [3.9.6]
GHGs differ in their physical characteristics. For example, per 
unit mass in the atmosphere, methane (CH4) causes a stronger 
instantaneous radiative forcing than CO2, but it remains in the 
atmosphere for a much shorter time. Thus, the time profiles of 
climate change brought about by different GHGs are different and 
consequential. Determining how emissions of different GHGs are 
compared for mitigation purposes involves comparing the result-
ing temporal profiles of climate change from each gas and making 
value judgments about the relative significance to humans of 
these profiles, which is a process fraught with uncertainty. [3.9.6; 
WGI 8.7]
A commonly used metric is the Global Warming Potential (GWP). 
It is defined as the accumulated radiative forcing within a specific 
time horizon (e. g., 100 years — GWP100), caused by emitting one 
kilogram of the gas, relative to that of the reference gas CO2. This 
metric is used to transform the effects of different GHG emissions 
to a common scale (CO2-equivalents).1 One strength of the GWP is 
1 In this summary, all quantities of GHG emissions are expressed in CO2-equiva-
lent (CO2eq) emissions that are calculated based on GWP100. Unless otherwise 
stated, GWP values for different gases are taken from IPCC Second Assess-
ment Report (SAR). Although GWP values have been updated several times 
since, the SAR values are widely used in policy settings, including the Kyoto 
Protocol, as well as in many national and international emission accounting 
systems. Modelling studies show that the changes in GWP100 values from 
SAR to AR4 have little impact on the optimal mitigation strategy at the global 
level. [6.3.2.5, Annex II.9.1]
that it can be calculated in a relatively transparent and straight-
forward manner. However, there are also limitations, including the 
requirement to use a specific time horizon, the focus on cumula-
tive forcing, and the insensitivity of the metric to the temporal 
profile of climate effects and its significance to humans. The choice 
of time horizon is particularly important for short-lived gases, 
notably methane: when computed with a shorter time horizon for 
GWP, their share in calculated total warming effect is larger and 
the mitigation strategy might change as a consequence. [1.2.5]
Many alternative metrics have been proposed in the scientific 
literature. All of them have advantages and disadvantages, and 
the choice of metric can make a large difference for the weights 
given to emissions from particular gases. For instance, methane’s 
GWP100 is 28 while its Global Temperature Change Potential 
(GTP), one alternative metric, is 4 for the same time horizon (AR5 
values, see WGI Section 8.7). In terms of aggregate mitigation 
costs alone, GWP100 may perform similarly to other metrics (such 
as the time-dependent Global Temperature Change Potential or 
the Global Cost Potential) of reaching a prescribed climate target; 
however, there may be significant differences in terms of the 
implied distribution of costs across sectors, regions, and over time. 
[3.9.6, 6.3.2.5]
An alternative to a single metric for all gases is to adopt a ‘multi-
basket’ approach in which gases are grouped according to their 
contributions to short and long term climate change. This may 
solve some problems associated with using a single metric, but 
the question remains of what relative importance to attach to 
reducing GHG emissions in the different groups. [3.9.6; WGI 8.7]
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individual national economic figures into global totals can be done 
in various ways. With rising population and economic output, emis-
sions of CO2 from fossil fuel combustion have risen as well. Over 
the last decade, the importance of economic growth as a driver of 
global CO2 emissions has risen sharply while population growth has 
remained roughly steady. Due to changes in technology, changes 
in the economic structure and the mix of energy sources as well 
as changes in other inputs such as capital and labour, the energy 
intensity of economic output has steadily declined worldwide. This 
decline has had an offsetting effect on global CO2 emissions that 
is nearly of the same magnitude as growth in population (Figure 
TS.6). There are only a few countries that combine economic growth 
and decreasing territorial CO2 emissions over longer periods of time. 
Such decoupling remains largely atypical, especially when consider-
ing consumption-based CO2 emissions. [1.3, 5.3]
Between 2000 and 2010, increased use of coal relative to other 
energy sources has reversed a long-standing pattern of gradual 
decarbonization of the world’s energy supply (high confidence). 
Increased use of coal, especially in developing Asia, is exacerbating 
the burden of energy-related GHG emissions (Figure TS.6). Estimates 
Box TS.6 | The use of scenarios in this report
Scenarios of how the future might evolve capture key factors of 
human development that influence GHG emissions and our ability 
to respond to climate change. Scenarios cover a range of plausible 
futures, because human development is determined by a myriad 
of factors including human decision making. Scenarios can be 
used to integrate knowledge about the drivers of GHG emissions, 
mitigation options, climate change, and climate impacts. 
One important element of scenarios is the projection of the level 
of human interference with the climate system. To this end, a set 
of four ‘representative concentration pathways’ (RCPs) has been 
developed. These RCPs reach radiative forcing levels of 2.6, 4.5, 
6.0, and 8.5 Watts per square meter (W / m2) (corresponding to 
concentrations of 450, 650, 850, and 1370 ppm CO2eq), respec-
tively, in 2100, covering the range of anthropogenic climate forc-
ing in the 21st century as reported in the literature. The four RCPs 
are the basis of a new set of climate change projections that have 
been assessed by WGI AR5. [WGI 6.4, WGI 12.4]
Scenarios of how the future develops without additional and 
explicit efforts to mitigate climate change (‘baseline scenarios’) 
and with the introduction of efforts to limit GHG emissions (‘miti-
gation scenarios’), respectively, generally include socio-economic 
projections in addition to emission, concentration, and climate 
change information. WGIII AR5 has assessed the full breadth of 
baseline and mitigation scenarios in the literature. To this end, it 
has collected a database of more than 1200 published mitigation 
and baseline scenarios. In most cases, the underlying socio-eco-
nomic projections reflect the modelling teams’ individual choices 
about how to conceptualize the future in the absence of climate 
policy. The baseline scenarios show a wide range of assump-
tions about economic growth (ranging from threefold to more 
than eightfold growth in per capita income by 2100), demand for 
energy (ranging from a 40 % to more than 80 % decline in energy 
intensity by 2100) and other factors, in particular the carbon 
intensity of energy. Assumptions about population are an excep-
tion: the vast majority of scenarios focus on the low to medium 
population range of nine to 10 billion people by 2100. Although 
the range of emissions pathways across baseline scenarios in the 
literature is broad, it may not represent the full potential range of 
possibilities (Figure TS.7). [6.3.1]
The concentration outcomes of the baseline and mitigation 
scenarios assessed by WGIII AR5 cover the full range of RCPs. 
However, they provide much more detail at the lower end, with 
many scenarios aiming at concentration levels in the range of 450, 
500, and 550 ppm CO2eq in 2100. The climate change projections 
of WGI based on RCPs, and the mitigation scenarios assessed 
by WGIII AR5 can be related to each other through the climate 
outcomes they imply. [6.2.1]
Figure TS.6 | Decomposition of the change in total annual CO2 emissions from fos-
sil fuel combustion by decade and four driving factors: population, income (GDP) per 
capita, energy intensity of GDP and carbon intensity of energy. Total emissions changes 
are indicated by a triangle. The change in emissions over each decade is measured in 
gigatonnes of CO2 per year (GtCO2/yr); income is converted into common units using 
purchasing power parities. [Figure 1.7]
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indicate that coal and unconventional gas and oil resources are large; 
therefore reducing the carbon intensity of energy may not be primar-
ily driven by fossil resource scarcity, but rather by other driving forces 
such as changes in technology, values, and socio-political choices. [5.3, 
7.2, 7.3, 7.4; SRREN Figure 1.7]
Technological innovations, infrastructural choices, and behav-
iour affect GHG emissions through productivity growth, energy- 
and carbon-intensity and consumption patterns (medium con-
fidence). Technological innovation improves labour and resource 
productivity; it can support economic growth both with increasing 
and with decreasing GHG emissions. The direction and speed of tech-
nological change depends on policies.  Technology is also central to 
the choices of infrastructure and spatial organization, such as in cit-
ies, which can have long-lasting effects on GHG emissions. In addi-
tion, a wide array of attitudes, values, and norms can inform different 
lifestyles, consumption preferences, and technological choices  all of 
which, in turn, affect patterns of GHG emissions. [5.3, 5.5, 5.6, 12.3]
Without additional efforts to reduce GHG emissions beyond 
those in place today, emissions growth is expected to persist, 
driven by growth in global population and economic activities 
despite improvements in energy supply and end-use technolo-
gies (high confidence). Atmospheric concentrations in baseline sce-
narios collected for this assessment (scenarios without explicit addi-
tional efforts to reduce GHG emissions) exceed 450 parts per million 
Figure TS.7 | Global baseline projection ranges for four emissions driving factors. Scenarios harmonized with respect to a particular factor are depicted with individual lines. Other 
scenarios are depicted as a range with median emboldened; shading reflects interquartile range (darkest), 5th – 95th percentile range (lighter), and full range (lightest), excluding 
one indicated outlier in panel a). Scenarios are filtered by model and study for each indicator to include only unique projections. Model projections and historic data are normalized 
to 1 in 2010. GDP is aggregated using base-year market exchange rates. Energy and carbon intensity are measured with respect to total primary energy. [Figure 6.1]
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(ppm) CO2eq by 2030.7 They reach CO2eq concentration levels from 
750 to more than 1300 ppm CO2eq by 2100 and result in projected 
global mean surface temperature increases in 2100 from 3.7 to 4.8 °C 
compared to pre-industrial levels8 (range based on median climate 
response; the range is 2.5 °C to 7.8 °C when including climate uncer-
tainty, see Table TS.1).9 The range of 2100 concentrations corresponds 
roughly to the range of CO2eq concentrations in the Representative 
Concentration Pathways (RCP) 6.0 and RCP8.5 pathways (see Box 
TS.6), with the majority of scenarios falling below the latter. For com-
parison, the CO2eq concentration in 2011 has been estimated to be 
430 ppm (uncertainty range 340 – 520 ppm).10 The literature does not 
systematically explore the full range of uncertainty surrounding devel-
opment pathways and possible evolution of key drivers such as popu-
lation, technology, and resources. Nonetheless, the scenarios strongly 
suggest that absent any explicit mitigation efforts, cumulative CO2 
emissions since 2010 will exceed 700 GtCO2 by 2030, 1,500 GtCO2 by 
2050, and potentially well over 4,000 GtCO2 by 2100. [6.3.1; WGI Fig-
ure SPM.5, WGI 8.5, WGI 12.3]
TS.3 Mitigation pathways and 
measures in the context of 
sustainable development
This section assesses the literature on mitigation pathways and mea-
sures in the context of sustainable development. Section TS 3.1 first 
examines the anthropogenic GHG emissions trajectories and potential 
temperature implications of mitigation pathways leading to a range 
of future atmospheric CO2eq concentrations. It then explores the tech-
nological, economic, and institutional requirements of these pathways 
along with their potential co-benefits and adverse side-effects. Section 
TS 3.2 examines mitigation options by sector and how they may inter-
act across sectors.
7 These CO2eq concentrations represent full radiative forcing, including GHGs, 
halogenated gases, tropospheric ozone, aerosols, mineral dust and albedo change.
8 Based on the longest global surface temperature dataset available, the observed 
change between the average of the period 1850 – 1900 and of the AR5 reference 
period (1986 – 2005) is 0.61 °C (5 – 95 % confidence interval: 0.55 to 0.67 °C) 
[WGI SPM.E], which is used here as an approximation of the change in global 
mean surface temperature since pre-industrial times, referred to as the period 
before 1750.
9 Provided estimates reflect the 10th to the 90th percentile of baseline scenarios 
collected for this assessment. The climate uncertainty reflects the 5th to 95th 
percentile of climate model calculations described in Table TS.1 for each scenario.
10 This is based on the assessment of total anthropogenic radiative forcing for 2011 
relative to 1750 in WGI AR5, i. e., 2.3 W m– 2, uncertainty range 1.1 to 3.3 W m– 2. 
[WGI Figure SPM.5, WGI 8.5, WGI 12.3]
TS.3.1 Mitigation pathways
TS.3.1.1 Understanding mitigation pathways in the 
context of multiple objectives
The world’s societies will need to both mitigate and adapt to cli-
mate change if it is to effectively avoid harmful climate impacts 
(robust evidence, high agreement). There are demonstrated examples 
of synergies between mitigation and adaptation [11.5.4, 12.8.1] in 
which the two strategies are complementary. More generally, the two 
strategies are related because increasing levels of mitigation imply less 
future need for adaptation. Although major efforts are now underway 
to incorporate impacts and adaptation into mitigation scenarios, inher-
ent difficulties associated with quantifying their interdependencies 
have limited their representation in models used to generate mitiga-
tion scenarios assessed in WGIII AR5 (Box TS.7). [2.6.3, 3.7.2.1, 6.3.3]
There is no single pathway to stabilize CO2eq concentrations at 
any level; instead, the literature points to a wide range of mitiga-
tion pathways that might meet any concentration level (high confi-
dence). Choices, whether deliberated or not, will determine which of these 
pathways is followed. These choices include, among other things, the 
emissions pathway to bring atmospheric CO2eq concentrations to a par-
ticular level, the degree to which concentrations temporarily exceed (over-
shoot) the long-term level, the technologies that are deployed to reduce 
emissions, the degree to which mitigation is coordinated across countries, 
the policy approaches used to achieve mitigation within and across coun-
tries, the treatment of land use, and the manner in which mitigation is 
meshed with other policy objectives such as sustainable development. 
A society’s development pathway — with its particular socioeconomic, 
institutional, political, cultural and technological features — enables and 
constrains the prospects for mitigation. At the national level, change is 
considered most effective when it reflects country and local visions and 
approaches to achieving sustainable development according to national 
circumstances and priorities. [4.2, 6.3 – 6.8, 11.8] 
Mitigation pathways can be distinguished from one another by 
a range of outcomes or requirements (high confidence). Decisions 
about mitigation pathways can be made by weighing the requirements 
of different pathways against each other. Although measures of aggre-
gate economic costs and benefits have often been put forward as key 
decision-making factors, they are far from the only outcomes that mat-
ter. Mitigation pathways inherently involve a range of synergies and 
tradeoffs connected with other policy objectives such as energy and 
food security, energy access, the distribution of economic impacts, 
local air quality, other environmental factors associated with different 
technological solutions, and economic competitiveness (Box TS.11). 
Many of these fall under the umbrella of sustainable development. 
In addition, requirements such as the rates of up-scaling of energy 
technologies or the rates of reductions in GHG emissions may provide 
important insights into the degree of challenge associated with meet-
ing a particular long-term goal. [4.5, 4.8, 6.3, 6.4, 6.6]
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TS.3.1.2 Short- and long-term requirements of mitigation 
pathways
Mitigation scenarios point to a range of technological and 
behavioral measures that could allow the world’s societies to 
follow GHG emissions pathways consistent with a range of dif-
ferent levels of mitigation (high confidence). As part of this assess-
ment, about 900 mitigation and 300 baseline scenarios have been 
collected from integrated modelling research groups around the world 
(Box TS.7). The mitigation scenarios span atmospheric concentration 
levels in 2100 from 430 ppm CO2eq to above 720 ppm CO2eq, which 
is roughly comparable to the 2100 forcing levels between the RCP2.6 
and RCP6.0 scenarios (Figure TS.8, left panel). Scenarios have been 
constructed to reach mitigation goals under very different assump-
tions about energy demands, international cooperation, technologies, 
the contributions of CO2 and other forcing agents to atmospheric 
CO2eq concentrations, and the degree to which concentrations tem-
porarily exceed the long-term goal (concentration overshoot, see Box 
TS.8). Other scenarios were also assessed, including some scenarios 
with concentrations in 2100 below 430 ppm CO2eq (for a discussion of 
these scenarios see below). [6.3]
Limiting atmospheric peak concentrations over the course of 
the century — not only reaching long-term concentration lev-
els — is critical for limiting transient temperature change (high 
confidence). Scenarios reaching concentration levels of about 500 ppm 
CO2eq by 2100 are more likely than not to limit temperature change 
to less than 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels, unless they temporar-
ily ‘overshoot’ concentration levels of roughly 530 ppm CO2eq before 
2100. In this case, they are about as likely as not to achieve that goal. 
The majority of scenarios reaching long-term concentrations of about 
450 ppm CO2eq in 2100 are likely to keep temperature change below 
2 °C over the course of the century relative to pre-industrial levels 
(Table TS.1, Box TS.8). Scenarios that reach 530 to 650 ppm CO2eq 
concentrations by 2100 are more unlikely than likely to keep tempera-
ture change below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels. Scenarios that 
exceed about 650 ppm CO2eq by 2100 are unlikely to limit tempera-
ture change to below 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels. Mitigation 
Box TS.7 | Scenarios from integrated models can help to understand how actions affect outcomes 
in complex systems
The long-term scenarios assessed in this report were generated 
primarily by large-scale computer models, referred to here as 
‘integrated models’, because they attempt to represent many of 
the most important interactions among technologies, relevant 
human systems (e. g., energy, agriculture, the economic system), 
and associated GHG emissions in a single integrated framework. 
A subset of these models is referred to as ‘integrated assessment 
models’, or IAMs. IAMs include not only an integrated representa-
tion of human systems, but also of important physical processes 
associated with climate change, such as the carbon cycle, and 
sometimes representations of impacts from climate change. Some 
IAMs have the capability of endogenously balancing impacts 
with mitigation costs, though these models tend to be highly 
aggregated. Although aggregate models with representations 
of mitigation and damage costs can be very useful, the focus in 
this assessment is on integrated models with sufficient sectoral 
and geographic resolution to understand the evolution of key 
processes such as energy systems or land systems.
Scenarios from integrated models are invaluable to help under-
stand how possible actions or choices might lead to different 
future outcomes in these complex systems. They provide quan-
titative, long-term projections (conditional on our current state 
of knowledge) of many of the most important characteristics 
of mitigation pathways while accounting for many of the most 
important interactions between the various relevant human and 
natural systems. For example, they provide both regional and 
global information about emissions pathways, energy and land-
use transitions, and aggregate economic costs of mitigation.
At the same time, these integrated models have particular 
characteristics and limitations that should be considered when 
interpreting their results. Many integrated models are based 
on the rational choice paradigm for decision making, exclud-
ing the consideration of some behavioural factors. The models 
approximate cost-effective solutions that minimize the aggregate 
economic costs of achieving mitigation outcomes, unless they 
are specifically constrained to behave otherwise. Scenarios from 
these models capture only some of the dimensions of develop-
ment pathways that are relevant to mitigation options, often only 
minimally treating issues such as distributional impacts of mitiga-
tion actions and consistency with broader development goals. In 
addition, the models in this assessment do not effectively account 
for the interactions between mitigation, adaptation, and climate 
impacts. For these reasons, mitigation has been assessed indepen-
dently from climate impacts. Finally, and most fundamentally, inte-
grated models are simplified, stylized, numerical approaches for 
representing enormously complex physical and social systems, and 
scenarios from these models are based on uncertain projections 
about key events and drivers over often century-long timescales. 
Simplifications and differences in assumptions are the reason why 
output generated from different models — or versions of the same 
model — can differ, and projections from all models can differ 
considerably from the reality that unfolds. [3.7, 6.2]
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scenarios in which temperature increase is more likely than not to be 
less than 1.5 °C relative to pre-industrial levels by 2100 are character-
ized by concentrations in 2100 of below 430 ppm CO2eq. Temperature 
peaks during the century and then declines in these scenarios. [6.3]
Mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq in 2100 
typically involve temporary overshoot of atmospheric concen-
trations, as do many scenarios reaching about 500 ppm or about 
550 ppm CO2eq in 2100 (high confidence). Concentration overshoot 
means that concentrations peak during the century before descend-
ing toward their 2100 levels. Overshoot involves less mitigation in the 
near term, but it also involves more rapid and deeper emissions reduc-
tions in the long run. The vast majority of scenarios reaching about 
450 ppm CO2eq in 2100 involve concentration overshoot, since most 
models cannot reach the immediate, near-term emissions reductions 
that would be necessary to avoid overshoot of these concentration 
levels. Many scenarios have been constructed to reach about 550 ppm 
CO2eq by 2100 without overshoot. 
Depending on the level of overshoot, many overshoot sce-
narios rely on the availability and widespread deployment of 
bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS) 
and / or afforestation in the second half of the century (high con-
fidence). These and other carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies 
and methods remove CO2 from the atmosphere (negative emissions). 
Scenarios with overshoot of greater than 0.4 W / m2 (>  35 – 50 ppm 
CO2eq concentration) typically deploy CDR technologies to an extent 
that net global CO2 emissions become negative in the second-half of 
the century (Figure TS.8, right panel). CDR is also prevalent in many 
scenarios without concentration overshoot to compensate for residual 
emissions from sectors where mitigation is more expensive. The avail-
ability and potential of BECCS, afforestation, and other CDR technolo-
gies and methods are uncertain and CDR technologies and methods 
are, to varying degrees, associated with challenges and risks. There is 
uncertainty about the potential for large-scale deployment of BECCS, 
large-scale afforestation, and other CDR technologies and methods. 
[6.3, 6.9]
Reaching atmospheric concentration levels of about 450 to about 
500 ppm CO2eq by 2100 will require substantial cuts in anthro-
pogenic GHG emissions by mid-century (high confidence). Scenarios 
reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 are associated with GHG emis-
sions reductions of about 40 % to 70 % by 2050 compared to 2010 and 
emissions levels near zero GtCO2eq or below in 2100.11 Scenarios with 
GHG emissions reductions in 2050 at the lower end of this range are 
characterized by a greater reliance on CDR technologies beyond mid-
century. The majority of scenarios that reach about 500 ppm CO2eq in 
2100 without overshooting roughly 530 ppm CO2eq at any point during 
the century are associated with GHG emissions reductions of 40 % to 
55 % by 2050 compared to 2010 (Figure TS.8, left panel; Table TS.1). In 
contrast, in some scenarios in which concentrations rise to well above 
530 ppm CO2eq during the century before descending to concentrations 
below this level by 2100, emissions rise to as high as 20 % above 2010 
levels in 2050. However, these high-overshoot scenarios are character-
ized by negative global emissions of well over 20 GtCO2 per year in the 
second half of the century (Figure TS.8, right panel). Cumulative CO2 
11 This range differs from the range provided for a similar concentration category in 
AR4 (50 % to 85 % lower than 2000 for CO2 only). Reasons for this difference 
include that this report has assessed a substantially larger number of scenarios 
than in AR4 and looks at all GHGs. In addition, a large proportion of the new 
scenarios include Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) technologies and associated 
increases in concentration overshoot. Other factors include the use of 2100 con-
centration levels instead of stabilization levels and the shift in reference year from 
2000 to 2010.
Figure TS.8 | Development of total GHG emissions for different long-term concentration levels (left panel) and for scenarios reaching about 450 to about 500 (430 – 530) ppm 
CO2eq in 2100 with and without net negative CO2 emissions larger than 20 GtCO2 / yr (right panel). Ranges are given for the 10th – 90th percentile of scenarios. [Figure 6.7]
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emissions between 2011 and 2100 are 630 – 1180 GtCO2 in scenarios 
reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq in 2100; they are 960 – 1550 GtCO2 in 
scenarios reaching about 500 ppm CO2eq in 2100. The variation in cumu-
lative CO2 emissions across scenarios is due to differences in the contri-
bution of non-CO2 GHGs and other radiatively active substances as well 
as the timing of mitigation (Table TS.1). [6.3]
In order to reach atmospheric concentration levels of about 450 
to about 500 ppm CO2eq by 2100, the majority of mitigation 
relative to baseline emissions over the course of century will 
occur in the non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries (high confidence). In scenarios that 
attempt to cost-effectively allocate emissions reductions across coun-
tries and over time, the total CO2eq emissions reductions from baseline 
emissions in non-OECD countries are greater than in OECD countries. 
This is, in large part, because baseline emissions from the non-OECD 
countries are projected to be larger than those from the OECD coun-
tries, but it also derives from higher carbon intensities in non-OECD 
countries and different terms of trade structures. In these scenarios, 
GHG emissions peak earlier in the OECD countries than in the non-
OECD countries. [6.3]
Reaching atmospheric concentration levels of about 450 to 
about 650 ppm CO2eq by 2100 will require large-scale changes 
to global and national energy systems over the coming decades 
(high confidence). Scenarios reaching atmospheric concentrations lev-
els of about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq by 2100 are characterized by 
a tripling to nearly a quadrupling of the global share of zero- and low-
carbon energy supply from renewables, nuclear energy, fossil energy 
with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS), and bioenergy with 
CCS (BECCS), by the year 2050 relative to 2010 (about 17 %) (Figure 
TS.10, left panel). The increase in total global low-carbon energy sup-
Box TS.8 | Assessment of temperature change in the context of mitigation scenarios
Long-term climate goals have been expressed both in terms of 
concentrations and temperature. Article 2 of the UNFCCC calls 
for the need to ‘stabilize’ concentrations of GHGs. Stabilization of 
concentrations is generally understood to mean that the CO2eq 
concentration reaches a specific level and then remains at that level 
indefinitely until the global carbon and other cycles come into a new 
equilibrium. The notion of stabilization does not necessarily preclude 
the possibility that concentrations might exceed, or ‘overshoot’ 
the long-term goal before eventually stabilizing at that goal. The 
possibility of ‘overshoot’ has important implications for the required 
GHG emissions reductions to reach a long-term concentration level. 
Concentration overshoot involves less mitigation in the near term 
with more rapid and deeper emissions reductions in the long run. 
The temperature response of the concentration pathways assessed 
in this report focuses on transient temperature change over the 
course of the century. This is an important difference with WGIII 
AR4, which focused on the long-term equilibrium temperature 
response, a state that is reached millennia after the stabilization 
of concentrations. The temperature outcomes in this report are 
thus not directly comparable to those presented in the WGIII AR4 
assessment. One reason that this assessment focuses on transient 
temperature response is that it is less uncertain than the equilib-
rium response and correlates more strongly with GHG emissions 
in the near and medium term. An additional reason is that the 
mitigation pathways assessed in WGIII AR5 do not extend beyond 
2100 and are primarily designed to reach specific concentration 
goals for the year 2100. The majority of these pathways do not 
stabilize concentrations in 2100, which makes the assessment of 
the equilibrium temperature response ambiguous and dependent 
on assumptions about post-2100 emissions and concentrations.
Transient temperature goals might be defined in terms of the 
temperature in a specific year (e. g., 2100), or based on never 
exceeding a particular level. This report explores the implications 
of both types of goals. The assessment of temperature goals are 
complicated by the uncertainty that surrounds our understanding 
of key physical relationships in the earth system, most notably 
the relationship between concentrations and temperature. It is 
not possible to state definitively whether any long-term con-
centration pathway will limit either transient or equilibrium 
temperature change to below a specified level. It is only possible 
to express the temperature implications of particular concentra-
tion pathways in probabilistic terms, and such estimates will 
be dependent on the source of the probability distribution of 
different climate parameters and the climate model used for 
analysis. This report employs the MAGICC model and a distribu-
tion of climate parameters that results in temperature outcomes 
with dynamics similar to those from the Earth System Models 
assessed in WGI AR5. For each emissions scenario, a median 
transient temperature response is calculated to illustrate the 
variation of temperature due to different emissions pathways. 
In addition, a transient temperature range for each scenario is 
provided, reflecting the climate system uncertainties. Information 
regarding the full distribution of climate parameters was utilized 
for estimating the likelihood that the scenarios would limit tran-
sient temperature change to below specific levels (Table TS.1). 
Providing the combination of information about the plausible 
range of temperature outcomes as well as the likelihood of meet-
ing different targets is of critical importance for policymaking, 
since it facilitates the assessment of different climate objectives 
from a risk management perspective. [2.5.7.2, 6.3.2]
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Table TS.1 | Key characteristics of the scenarios collected and assessed for WGIII AR5. For all parameters, the 10th to 90th percentile of the scenarios is shown.1, 2 [Table 6.3] 
CO2eq 
Concentrations 
in 2100 [ppm 
CO2eq] 
Category label 
(concentration 
range)9
Subcategories
Relative 
position of 
the RCPs5
Cumulative CO2 
emissions3  [GtCO2]
Change in CO2eq emissions 
compared to 2010 in [%]4
Temperature change (relative to 1850 – 1900)5, 6
2011 – 2050 2011 – 2100 2050 2100
2100 
Temperature 
change [°C]7
Likelihood of staying below temperature 
level over the 21st century8
1.5 °C 2.0 °C 3.0 °C 4.0 °C
< 430 Only a limited number of individual model studies have explored levels below 430 ppm CO2eq
450  
(430 – 480)
Total range1, 10 RCP2.6 550 – 1300 630 – 1180 − 72 to − 41 − 118 to − 78
1.5 – 1.7 
(1.0 – 2.8)
More unlikely 
than likely
Likely
Likely
Likely
500  
(480 – 530)
No overshoot of 
530 ppm CO2eq
860 – 1180 960 – 1430 − 57 to − 42 − 107 to − 73
1.7 – 1.9 
(1.2 – 2.9)
Unlikely
More likely 
than not
Overshoot of 
530 ppm CO2eq
1130 – 1530 990 – 1550 − 55 to − 25 − 114 to − 90
1.8 – 2.0 
(1.2 – 3.3)
About as 
likely as not
550  
(530 – 580)
No overshoot of 
580 ppm CO2eq
1070 – 1460 1240 – 2240 − 47 to − 19 − 81 to − 59
2.0 – 2.2 
(1.4 – 3.6)
More unlikely 
than likely12
Overshoot of 
580 ppm CO2eq
1420 – 1750 1170 – 2100 − 16 to 7 − 183 to − 86
2.1 – 2.3 
(1.4 – 3.6)
(580 – 650) Total range
RCP4.5
1260 – 1640 1870 – 2440 − 38 to 24 − 134 to − 50
2.3 – 2.6 
(1.5 – 4.2)
(650 – 720) Total range 1310 – 1750 2570 – 3340 − 11 to 17 − 54 to − 21
2.6 – 2.9 
(1.8 – 4.5)
Unlikely
More likely 
than not
(720 – 1000)2 Total range RCP6.0 1570 – 1940 3620 – 4990 18 to 54 − 7 to 72
3.1 – 3.7 
(2.1 – 5.8)
Unlikely11
More unlikely 
than likely
> 10002 Total range RCP8.5 1840 – 2310 5350 – 7010 52 to 95 74 to 178
4.1 – 4.8 
(2.8 – 7.8)
Unlikely11 Unlikely
More unlikely 
than likely
Notes:
1 The ‘total range’ for the 430 – 480 ppm CO2eq scenarios corresponds to the range of the 10th – 90th percentile of the subcategory of these scenarios shown in Table 6.3. 
2 Baseline scenarios (see TS.2.2) fall into the > 1000 and 720 – 1000 ppm CO2eq categories. The latter category also includes mitigation scenarios. The baseline scenarios in the 
latter category reach a temperature change of 2.5 – 5.8 °C above preindustrial in 2100. Together with the baseline scenarios in the > 1000 ppm CO2eq category, this leads to 
an overall 2100 temperature range of 2.5 – 7.8 °C (range based on median climate response: 3.7 – 4.8 °C) for baseline scenarios across both concentration categories.
3 For comparison of the cumulative CO2 emissions estimates assessed here with those presented in WGI AR5, an amount of 515 [445 – 585] GtC (1890 [1630 – 2150] GtCO2), 
was already emitted by 2011 since 1870 [WGI 12.5]. Note that cumulative CO2 emissions are presented here for different periods of time (2011 – 2050 and 2011 – 2100) 
while cumulative CO2 emissions in WGI AR5 are presented as total compatible emissions for the RCPs (2012 – 2100) or for total compatible emissions for remaining below a 
given temperature target with a given likelihood [WGI Table SPM.3, WGI SPM.E.8].      
4 The global 2010 emissions are 31 % above the 1990 emissions (consistent with the historic GHG emissions estimates presented in this report). CO2eq emissions include the 
basket of Kyoto gases (CO2, CH4, N2O as well as F-gases).
5 The assessment in WGIII AR5 involves a large number of scenarios published in the scientific literature and is thus not limited to the RCPs. To evaluate the CO2eq concen-
tration and climate implications of these scenarios, the MAGICC model was used in a probabilistic mode (see Annex II). For a comparison between MAGICC model results 
and the outcomes of the models used in WGI, see Sections WGI 12.4.1.2, WGI 12.4.8 and 6.3.2.6. Reasons for differences with WGI SPM Table.2 include the difference in 
reference year (1986 – 2005 vs. 1850 – 1900 here), difference in reporting year (2081 – 2100 vs 2100 here), set-up of simulation (CMIP5 concentration-driven versus MAGICC 
emission-driven here), and the wider set of scenarios (RCPs versus the full set of scenarios in the WGIII AR5 scenario database here). 
6 Temperature change is reported for the year 2100, which is not directly comparable to the equilibrium warming reported in WGIII AR4 [Table 3.5, Chapter 3; see also WGIII 
AR5 6.3.2]. For the 2100 temperature estimates, the transient climate response (TCR) is the most relevant system property. The assumed 90 % range of the TCR for MAGICC 
is 1.2 – 2.6 °C (median 1.8 °C). This compares to the 90 % range of TCR between 1.2 – 2.4 °C for CMIP5 [WGI 9.7] and an assessed likely range of 1 – 2.5 °C from multiple 
lines of evidence reported in the WGI AR5 [Box 12.2 in Section 12.5]. 
7 Temperature change in 2100 is provided for a median estimate of the MAGICC calculations, which illustrates differences between the emissions pathways of the scenarios 
in each category. The range of temperature change in the parentheses includes in addition the carbon cycle and climate system uncertainties as represented by the MAGICC 
model [see 6.3.2.6 for further details]. The temperature data compared to the 1850 – 1900 reference year was calculated by taking all projected warming relative to 
1986 – 2005, and adding 0.61 °C for 1986 – 2005 compared to 1850 – 1900, based on HadCRUT4 [see WGI Table SPM.2]. 
8 The assessment in this table is based on the probabilities calculated for the full ensemble of scenarios in WGIII AR5 using MAGICC and the assessment in WGI AR5 of the 
uncertainty of the temperature projections not covered by climate models. The statements are therefore consistent with the statements in WGI AR5, which are based on the 
CMIP5 runs of the RCPs and the assessed uncertainties. Hence, the likelihood statements reflect different lines of evidence from both WGs. This WGI method was also applied 
for scenarios with intermediate concentration levels where no CMIP5 runs are available. The likelihood statements are indicative only [6.3], and follow broadly the terms used 
by the WGI AR5 SPM for temperature projections: likely 66 – 100 %, more likely than not > 50 – 100 %, about as likely as not 33 – 66 %, and unlikely 0 – 33 %. In addition the 
term more unlikely than likely 0 – < 50 % is used.
9 The CO2-equivalent concentration includes the forcing of all GHGs including halogenated gases and tropospheric ozone, as well as aerosols and albedo change (calculated on 
the basis of the total forcing from a simple carbon cycle / climate model, MAGICC).
10 The vast majority of scenarios in this category overshoot the category boundary of 480 ppm CO2eq concentrations.
11  For scenarios in this category no CMIP5 run [WGI Chapter 12, Table 12.3] as well as no MAGICC realization [6.3] stays below the respective temperature level. Still, an 
unlikely assignment is given to reflect uncertainties that might not be reflected by the current climate models. 
12  Scenarios in the 580 – 650 ppm CO2eq category include both overshoot scenarios and scenarios that do not exceed the concentration level at the high end of the category 
(like RCP4.5). The latter type of scenarios, in general, have an assessed probability of more unlikely than likely to stay below the 2 °C temperature level, while the former are 
mostly assessed to have an unlikely probability of staying below this level.
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ply is from three-fold to seven-fold over this same period. Many mod-
els could not reach 2100 concentration levels of about 450 ppm CO2eq 
if the full suite of low-carbon technologies is not available. Studies 
indicate a large potential for energy demand reductions, but also indi-
cate that demand reductions on their own would not be sufficient to 
bring about the reductions needed to reach levels of about 650 ppm 
CO2eq or below by 2100. [6.3, 7.11]
Mitigation scenarios indicate a potentially critical role for land-
related mitigation measures and that a wide range of alter-
native land transformations may be consistent with similar 
concentration levels (medium confidence). Land-use dynamics in 
mitigation scenarios are heavily influenced by the production of bioen-
ergy and the degree to which afforestation is deployed as a negative-
emissions, or CDR option. They are, in addition, influenced by forces 
independent of mitigation such as agricultural productivity improve-
ments and increased demand for food. The range of land-use trans-
formations depicted in mitigation scenarios reflects a wide range of 
differing assumptions about the evolution of all of these forces. Many 
scenarios reflect strong increases in the degree of competition for land 
between food, feed, and energy uses. [6.3, 6.8, 11.4.2]
Delaying mitigation efforts beyond those in place today 
through 2030 will increase the challenges of, and reduce the 
options for, limiting atmospheric concentration levels from 
about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq by the end of the century 
(high confidence). Cost-effective mitigation scenarios leading to atmo-
spheric concentration levels of about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq at 
the end of the 21st century are typically characterized by annual GHG 
emissions in 2030 of roughly between 30 GtCO2eq and 50 GtCO2eq. 
Scenarios with emissions above 55 GtCO2eq in 2030 are character-
ized by substantially higher rates of emissions reductions from 2030 
to 2050 (median emissions reductions of about 6 % / yr as compared to 
just over 3 % / yr) (Figure TS.9, right panel); much more rapid scale-up of 
low-carbon energy over this period (more than a tripling compared to 
a doubling of the low-carbon energy share) (Figure TS.10, right panel); 
Figure TS.9 | The implications of different 2030 GHG emissions levels for the rate of CO2 emissions reductions from 2030 to 2050 in mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 to 
about 500 (430 – 530) ppm CO2eq concentrations by 2100. The scenarios are grouped according to different emissions levels by 2030 (coloured in different shades of green). The 
left panel shows the pathways of GHG emissions (GtCO2eq / yr) leading to these 2030 levels. The black bar shows the estimated uncertainty range of GHG emissions implied by the 
Cancún Pledges. Black dot with whiskers gives historic GHG emission levels and associated uncertainties in 2010 as reported in Figure TS.1. The right panel denotes the average 
annual CO2 emissions reduction rates for the period 2030 – 2050. It compares the median and interquartile range across scenarios from recent intermodel comparisons with explicit 
2030 interim goals to the range of scenarios in the Scenario Database for WGIII AR5. Annual rates of historical emissions change between 1900 – 2010 (sustained over a period 
of 20 years) and the average annual emissions change between 2000 – 2010 are shown in grey. Note: Scenarios with large net negative global emissions (> 20 GtCO2 / yr) are not 
included in the WGIII AR5 scenario range, but rather shown as independent points. Only scenarios that apply the full, unconstrained mitigation technology portfolio of the underlying 
models (default technology assumption) are shown. Scenarios with exogenous carbon price assumptions or other policies affecting the timing of mitigation (other than 2030 interim 
targets) as well as scenarios with 2010 emissions significantly outside the historical range are excluded. [Figure 6.32, 13.13.1.3]
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a larger reliance on CDR technologies in the long-term (Figure TS.8, 
right panel); and higher transitional and long term economic impacts 
(Table TS.2, orange segments, Figure TS.13, right panel). Due to these 
increased challenges, many models with 2030 GHG emissions in this 
range could not produce scenarios reaching atmospheric concentra-
tions levels of about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq in 2100. [6.4, 7.11]
Estimated global GHG emissions levels in 2020 based on the 
Cancún Pledges are not consistent with cost-effective long-
term mitigation trajectories that reach atmospheric concen-
trations levels of about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq by 2100, 
but they do not preclude the option to meet that goal (robust 
evidence, high agreement). The Cancún Pledges are broadly consis-
tent with cost-effective scenarios reaching about 550 ppm CO2eq to 
650 ppm CO2eq by 2100. Studies confirm that delaying mitigation 
through 2030 has a substantially larger influence on the subsequent 
challenges of mitigation than do delays through 2020 (Figures TS.9, 
TS.11). [6.4]
Only a limited number of studies have explored scenarios that 
are more likely than not to bring temperature change back to 
below 1.5 °C by 2100 relative to pre-industrial levels; these 
scenarios bring atmospheric concentrations to below 430 ppm 
CO2eq by 2100 (high confidence). Assessing this goal is currently dif-
ficult because no multi-model study has explored these scenarios. The 
limited number of published studies exploring this goal have produced 
associated scenarios that are characterized by (1) immediate mitiga-
tion; (2) the rapid up-scaling of the full portfolio of mitigation technol-
ogies; and (3) development along a low-energy demand trajectory.12 
[6.3, 7.11] 
TS.3.1.3 Costs, investments and burden sharing
Globally comprehensive and harmonized mitigation actions 
would result in significant economic benefits compared to frag-
mented approaches, but would require establishing effective 
institutions (high confidence). Economic analysis of mitigation scenar-
ios demonstrates that globally comprehensive and harmonized mitiga-
tion actions achieve mitigation at least aggregate economic cost, since 
they allow mitigation to be undertaken where and when it is least 
expensive (see Box TS.7, Box TS.9). Most of these mitigation scenarios 
assume a global carbon price, which reaches all sectors of the econ-
omy. Instruments with limited coverage of GHG emissions reductions 
among sectors and climate policy regimes with fragmented regional 
12 In these scenarios, the cumulative CO2 emissions range between 680 – 800 GtCO2 
for the period 2011 – 2050 and between 90 – 310 GtCO2 for the period 
2011 – 2100. Global CO2eq emissions in 2050 are between 70 – 95 % below 2010 
emissions, and they are between 110 – 120 % below 2010 emissions in 2100.
Figure TS.10 | The up-scaling of low-carbon energy in scenarios meeting different 2100 CO2eq concentration levels (left panel). The right panel shows the rate of up-scaling subject 
to different 2030 GHG emissions levels in mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 to about 500 (430 – 530) ppm CO2eq concentrations by 2100. Colored bars show the inter-
quartile range and white bars indicate the full range across the scenarios, excluding those with large, global net negative CO2 emissions (> 20 GtCO2 / yr). Scenarios with large net 
negative global emissions are shown as individual points. The arrows indicate the magnitude of zero- and low-carbon energy supply up-scaling from 2030 to 2050. Zero- and low-
carbon energy supply includes renewables, nuclear energy, fossil energy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS), and bioenergy with CCS (BECCS). Note: Only scenarios that 
apply the full, unconstrained mitigation technology portfolio of the underlying models (default technology assumption) are shown. Scenarios with exogenous carbon price assump-
tions are excluded in both panels. In the right panel, scenarios with policies affecting the timing of mitigation other than 2030 interim targets are also excluded. [Figure 7.16]
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Figure TS.11 | Near-term GHG emissions from mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 to about 500 (430 – 530) ppm CO2eq concentrations by 2100. The Figure includes only 
scenarios for which temperature exceedance probabilities were calculated. Individual model results are indicated with a data point when 2 °C exceedance probability is below 50 % 
as assessed by a simple carbon cycle/climate model (MAGICC). Colours refer to scenario classification in terms of whether net CO2 emissions become negative before 2100 (nega-
tive vs. no negative) and the timing of international participation in climate mitigation (immediate vs. delay until 2020 vs. delay until 2030). Number of reported individual results 
is shown in legend. The range of global GHG emissions in 2020 implied by the Cancún Pledges is based on analysis of alternative interpretations of national pledges. Note: In the 
WGIII AR5 scenario database, only four reported scenarios were produced based on delayed mitigation without net negative emissions while still lying below 530 ppm CO2eq by 
2100. They do not appear in the figure, because the model had insufficient coverage of non-gas species to enable a temperature calculation. Delay in these scenarios extended 
only to 2020, and their emissions fell in the same range as the ‘No Negative / Immediate’ category. Delay scenarios include both delayed global mitigation and fragmented action 
scenarios. [Figure 6.31, 13.13.1.3]
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action increase aggregate economic costs. These cost increases are 
higher at more ambitious levels of mitigation. [6.3.6]
Estimates of the aggregate economic costs of mitigation vary 
widely, but increase with stringency of mitigation (high confi-
dence). Most cost-effective scenarios collected for this assessment that 
are based on the assumptions that all countries of the world begin 
mitigation immediately, there is a single global carbon price applied to 
well-functioning markets, and key technologies are available, estimate 
that reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 would entail global con-
sumption losses of 1 % to 4 % in 2030 (median: 1.7 %), 2 % to 6 % in 
2050 (median: 3.4 %), and 3 % to 11 % in 2100 (median: 4.8 %) relative 
to consumption in baseline scenarios (those without additional miti-
gation efforts) that grows anywhere from 300 % to more than 900 % 
between 2010 and 2100 (baseline consumption growth represents the 
full range of corresponding baseline scenarios; Figure TS.12; Table TS.2 
yellow segments). The consumption losses correspond to an annual 
average reduction of consumption growth by 0.06 to 0.2 percentage 
points from 2010 through 2030 (median: 0.09), 0.06 to 0.17 percentage 
points through 2050 (median: 0.09), and 0.04 to 0.14 percentage points 
over the century (median: 0.06). These numbers are relative to annual 
average consumption growth rates in baseline scenarios between 1.9 % 
and 3.8 % per year through 2050 and between 1.6 % and 3 % per year 
over the century (Table TS.2, yellow segments). These mitigation cost 
estimates do not consider the benefits of reduced climate change or 
co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation (Box TS.9). Costs for 
maintaining concentrations in the range of 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq are 
estimated to be roughly one-third to two-thirds lower than for associ-
ated 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq scenarios. Cost estimates from scenarios can 
vary substantially across regions. Substantially higher cost estimates 
have been obtained based on assumptions about less idealized policy 
implementations and limits on technology availability as discussed 
below. Both higher and lower estimates have been obtained based on 
interactions with pre-existing distortions, non-climate market failures, 
or complementary policies. [6.3.6.2]
Delaying mitigation efforts beyond those in place today through 
2030 or beyond could substantially increase mitigation costs 
in the decades that follow and the second half of the century 
(high confidence). Although delays in mitigation by any major emitter 
will reduce near-term mitigation costs, they will also result in more 
investment in carbon-intensive infrastructure and then rely on future 
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decision makers to undertake a more rapid, deeper, and costlier future 
transformation of this infrastructure. Studies have found that aggre-
gate costs, and associated carbon prices, rise more rapidly to higher 
levels in scenarios with delayed mitigation compared to scenarios 
where mitigation is undertaken immediately. Recent modelling stud-
ies have found that delayed mitigation through 2030 can substantially 
increase the aggregate costs of meeting 2100 concentrations of about 
450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq, particularly in scenarios with emissions 
greater than 55 GtCO2eq in 2030. (Figure TS.13, right panel; Table TS.2, 
orange segments) [6.3.6.4]
The technological options available for mitigation greatly influ-
ence mitigation costs and the challenges of reaching atmo-
spheric concentration levels of about 450 to about 550 ppm 
CO2eq by 2100 (high confidence). Many models in recent model inter-
comparisons could not produce scenarios reaching atmospheric con-
centrations of about 450 ppm CO2eq by 2100 with broadly pessimistic 
assumptions about key mitigation technologies. In these studies, the 
character and availability of CCS and bioenergy were found to have a 
particularly important influence on the mitigation costs and the chal-
lenges of reaching concentration levels in this range. For those mod-
els that could produce such scenarios, pessimistic assumptions about 
these increased discounted global mitigation costs of reaching concen-
tration levels of about 450 and about 550 ppm CO2eq by the end of 
the century significantly, with the effect being larger for more strin-
gent mitigation scenarios (Figure TS.13, left panel; Table TS.2, grey seg-
ments). The studies also showed that reducing energy demand could 
potentially decrease mitigation costs significantly. [6.3.6.3]
The distribution of mitigation costs among different countries 
depends in part on the nature of effort-sharing frameworks 
and thus need not be the same as the distribution of mitiga-
tion efforts. Different effort-sharing frameworks draw upon 
different ethical principles (medium confidence). In cost-effective 
scenarios reaching concentrations of about 450 to about 550 ppm 
CO2eq in 2100, the majority of mitigation investments over the course 
Table TS.2 | Global mitigation costs in cost-effective scenarios1 and estimated cost increases due to assumed limited availability of specific technologies and delayed additional mit-
igation. Cost estimates shown in this table do not consider the benefits of reduced climate change as well as co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation. The yellow columns 
show consumption losses (Figure TS.12, right panel) and annualized consumption growth reductions in cost-effective scenarios relative to a baseline development without climate 
policy. The grey columns show the percentage increase in discounted costs2 over the century, relative to cost-effective scenarios, in scenarios in which technology is constrained 
relative to default technology assumptions (Figure TS.13, left panel).3 The orange columns show the increase in mitigation costs over the periods 2030 – 2050 and 2050 – 2100, rela-
tive to scenarios with immediate mitigation, due to delayed additional mitigation through 2030 (see Figure TS.13, right panel).4 These scenarios with delayed additional mitigation 
are grouped by emission levels of less or more than 55 GtCO2eq in 2030, and two concentration ranges in 2100 (430 – 530 ppm CO2eq and 530 – 650 ppm CO2eq). In all figures, 
the median of the scenario set is shown without parentheses, the range between the 16th and 84th percentile of the scenario set is shown in the parentheses, and the number of 
scenarios in the set is shown in square brackets.5 [Figures TS.12, TS.13, 6.21, 6.24, 6.25, Annex II.10] 
Consumption losses in cost-effective scenarios1 
Increase in total discounted mitigation costs in 
scenarios with limited availability of technologies
Increase in medium- and long-term 
mitigation costs due to delayed 
additional mitigation until 2030 
[% reduction in consumption 
relative to baseline]
[percentage point reduction in 
annualized consumption growth rate]
[% increase in total discounted 
mitigation costs (2015 – 2100) relative 
to default technology assumptions]
[% increase in mitigation costs 
relative to immediate mitigation]
Concentration 
in 2100  
[ppm CO2eq]
2030 2050 2100
2010 
 – 2030
2010 
 – 2050
2010 
 – 2100
No CCS
Nuclear 
phase 
out
Limited 
Solar / 
Wind
Limited 
Bioenergy
≤ 55 GtCO2eq > 55 GtCO2eq
2030 – 
2050
2050 – 
2100
2030 – 
2050
2050 – 
2100
450 (430 – 480) 
1.7 
(1.0 – 3.7) 
[N: 14]
3.4 
(2.1 – 6.2)
4.8 
(2.9 – 11.4)
0.09 
(0.06–0.2)
0.09 
(0.06–0.17)
0.06 
(0.04–0.14)
138 
(29 – 297) 
[N: 4]
7 
(4 – 18) 
[N: 8]
6 
(2 – 29) 
[N: 8]
64 
(44 – 78) 
[N: 8] 28 
(14 – 50) 
[N: 34]
15 
(5 – 59) 
44 
(2 – 78) 
[N: 29]
37 
(16 – 82) 
500 (480 – 530)
1.7 
(0.6 – 2.1) 
[N: 32]
2.7 
(1.5 – 4.2)
4.7 
(2.4 – 10.6)
0.09 
(0.03–0.12)
0.07 
(0.04–0.12)
0.06 
(0.03–0.13)
N / A N / A N / A N / A
550 (530 – 580)
0.6  
(0.2 – 1.3) 
[N: 46]
1.7 
(1.2 – 3.3)
3.8 
(1.2 – 7.3)
0.03 
(0.01–0.08)
0.05 
(0.03–0.08)
0.04 
(0.01–0.09)
39 
(18 – 78) 
[N: 11]
13 
(2 – 23) 
[N: 10]
8 
(5 – 15) 
[N: 10]
18 
(4 – 66) 
[N: 12] 3 
(− 5 – 16) 
[N: 14]
4 
(− 4 – 11) 
15 
(3 – 32) 
[N: 10]
16 
(5 – 24) 
580 – 650 
0.3 
(0 – 0.9) 
[N: 16]
1.3 
(0.5 – 2.0)
2.3 
(1.2 – 4.4)
0.02 
(0–0.04)
0.03 
(0.01–0.05)
0.03 
(0.01–0.05)
N / A N / A N / A N / A
Notes:
1 Cost-effective scenarios assume immediate mitigation in all countries and a single global carbon price. In this analysis, they also impose no additional limitations on technol-
ogy relative to the models’ default technology assumptions.
2 Percentage increase of net present value of consumption losses in percent of baseline consumption (for scenarios from general equilibrium models) and abatement costs in 
percent of baseline GDP (for scenarios from partial equilibrium models) for the period 2015 – 2100, discounted (see Box TS.10) at 5 % per year.
3 No CCS: CCS is not included in these scenarios. Nuclear phase out: No addition of nuclear power plants beyond those under construction, and operation of existing plants 
until the end of their lifetime. Limited Solar / Wind: a maximum of 20 % global electricity generation from solar and wind power in any year of these scenarios. Limited Bioen-
ergy: a maximum of 100 EJ / yr modern bioenergy supply globally (modern bioenergy used for heat, power, combinations, and industry was around 18 EJ / yr in 2008 [11.13.5]).
4 Percentage increase of total undiscounted mitigation costs for the periods 2030 – 2050 and 2050 – 2100.
5 The range is determined by the central scenarios encompassing the 16th and 84th percentile of the scenario set. Only scenarios with a time horizon until 2100 are included. 
Some models that are included in the cost ranges for concentration levels above 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100 could not produce associated scenarios for concentration levels 
below 530 ppm CO2eq in 2100 with assumptions about limited availability of technologies and / or delayed additional mitigation (see caption of Figure TS.13 for more details). 
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Box TS.9 | The meaning of ‘mitigation cost’ in the context of mitigation scenarios
Mitigation costs represent one component of the change in 
human welfare from climate change mitigation. Mitigation costs 
are expressed in monetary terms and generally are estimated 
against baseline scenarios, which typically involve continued, and 
sometimes substantial, economic growth and no additional and 
explicit mitigation efforts [3.9.3, 6.3.6]. Because mitigation cost 
estimates focus only on direct market effects, they do not take 
into account the welfare value (if any) of co-benefits or adverse 
side-effects of mitigation actions (Box TS.11) [3.6.3]. Further, these 
costs do not capture the benefits of reducing climate impacts 
through mitigation (Box TS.2).
There are a wide variety of metrics of aggregate mitigation 
costs used by economists, measured in different ways or at 
different places in the economy, including changes in GDP, 
consumption losses, equivalent variation and compensating 
variation, and loss in consumer and producer surplus. Consump-
tion losses are often used as a metric because they emerge from 
many integrated models and they directly impact welfare. They 
can be expressed as a reduction in overall consumption relative 
to consumption in the corresponding baseline scenario in a 
given year or as a reduction of the average rate of consumption 
growth in the corresponding baseline scenario over a given time 
period. 
Mitigation costs need to be distinguished from emissions prices. 
Emissions prices measure the cost of an additional unit of emis-
sions reduction; that is, the marginal cost. In contrast, mitigation 
costs usually represent the total costs of all mitigation. In addition, 
emissions prices can interact with other policies and measures, such 
as regulatory policies directed at GHG reduction. If mitigation is 
achieved partly by these other measures, emissions prices may not 
reflect the actual costs of an additional unit of emissions reductions 
(depending on how additional emissions reductions are induced).
In general, estimates of global aggregate mitigation costs over 
the coming century from integrated models are based on largely 
stylized assumptions about both policy approaches and existing 
markets and policies, and these assumptions have an important 
influence on cost estimates. For example, cost-effective idealized 
implementation scenarios assume a uniform price on CO2 and 
other GHGs in every country and sector across the globe, and 
constitute the least cost approach in the idealized case of largely 
efficient markets without market failures other than the climate 
change externality. Most long-term, global scenarios do not 
account for the interactions between mitigation and pre-existing 
or new policies, market failures, and distortions. Climate policies 
can interact with existing policies to increase or reduce the actual 
cost of climate policies. [3.6.3.3, 6.3.6.5]
Figure TS.12 | Global carbon prices (left panel) and consumption losses (right panel) over time in cost-effective, idealized implementation scenarios. Consumption losses are 
expressed as the percentage reduction from consumption in the baseline. The number of scenarios included in the boxplots is indicated at the bottom of the panels. The 2030 num-
bers also apply to 2020 and 2050. The number of scenarios outside the figure range is noted at the top. Note: The figure shows only scenarios that reported consumption losses (a 
subset of models with full coverage of the economy) or carbon prices, respectively, to 2050 or 2100. Multiple scenarios from the same model with similar characteristics are only 
represented by a single scenario in the sample. [Figure 6.21]
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of century occur in the non-OECD countries. Some studies exploring 
particular effort-sharing frameworks, under the assumption of a global 
carbon market, estimate that the associated financial flows could be 
in the order of hundred billions of USD per year before mid-century to 
bring concentrations to between about 450 and about 500 ppm CO2eq 
in 2100. Most studies assume efficient mechanisms for international 
carbon markets, in which case economic theory and empirical research 
suggest that the choice of effort sharing allocations will not meaning-
fully affect the globally efficient levels of regional abatement or aggre-
gate global costs. Actual approaches to effort-sharing can deviate from 
this assumption. [3.3, 6.3.6.6, 13.4.2.4]
Geoengineering denotes two clusters of technologies that are 
quite distinct: carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and solar radia-
tion management (SRM). Mitigation scenarios assessed in AR5 
do not assume any geoengineering options beyond large-scale 
CDR due to afforestation and BECCS. CDR techniques include affor-
estation, using bioenergy along with CCS (BECCS), and enhancing 
uptake of CO2 by the oceans through iron fertilization or increasing 
alkalinity. Most terrestrial CDR techniques would require large-scale 
land-use changes and could involve local and regional risks, while 
maritime CDR may involve significant transboundary risks for ocean 
ecosystems, so that its deployment could pose additional challenges 
for cooperation between countries. With currently known technologies, 
CDR could not be deployed quickly on a large scale. SRM includes vari-
ous technologies to offset crudely some of the climatic effects of the 
build-up of GHGs in the atmosphere. It works by adjusting the planet’s 
heat balance through a small increase in the reflection of incoming 
sunlight such as by injecting particles or aerosol precursors in the 
upper atmosphere. SRM has attracted considerable attention, mainly 
Figure TS.13 | Left panel shows the relative increase in net present value mitigation costs (2015 – 2100, discounted at 5 % per year) from technology portfolio variations relative to 
a scenario with default technology assumptions. Scenario names on the horizontal axis indicate the technology variation relative to the default assumptions: No CCS = unavailabil-
ity of carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS); Nuclear phase out = No addition of nuclear power plants beyond those under construction; existing plants operated until the end 
of their lifetime; Limited Solar / Wind = a maximum of 20 % global electricity generation from solar and wind power in any year of these scenarios; Limited Bioenergy = a maximum 
of 100 exajoules per year (EJ / yr) modern bioenergy supply globally. [Figure 6.24] Right panel shows increase in long-term mitigation costs for the period 2050 – 2100 (sum over 
undiscounted costs) as a function of reduced near-term mitigation effort, expressed as the relative change between scenarios implementing mitigation immediately and those that 
correspond to delayed additional mitigation through 2020 or 2030 (referred to here as ‘mitigation gap’). The mitigation gap is defined as the difference in cumulative CO2 emis-
sions reductions until 2030 between the immediate and delayed additional mitigation scenarios. The bars in the lower right panel indicate the mitigation gap range where 75 % 
of scenarios with 2030 emissions above (dark blue) and below (red) 55 GtCO2, respectively, are found. Not all model simulations of delayed additional mitigation until 2030 could 
reach the lower concentration goals of about 450 or 500 (430 – 530) ppm CO2eq (for 2030 emissions above 55 GtCO2eq, 29 of 48 attempted simulations could reach the goal; for 
2030 emissions below 55 GtCO2eq, 34 of 51 attempted simulations could reach the goal). [Figure 6.25]
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because of the potential for rapid deployment in case of climate emer-
gency. The suggestion that deployment costs for individual technolo-
gies could potentially be low could result in new challenges for inter-
national cooperation because nations may be tempted to prematurely 
deploy unilaterally systems that are perceived to be inexpensive. Con-
sequently, SRM technologies raise questions about costs, risks, gover-
nance, and ethical implications of developing and deploying SRM, with 
special challenges emerging for international institutions, norms and 
other mechanisms that could coordinate research and restrain testing 
and deployment. [1.4, 3.3.7, 6.9, 13.4.4]
Knowledge about the possible beneficial or harmful effects of 
SRM is highly preliminary. SRM would have varying impacts on 
regional climate variables such as temperature and precipitation, and 
might result in substantial changes in the global hydrological cycle 
with uncertain regional effects, for example on monsoon precipita-
tion. Non-climate effects could include possible depletion of strato-
spheric ozone by stratospheric aerosol injections. A few studies have 
begun to examine climate and non-climate impacts of SRM, but there 
is very little agreement in the scientific community on the results or 
on whether the lack of knowledge requires additional research or 
eventually field testing of SRM-related technologies. [1.4, 3.3.7, 6.9, 
13.4.4]
TS.3.1.4 Implications of mitigation pathways for other 
objectives
Mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 to about 500 ppm 
CO2eq by 2100 show reduced costs for achieving energy secu-
rity and air quality objectives (medium confidence) (Figure TS.14, 
lower panel). The mitigation costs of most of the scenarios in this 
assessment do not consider the economic implications of the cost 
reductions for these other objectives (Box TS.9). There is a wide range 
of co-benefits and adverse side-effects other than air quality and 
energy security (Tables TS.4 – 8). The impact of mitigation on the over-
all costs for achieving many of these other objectives as well as the 
associated welfare implications are less well understood and have 
not been assessed thoroughly in the literature (Box TS.11). [3.6.3, 
4.8, 6.6]
Box TS.10 | Future goods should be discounted at an appropriate rate
Investments aimed at mitigating climate change will bear fruit 
far in the future, much of it more than 100 years from now. To 
decide whether a particular investment is worthwhile, its future 
benefits need to be weighed against its present costs. In doing 
this, economists do not normally take a quantity of commodities 
at one time as equal in value to the same quantity of the same 
commodities at a different time. They normally give less value 
to later commodities than to earlier ones. They ‘discount’ later 
commodities, that is to say. The rate at which the weight given to 
future goods diminishes through time is known as the ‘discount 
rate’ on commodities.
There are two types of discount rates used for different purposes. 
The market discount rate reflects the preferences of presently 
living people between present and future commodities. The social 
discount rate is used by society to compare benefits of present 
members of society with those not yet born. Because living people 
may be impatient, and because future people do not trade in 
the market, the market may not accurately reflect the value of 
commodities that will come to future people relative to those that 
come to present people. So the social discount rate may differ 
from the market rate. 
The chief reason for social discounting (favouring present people 
over future people) is that commodities have ‘diminishing 
marginal benefit’ and per capita income is expected to increase 
over time. Diminishing marginal benefit means that the value of 
extra commodities to society declines as people become better 
off. If economies continue to grow, people who live later in time 
will on average be better off — possess more commodities — than 
people who live earlier. The faster the growth and the greater the 
degree of diminishing marginal benefit, the greater should be the 
discount rate on commodities. If per capita growth is expected to 
be negative (as it is in some countries), the social discount rate 
may be negative.
Some authors have argued, in addition, that the present genera-
tion of people should give less weight to later people’s well-being 
just because they are more remote in time. This factor would add 
to the social discount rate on commodities.
The social discount rate is appropriate for evaluating mitigation 
projects that are financed by reducing current consumption. If a 
project is financed partly by ‘crowding out’ other investments, the 
benefits of those other investments are lost, and their loss must 
be counted as an opportunity cost of the mitigation project. If a 
mitigation project crowds out an exactly equal amount of other 
investment, then the only issue is whether or not the mitiga-
tion investment produces a greater return than the crowded-out 
investment. This can be tested by evaluating the mitigation 
investment using a discount rate equal to the return that would 
have been expected from the crowded out investment. If the 
market functions well, this will be the market discount rate. 
[3.6.2]
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Figure TS.14 | Co-benefits of mitigation for energy security and air quality in scenarios with stringent climate policies reaching about 450 to about 500 (430 – 530) ppm CO2eq 
concentrations in 2100. Upper panels show co-benefits for different security indicators and air pollutant emissions. Lower panel shows related global policy costs of achieving the 
energy security, air quality, and mitigation objectives, either alone (w, x, y) or simultaneously (z). Integrated approaches that achieve these objectives simultaneously show the high-
est cost-effectiveness due to synergies (w + x + y > z). Policy costs are given as the increase in total energy system costs relative to a baseline scenario without additional efforts to 
reduce GHG emissions beyond those in place today. Costs are indicative and do not represent full uncertainty ranges. [Figure 6.33] 
Mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 to about 500 ppm 
CO2eq by 2100 show co-benefits for energy security objectives, 
enhancing the sufficiency of resources to meet national energy 
demand as well as the resilience of the energy system (medium 
confidence). These mitigation scenarios show improvements in terms 
of the diversity of energy sources and reduction of energy imports, 
resulting in energy systems that are less vulnerable to price volatility 
and supply disruptions (Figure TS.14, upper left panel). [6.3.6, 6.6, 7.9, 
8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.13.6, 12.8]
Mitigation policy could devalue fossil fuel assets and reduce 
revenues for fossil fuel exporters, but differences between 
regions and fuels exist (high confidence). Most mitigation scenarios 
are associated with reduced revenues from coal and oil trade for major 
exporters (high confidence). However, a limited number of studies find 
that mitigation policies could increase the relative competitiveness of 
conventional oil vis-à-vis more carbon-intensive unconventional oil 
and ‘coal-to-liquids’. The effect of mitigation on natural gas export rev-
enues is more uncertain, with some studies showing possible benefits 
for export revenues in the medium term until about 2050 (medium 
confidence). The availability of CCS would reduce the adverse effect 
of mitigation on the value of fossil fuel assets (medium confidence). 
[6.3.6, 6.6, 14.4.2]
Fragmented mitigation policy can provide incentives for emis-
sion-intensive economic activity to migrate away from a region 
that undertakes mitigation (medium confidence). Scenario studies 
have shown that such ‘carbon leakage’ rates of energy-related emis-
sions are relatively contained, often below 20 % of the emissions 
reductions. Leakage in land-use emissions could be substantial, though 
fewer studies have quantified it. While border tax adjustments are 
seen as enhancing the competitiveness of GHG- and trade-intensive 
industries within a climate policy regime, they can also entail welfare 
losses for non-participating, and particularly developing, countries. 
[5.4, 6.3, 13.8, 14.4]
Mitigation scenarios leading to atmospheric concentration lev-
els of about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2eq in 2100 are associated 
with significant co-benefits for air quality and related human 
health and ecosystem impacts. The benefits from major cuts in 
air pollutant emissions are particularly high where currently 
legislated and planned air pollution controls are weak (high con-
fidence). Stringent mitigation policies result in co-controls with major 
cuts in air pollutant emissions significantly below baseline scenarios 
(Figure TS.14, upper right panel). Co-benefits for health are particularly 
high in today’s developing world. The extent to which air pollution 
policies, targeting for example black carbon (BC), can mitigate climate 
change is uncertain. [5.7, 6.3, 6.6, 7.9, 8.7, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6, 
12.8; WGII 11.9]
There is a wide range of possible adverse side-effects as well 
as co-benefits and spillovers from climate policy that have not 
been well-quantified (high confidence). Whether or not side-effects 
materialize, and to what extent side-effects materialize, will be case- 
and site-specific, as they will depend on local circumstances and the 
scale, scope, and pace of implementation. Important examples include 
biodiversity conservation, water availability, food security, income dis-
tribution, efficiency of the taxation system, labour supply and employ-
ment, urban sprawl, and the sustainability of the growth of developing 
countries. (Box TS.11)
Some mitigation policies raise the prices for some energy 
services and could hamper the ability of societies to expand 
access to modern energy services to underserved populations 
(low confidence). These potential adverse side-effects can be 
avoided with the adoption of complementary policies (medium 
confidence). Most notably, about 1.3 billion people worldwide do not 
have access to electricity and about 3 billion are dependent on tradi-
tional solid fuels for cooking and heating with severe adverse effects 
on health, ecosystems and development. Providing access to modern 
energy services is an important sustainable development objective. 
The costs of achieving nearly universal access to electricity and clean 
fuels for cooking and heating are projected to be between 72 to 95 
billion USD per year until 2030 with minimal effects on GHG emis-
sions (limited evidence, medium agreement). A transition away from 
the use of traditional biomass13 and the more efficient combustion of 
solid fuels reduce air pollutant emissions, such as sulfur dioxide (SO2), 
nitrogen oxides (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO), and black carbon (BC), 
and thus yield large health benefits (high confidence). [4.3, 6.6, 7.9, 
9.3, 9.7, 11.13.6, 16.8]
The effect of mitigation on water use depends on technologi-
cal choices and the portfolio of mitigation measures (high con-
fidence). While the switch from fossil energy to renewable energy like 
photovoltaic (PV) or wind can help reducing water use of the energy 
system, deployment of other renewables, such as some forms of hydro-
power, concentrated solar power (CSP), and bioenergy may have 
adverse effects on water use. [6.6, 7.9, 9.7, 10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6]
13 Traditional biomass refers to the biomass — fuelwood, charcoal, agricultural resi-
dues, and animal dung — used with the so-called traditional technologies such as 
open fires for cooking, rustic kilns and ovens for small industries (see Glossary).
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Box TS.11 | Accounting for the co-benefits and adverse side-effects of mitigation
A government policy or a measure intended to achieve one objec-
tive (such as mitigation) will also affect other objectives (such as 
local air quality). To the extent these side-effects are positive, they 
can be deemed ‘co-benefits’; otherwise they are termed ‘adverse 
side-effects’. In this report, co-benefits and adverse side-effects 
are measured in non-monetary units. Determining the value of 
these effects to society is a separate issue. The effects of co-ben-
efits on social welfare are not evaluated in most studies, and one 
reason is that the value of a co-benefit depends on local circum-
stances and can be positive, zero, or even negative. For example, 
the value of the extra tonne of sulfur dioxide (SO2) reduction 
that occurs with mitigation depends greatly on the stringency 
of existing SO2 control policies: in the case of weak existing SO2 
policy, the value of SO2 reductions may be large, but in the case 
of stringent existing SO2 policy it may be near zero. If SO2 policy 
is too stringent, the value of the co-benefit may be negative 
(assuming SO2 policy is not adjusted). While climate policy affects 
non-climate objectives (Tables TS.4 – 8) other policies also affect 
climate change outcomes. [3.6.3, 4.8, 6.6, Glossary]
Mitigation can have many potential co-benefits and adverse 
side-effects, which makes comprehensive analysis difficult. The 
direct benefits of climate policy include, for example, intended 
effects on global mean surface temperature, sea level rise, agri-
cultural productivity, biodiversity, and health effects of global 
warming [WGII TS]. The co-benefits and adverse side-effects of 
climate policy could include effects on a partly overlapping set 
of objectives such as local air pollutant emissions reductions 
and related health and ecosystem impacts, biodiversity con-
servation, water availability, energy and food security, energy 
access, income distribution, efficiency of the taxation system, 
labour supply and employment, urban sprawl, and the sustain-
ability of the growth of developing countries [3.6, 4.8, 6.6, 
15.2].
All these side-effects are important, because a comprehensive 
evaluation of climate policy needs to account for benefits and 
costs related to other objectives. If overall social welfare is to 
be determined and quantified, this would require valuation 
methods and a consideration of pre-existing efforts to attain 
the many objectives. Valuation is made difficult by factors such 
as interaction between climate policies and pre-existing non-
climate policies, externalities, and non-competitive behaviour. 
[3.6.3]
Mitigation scenarios and sectoral studies show that overall the 
potential for co-benefits of energy end-use measures outweigh 
the potential adverse side-effects, whereas the evidence sug-
gests this may not be the case for all energy supply and AFOLU 
measures (high confidence). (Tables TS.4 – 8) [4.8, 5.7, 6.6, 7.9, 8.7, 
9.7, 10.8, 11.7, 11.13.6, 12.8]
TS.3.2 Sectoral and cross-sectoral mitigation 
measures
Anthropogenic GHG emissions result from a broad set of human 
activities, most notably those associated with energy supply and con-
sumption and with the use of land for food production and other 
purposes. A large proportion of emissions arise in urban areas. Miti-
gation options can be grouped into three broad sectors: (1) energy 
supply, (2) energy end-use sectors including transport, buildings, 
industry, and (3) AFOLU. Emissions from human settlements and 
infrastructures cut across these different sectors. Many mitigation 
options are linked. The precise set of mitigation actions taken in any 
sector will depend on a wide range of factors, including their relative 
economics, policy structures, normative values, and linkages to other 
policy objectives. The first section examines issues that cut across 
the sectors and the following subsections examine the sectors them-
selves. 
TS.3.2.1 Cross-sectoral mitigation pathways and 
measures
Without new mitigation policies GHG emissions are projected 
to grow in all sectors, except for net CO2 emissions in the 
AFOL U 14 sector (robust evidence, medium agreement). Energy sup-
ply sector emissions are expected to continue to be the major source 
of GHG emissions in baseline scenarios, ultimately accounting for the 
significant increases in indirect emissions from electricity use in the 
buildings and the industry sectors. Deforestation decreases in most of 
the baseline scenarios, which leads to a decline in net CO2 emissions 
from the AFOLU sector. In some scenarios the AFOLU sector changes 
from an emission source to a net emission sink towards the end of the 
century. (Figure TS.15) [6.3.1.4, 6.8]
Infrastructure developments and long-lived products that lock 
societies into GHG-intensive emissions pathways may be dif-
ficult or very costly to change, reinforcing the importance of 
early action for ambitious mitigation (robust evidence, high agree-
ment). This lock-in risk is compounded by the lifetime of the infrastruc-
ture, by the difference in emissions associated with alternatives, and 
14 Net AFOLU CO2 emissions include emissions and removals of CO2 from the AFOLU 
sector, including land under forestry and, in some assessments, CO2 sinks in agri-
cultural soils.
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the magnitude of the investment cost. As a result, lock-in related to 
infrastructure and spatial planning is the most difficult to eliminate, 
and thus avoiding options that lock high emission patterns in perma-
nently is an important part of mitigation strategies in regions with rap-
idly developing infrastructure. In mature or established cities, options 
are constrained by existing urban forms and infrastructure, and limits 
on the potential for refurbishing or altering them. However, materials, 
products and infrastructure with long lifetimes and low lifecycle emis-
sions can ensure positive lock-in as well as avoid emissions through 
dematerialization (i. e., through reducing the total material inputs 
required to deliver a final service). [5.6.3, 6.3.6.4, 9.4, 10.4, 12.3, 12.4] 
Systemic and cross-sectoral approaches to mitigation are 
expected to be more cost-effective and more effective in cut-
ting emissions than sector-by-sector policies (medium confi-
dence). Cost-effective mitigation policies need to employ a system 
perspective in order to account for inter-dependencies among differ-
ent economic sectors and to maximize synergistic effects. Stabiliz-
ing atmospheric CO2eq concentrations at any level will ultimately 
require deep reductions in emissions and fundamental changes to 
both the end-use and supply-side of the energy system as well as 
changes in land-use practices and industrial processes. In addition, 
many low-carbon energy supply technologies (including CCS) and 
their infrastructural requirements face public acceptance issues lim-
iting their deployment. This applies also to the adoption of new tech-
nologies, and structural and behavioural change, in the energy end-
use sectors (robust evidence, high agreement) [7.9.4, 8.7, 9.3.10, 
9.8, 10.8, 11.3, 11.13]. Lack of acceptance may have implications 
not only for mitigation in that particular sector, but also for wider 
mitigation efforts. 
Integrated models identify three categories of energy system 
related mitigation measures: the decarbonization of the energy 
supply sector, final energy demand reductions, and the switch to 
low-carbon energy carriers, including electricity, in the energy 
end-use sectors (robust evidence, high agreement) [6.3.4, 6.8, 7.11]. 
The broad range of sectoral mitigation options available mainly relate 
to achieving reductions in GHG emissions intensity, energy intensity 
and changes in activity (Table TS.3) [7.5, 8.3, 8.4, 9.3, 10.4, 12.4]. Direct 
options in AFOLU involve storing carbon in terrestrial systems (for 
example, through afforestation) and providing bioenergy feedstocks 
[11.3, 11.13]. Options to reduce non-CO2 GHG emissions exist across 
all sectors, but most notably in agriculture, energy supply, and industry. 
Demand reductions in the energy end-use sectors, due to, e.g., 
efficiency enhancement and behavioural change, are a key miti-
Figure TS.15 | Direct (left panel) and direct and indirect emissions (right panel) of CO2 and non-CO2 GHGs across sectors in baseline scenarios. Non-CO2 GHGs are converted to 
CO2-equivalents based on Global Warming Potentials with a 100-year time horizon from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) (see Box TS.5). Note that in the case of indirect 
emissions, only electricity generation emissions are allocated from energy supply to end-use sectors. In the left panel electricity sector emissions are shown (Electricity*) in addition 
to energy supply sector emissions which they are part of, to illustrate their large role on the energy supply side. The numbers at the bottom refer to the number of scenarios included 
in the ranges that differ across sectors and time due to different sectoral resolutions and time horizons of models. [Figure 6.34]
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gation strategy and affect the scale of the mitigation challenge 
for the energy supply side (high confidence). Limiting energy demand: 
(1) increases policy choices by maintaining flexibility in the technology 
portfolio; (2) reduces the required pace for up-scaling low-carbon energy 
supply technologies and hedges against related supply-side risks (Fig-
ure TS.16); (3) avoids lock-in to new, or potentially premature retirement 
of, carbon-intensive infrastructures; (4) maximizes co-benefits for other 
policy objectives, since the potential for co-benefits of energy end-use 
measures outweighs the potential for adverse side-effects which may 
not be the case for all supply-side measures (see Tables TS.4 – 8); and 
(5) increases the cost-effectiveness of the transformation (as compared 
to mitigation strategies with higher levels of energy demand) (medium 
confidence). However, energy service demand reductions are unlikely in 
developing countries or for poorer population segments whose energy 
service levels are low or partially unmet. [6.3.4, 6.6, 7.11, 10.4]
Behaviour, lifestyle, and culture have a considerable influence 
on energy use and associated emissions, with a high mitigation 
potential in some sectors, in particular when complementing 
technological and structural change (medium evidence, medium 
agreement). Emissions can be substantially lowered through: changes 
in consumption patterns (e. g., mobility demand and mode, energy use 
in households, choice of longer-lasting products); dietary change and 
reduction in food wastes; and change of lifestyle (e. g., stabilizing / low-
ering consumption in some of the most developed countries, sharing 
economy and other behavioural changes affecting activity) (Table 
TS.3). [8.1, 8.9, 9.2, 9.3, Box 10.2, 10.4, 11.4, 12.4, 12.6, 12.7] 
Evidence from mitigation scenarios indicates that the decar-
bonization of energy supply is a key requirement for stabiliz-
ing atmospheric CO2eq concentrations below 580 ppm (robust 
evidence, high agreement). In most long-term mitigation scenarios not 
exceeding 580 ppm CO2eq by 2100, global energy supply is fully decar-
bonized at the end of the 21st century with many scenarios relying on 
a net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere. However, because exist-
ing supply systems are largely reliant on carbon-intensive fossil fuels, 
energy intensity reductions can equal or outweigh decarbonization of 
energy supply in the near term. In the buildings and industry sector, for 
example, efficiency improvements are an important strategy for reduc-
ing indirect emissions from electricity generation (Figure TS.15). In the 
long term, the reduction in electricity generation emissions is accom-
panied by an increase in the share of electricity in end uses (e. g., for 
Figure TS.16 | Influence of energy demand on the deployment of energy supply technologies in 2050 in mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 to about 500 (430 – 530) ppm 
CO2eq concentrations by 2100. Blue bars for ‘low energy demand’ show the deployment range of scenarios with limited growth of final energy of < 20 % in 2050 compared 
to 2010. Red bars show the deployment range of technologies in case of ‘high energy demand’ (> 20 % growth in 2050 compared to 2010). For each technology, the median, 
interquartile, and full deployment range is displayed. Notes: Scenarios assuming technology restrictions and scenarios with final energy in the base-year outside ± 5 % of 2010 
inventories are excluded. Ranges include results from many different integrated models. Multiple scenario results from the same model were averaged to avoid sampling biases; see 
Chapter 6 for further details. [Figure 7.11]
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space and process heating, and potentially for some modes of trans-
port). Deep emissions reductions in transport are generally the last to 
emerge in integrated modelling studies because of the limited options 
to switch to low-carbon energy carriers compared to buildings and 
industry (Figure TS.17). [6.3.4, 6.8, 8.9, 9.8, 10.10, 7.11, Figure 6.17]
The availability of CDR technologies affects the size of the miti-
gation challenge for the energy end-use sectors (robust evidence, 
high agreement) [6.8, 7.11]. There are strong interdependencies in 
mitigation scenarios between the required pace of decarbonization of 
energy supply and end-use sectors. The more rapid decarbonization of 
supply generally provides more flexibility for the end-use sectors. How-
ever, barriers to decarbonizing the supply side, resulting for example 
from a limited availability of CCS to achieve negative emissions when 
combined with bioenergy, require a more rapid and pervasive decar-
bonisation of the energy end-use sectors in scenarios achieving low-
CO2eq concentration levels (Figure TS.17). The availability of mature 
large-scale biomass supply for energy, or carbon sequestration tech-
nologies in the AFOLU sector also provides flexibility for the develop-
ment of mitigation technologies in the energy supply and energy end-
use sectors [11.3] (limited evidence, medium agreement), though there 
may be adverse impacts on sustainable development. 
Spatial planning can contribute to managing the development 
of new infrastructure and increasing system-wide efficiencies 
across sectors (robust evidence, high agreement). Land use, transport 
choice, housing, and behaviour are strongly interlinked and shaped by 
infrastructure and urban form. Spatial and land-use planning, such as 
mixed-zoning, transport-oriented development, increasing density, and 
co-locating jobs and homes can contribute to mitigation across sectors 
by (1) reducing emissions from travel demand for both work and lei-
sure, and enabling non-motorized transport, (2) reducing floor space for 
housing, and hence (3) reducing overall direct and indirect energy use 
through efficient infrastructure supply. Compact and in-fill development 
of urban spaces and intelligent densification can save land for agricul-
ture and bioenergy and preserve land carbon stocks. [8.4, 9.10, 10.5, 
11.10, 12.2, 12.3] 
Interdependencies exist between adaptation and mitigation at 
the sectoral level and there are benefits from considering adap-
tation and mitigation in concert (medium evidence, high agree-
ment). Particular mitigation actions can affect sectoral climate vulner-
ability, both by influencing exposure to impacts and by altering the 
capacity to adapt to them [8.5, 11.5]. Other interdependencies include 
climate impacts on mitigation options, such as forest conservation or 
hydropower production [11.5.5, 7.7], as well as the effects of particular 
adaptation options, such as heating or cooling of buildings or estab-
lishing more diversified cropping systems in agriculture, on GHG emis-
sions and radiative forcing [11.5.4, 9.5]. There is a growing evidence 
base for such interdependencies in each sector, but there are substan-
tial knowledge gaps that prevent the generation of integrated results 
at the cross-sectoral level. 
29 29 29 22 22 22 22 22 22 36 36 36 32 32 32 36 36 36
20
30
20
50
21
00
Transport Buildings Industry Electricity Net
AFOLU
Non−CO2 Transport Buildings Industry Electricity Net
AFOLU
Non−CO2
5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6
20
-20
10
-10
0
D
ir
ec
t 
G
H
G
 E
m
is
si
on
s 
[G
tC
O
2e
q/
yr
]
D
ir
ec
t 
G
H
G
 E
m
is
si
on
s 
[G
tC
O
2e
q/
yr
]
n=
450 ppm CO2eq with CCS 450 ppm CO2eq without CCS
20
30
20
50
21
00
20
-20
10
-10
0
CO2 Transport 
CO2 Buildings
CO2 Industry 
CO2 Electricity
CO2 Net AFOLU
Non−CO2 (All Sectors)
Actual 2010 Level Individual 
Scenarios
Min 
75th Percentile
Max 
Median
25th Percentile
Figure TS.17 | Direct emissions of CO2 and non-CO2 GHGs across sectors in mitigation scenarios that reach about 450 (430–480) ppm CO2eq concentrations in 2100 with using 
carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) (left panel) and without using CCS (right panel). The numbers at the bottom of the graphs refer to the number of scenarios included in the 
ranges that differ across sectors and time due to different sectoral resolutions and time horizons of models. White dots in the right panel refer to emissions of individual scenarios to 
give a sense of the spread within the ranges shown due to the small number of scenarios. [Figures 6.35]
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Table TS.3 | Main sectoral mitigation measures categorized by key mitigation strategies (in bold) and associated sectoral indicators (highlighted in yellow) as discussed in 
Chapters 7 – 12.
GHG emissions 
intensity reduction
Energy intensity reduction by 
improving technical efficiency
Production and resource 
efficiency improvement
Structural and systems 
efficiency improvement
Activity indicator change
En
er
gy
 [S
ec
ti
on
 7
.5
]
Emissions / secondary 
energy output
Energy input / energy output Embodied energy / energy output
–
Final energy use
Greater deployment of renewable 
energy (RE), nuclear energy, 
and (BE)CCS; fuel switching 
within the group of fossil fuels; 
reduction of fugitive (methane) 
emissions in the fossil fuel chain
Extraction, transport and 
conversion of fossil fuels; 
electricity / heat / fuel transmission, 
distribution, and storage; 
Combined Heat and Power (CHP) 
or cogeneration (see Buildings 
and Human Settlements)
Energy embodied in manufacturing 
of energy extraction, 
conversion, transmission and 
distribution technologies
Addressing integration needs Demand from end-use sectors 
for different energy carriers (see 
Transport, Buildings and Industry)
Tr
an
sp
or
t 
[8
.3
]
Emissions / final energy Final energy / transport service
–
Shares for each mode Total distance per year
Fuel carbon intensity 
(CO2eq / megajoule (MJ)): 
Fuel switching to low-carbon 
fuels e. g., electricity / hydrogen 
from low-carbon sources (see 
Energy); specific biofuels in 
various modes (see AFOLU)
Energy intensity 
(MJ / passenger-km, tonne-
km): Fuel-efficient engines and 
vehicle designs; more advanced 
propulsion systems and designs; 
use of lighter materials in vehicles
Embodied emissions during 
vehicle manufacture; material 
efficiency; and recycling of 
materials (see Industry); 
infrastructure lifecycle emissions 
(see Human Settlements)
Modal shifts from light-duty 
vehicles (LDVs) to public transit, 
cycling / walking, and from aviation 
and heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs) 
to rail; eco-driving; improved 
freight logistics; transport 
(infrastructure) planning
Journey avoidance; higher 
occupancy / loading rates; reduced 
transport demand; urban planning 
(see Human Settlements)
Bu
ild
in
gs
 [9
.3
]
Emissions / final energy Final energy / useful energy Embodied energy / 
operating energy
Useful energy / energy service Energy service demand 
Fuel carbon intensity 
(CO2eq / MJ): Building-
integrated RE technologies; fuel 
switching to low-carbon fuels, 
e. g., electricity (see Energy) 
Device efficiency: heating / 
cooling (high-performance boilers, 
ventilation, air-conditioning, 
heat pumps); water heating; 
cooking (advanced biomass 
stoves); lighting; appliances
Building lifetime; component, 
equipment, and appliance 
durability; low(er) energy and 
emission material choice for 
construction (see Industry)
Systemic efficiency: integrated 
design process; low / zero energy 
buildings; building automation 
and controls; urban planning; 
district heating / cooling and CHP; 
smart meters / grids; commissioning 
Behavioural change (e. g., 
thermostat setting, appliance use); 
lifestyle change (e. g., per capita 
dwelling size, adaptive comfort)
In
du
st
ry
 [1
0.
4]
Emissions / final energy Final energy / material production Material input / product output Product demand / service demand Service demand
Emissions intensity: Process 
emissions reductions; use of 
waste (e. g., municipal solid waste 
(MSW) / sewage sludge in cement 
kilns) and CCS in industry; HFCs 
replacement and leak repair; 
fuel switching among fossil fuels 
to low-carbon electricity (see 
Energy) or biomass (see AFOLU)
Energy efficiency / best 
available technologies: 
Efficient steam systems; 
furnace and boiler systems; 
electric motor (pumps, fans, 
air compressor, refrigerators, 
and material handling) and 
electronic control systems; (waste) 
heat exchanges; recycling
Material efficiency: 
Reducing yield losses; 
manufacturing / construction: 
process innovations, new design 
approaches, re-using old material 
(e. g., structural steel); product 
design (e. g., light weight car 
design); fly ash substituting clinker 
Product-service efficiency: 
More intensive use of products 
(e. g., car sharing, using products 
such as clothing for longer, new 
and more durable products)
Reduced demand for, e. g., 
products such as clothing; 
alternative forms of travel 
leading to reduced demand 
for car manufacturing
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2.
4]
Emissions / final energy Final energy / useful energy Material input in infrastructure Useful energy / energy service Service demand per capita
Integration of urban 
renewables; urban-scale fuel 
switching programmes
Cogeneration, heat cascading, 
waste to energy
Managed infrastructure supply; 
reduced primary material 
input for infrastructure
Compact urban form; increased 
accessibility; mixed land use
Increasing accessibility: 
shorter travel time, and more 
transport mode options
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11
.3
] 
Supply-side improvements Demand-side measures
Emissions / area or unit product (conserved, restored) Animal / crop product consumption per capita
Emissions reduction: of methane (e. g., 
livestock management) and nitrous oxide 
(fertilizer and manure management) 
and prevention of emissions to the 
atmosphere by conserving existing carbon 
pools in soils or vegetation (reducing 
deforestation and forest degradation, fire 
prevention / control, agroforestry); reduced 
emissions intensity (GHG / unit product).
Sequestration: Increasing the 
size of existing carbon pools, 
thereby extracting CO2 from the 
atmosphere (e. g., afforestation, 
reforestation, integrated systems, 
carbon sequestration in soils)
Substitution: of biological 
products for fossil fuels or 
energy-intensive products, 
thereby reducing CO2 emissions, 
e. g., biomass co-firing / CHP (see 
Energy), biofuels (see Transport), 
biomass-based stoves, and 
insulation products (see Buildings)
Demand-side measures: Reducing losses 
and wastes of food; changes in human diets 
towards less emission-intensive products; 
use of long-lived wood products
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TS.3.2.2 Energy supply
The energy supply sector is the largest contributor to global 
GHG emissions (robust evidence, high agreement). Annual GHG emis-
sions from the global energy supply sector grew more rapidly between 
2000 and 2010 than in the previous decade; their growth accelerated 
from 1.7 % / yr from 1990 – 2000 to 3.1 % / yr from 2000 – 2010. The main 
contributors to this trend are an increasing demand for energy services 
and a growing share of coal in the global fuel mix. The energy supply 
sector, as defined in this report, comprises all energy extraction, con-
version, storage, transmission, and distribution processes that deliver 
final energy to the end-use sectors (industry, transport, buildings, agri-
culture and forestry). [7.2, 7.3]
In the baseline scenarios assessed in AR5, direct CO2 emissions 
from the energy supply sector increase from 14.4 GtCO2 / yr 
in 2010 to 24 – 33 GtCO2 / yr in 2050 (25 – 75th percentile; full 
range 15 – 42 GtCO2 / yr), with most of the baseline scenarios 
assessed in WGIII AR5 showing a significant increase (medium 
evidence, medium agreement) (Figure TS.15). The lower end of the 
full range is dominated by scenarios with a focus on energy inten-
sity improvements that go well beyond the observed improvements 
over the past 40 years. The availability of fossil fuels alone will not 
be sufficient to limit CO2eq concentration to levels such as 450 ppm, 
550 ppm, or 650 ppm. [6.3.4, 6.8, 7.11, Figure 6.15]
The energy supply sector offers a multitude of options to reduce 
GHG emissions (robust evidence, high agreement). These options 
include: energy efficiency improvements and fugitive emission reduc-
tions in fuel extraction as well as in energy conversion, transmission, 
and distribution systems; fossil fuel switching; and low-GHG energy 
supply technologies such as renewable energy (RE), nuclear power, and 
CCS (Table TS.3). [7.5, 7.8.1, 7.11]
The stabilization of GHG concentrations at low levels requires 
a fundamental transformation of the energy supply system, 
including the long-term phase-out of unabated fossil fuel con-
version technologies and their substitution by low-GHG alter-
natives (robust evidence, high agreement). Concentrations of CO2 in 
the atmosphere can only be stabilized if global (net) CO2 emissions 
peak and decline toward zero in the long term. Improving the energy 
efficiencies of fossil fuel power plants and / or the shift from coal to 
gas will not by themselves be sufficient to achieve this. Low-GHG 
energy supply technologies would be necessary if this goal were to be 
achieved (Figure TS.19). [7.5.1, 7.8.1, 7.11]
Decarbonizing (i. e., reducing the carbon intensity of) electric-
ity generation is a key component of cost-effective mitigation 
strategies in achieving low-stabilization levels (430 – 530 ppm 
CO2eq); in most integrated modelling scenarios, decarboniza-
tion happens more rapidly in electricity generation than in 
the buildings, transport, and industry sectors (medium evidence, 
high agreement) (Figure TS.17). In the majority of mitigation scenar-
ios reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq concentrations by 2100, the share 
of low-carbon electricity supply (comprising RE, nuclear, fossil fuels 
with CCS, and BECCS) increases from the current share of around 
30 % to more than 80 % by 2050, and fossil fuel power generation 
without CCS is phased out almost entirely by 2100 (Figures TS.17 and 
TS.18) [7.14].
Since AR4, many RE technologies have demonstrated substantial 
performance improvements and cost reductions, and a growing 
number of RE technologies have achieved a level of maturity 
to enable deployment at significant scale (robust evidence, high 
agreement). Some technologies are already economically competitive in 
various settings. Levelized costs of PV systems fell most substantially 
between 2009 and 2012, and a less extreme trend has been observed 
for many others RE technologies. Regarding electricity generation alone, 
RE accounted for just over half of the new electricity-generating capacity 
added globally in 2012, led by growth in wind, hydro, and solar power. 
Decentralized RE to meet rural energy needs has also increased, includ-
ing various modern and advanced traditional biomass options as well 
as small hydropower, PV, and wind. Nevertheless, many RE technologies 
still need direct support (e. g., feed-in tariffs (FITs), RE quota obligations, 
and tendering / bidding) and / or indirect support (e. g., sufficiently high 
carbon prices and the internalization of other externalities), if their mar-
ket shares are to be significantly increased. RE technology policies have 
been successful in driving the recent growth of RE. Additional enabling 
policies are needed to address their integration into future energy sys-
tems. (medium evidence, medium agreement) (Figure TS.19) [7.5.3, 
7.6.1, 7.8.2, 7.12, 11.13] 
The use of RE is often associated with co-benefits, including 
the reduction of air pollution, local employment opportunities, 
few severe accidents compared to some other energy supply 
technologies, as well as improved energy access and security 
(medium evidence, medium agreement) (Table TS.4). At the same time, 
however, some RE technologies can have technology and location-spe-
cific adverse side-effects, which can be reduced to a degree through 
appropriate technology selection, operational adjustments, and siting 
of facilities. [7.9] 
Infrastructure and integration challenges vary by RE technology 
and the characteristics of the existing energy system (medium 
evidence, medium agreement). Operating experience and studies of 
medium to high penetrations of RE indicate that integration issues can 
be managed with various technical and institutional tools. As RE pen-
etrations increase, such issues are more challenging, must be carefully 
considered in energy supply planning and operations to ensure reliable 
energy supply, and may result in higher costs. [7.6, 7.8.2] 
Nuclear energy is a mature low-GHG emission source of base-
load power, but its share of global electricity generation has 
been declining (since 1993). Nuclear energy could make an 
increasing contribution to low-carbon energy supply, but a 
variety of barriers and risks exist (robust evidence, high agree-
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ment) (Figure TS.19). Nuclear electricity accounted for 11 % of the 
world’s electricity generation in 2012, down from a high of 17 % in 
1993. Pricing the externalities of GHG emissions (carbon pricing) 
could improve the competitiveness of nuclear power plants. [7.2, 
7.5.4, 7.8.1, 7.12]
Barriers and risks associated with an increasing use of nuclear 
energy include operational risks and the associated safety 
concerns, uranium mining risks, financial and regulatory risks, 
unresolved waste management issues, nuclear weapon prolif-
eration concerns, and adverse public opinion (robust evidence, 
high agreement) (Table TS.4). New fuel cycles and reactor technologies 
addressing some of these issues are under development and progress 
has been made concerning safety and waste disposal. Investigation of 
mitigation scenarios not exceeding 580 ppm CO2eq has shown that 
excluding nuclear power from the available portfolio of technologies 
would result in only a slight increase in mitigation costs compared to 
the full technology portfolio (Figure TS.13). If other technologies, such 
as CCS, are constrained the role of nuclear power expands. [6.3.6, 
7.5.4, 7.8.2, 7.9, 7.11]
GHG emissions from energy supply can be reduced signifi-
cantly by replacing current world average coal-fired power 
plants with modern, highly efficient natural gas combined 
cycle power plants or combined heat and power (CHP) plants, 
provided that natural gas is available and the fugitive emis-
sions associated with its extraction and supply are low or mit-
igated (robust evidence, high agreement). In mitigation scenarios 
reaching about 450 ppm CO2eq concentrations by 2100, natural gas 
power generation without CCS typically acts as a bridge technology, 
with deployment increasing before peaking and falling to below 
current levels by 2050 and declining further in the second half of 
the century (robust evidence, high agreement). [7.5.1, 7.8, 7.9, 7.11, 
7.12]
Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) technologies could 
reduce the lifecycle GHG emissions of fossil fuel power plants 
(medium evidence, medium agreement). While all components of inte-
grated CCS systems exist and are in use today by the fossil fuel extrac-
tion and refining industry, CCS has not yet been applied at scale to 
a large, commercial fossil fuel power plant. CCS power plants could 
be seen in the market if they are required for fossil fuel facilities by 
regulation or if they become competitive with their unabated coun-
terparts, for instance, if the additional investment and operational 
costs faced by CCS plants, caused in part by efficiency reductions, are 
compensated by sufficiently high carbon prices (or direct financial sup-
port). Beyond economic incentives, well-defined regulations concern-
ing short- and long-term responsibilities for storage are essential for a 
large-scale future deployment of CCS. [7.5.5]
Barriers to large-scale deployment of CCS technologies include 
concerns about the operational safety and long-term integrity 
of CO2 storage, as well as risks related to transport and the 
required up-scaling of infrastructure (limited evidence, medium 
agreement) (Table TS.4). There is, however, a growing body of liter-
ature on how to ensure the integrity of CO2 wells, on the potential 
consequences of a CO2 pressure build-up within a geologic formation 
(such as induced seismicity), and on the potential human health and 
environmental impacts from CO2 that migrates out of the primary 
injection zone (limited evidence, medium agreement). [7.5.5, 7.9, 
7.11]
Combining bioenergy with CCS (BECCS) offers the prospect of 
energy supply with large-scale net negative emissions, which 
plays an important role in many low-stabilization scenarios, 
while it entails challenges and risks (limited evidence, medium 
agreement). Until 2050, bottom-up studies estimate the economic 
potential to be between 2 – 10 GtCO2 per year [11.13]. Some mitiga-
tion scenarios show higher deployment of BECCS towards the end of 
the century. Technological challenges and risks include those associ-
ated with the upstream provision of the biomass that is used in the 
CCS facility, as well as those associated with the CCS technology itself. 
Currently, no large-scale projects have been financed. [6.9, 7.5.5, 7.9, 
11.13]
Figure TS.18 | Share of low-carbon energy in total primary energy, electricity and liquid fuels supply sectors for the year 2050. Dashed horizontal lines show the low-carbon share 
for the year 2010. Low-carbon energy includes nuclear, renewables, fossil fuels with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) and bioenergy with CCS. [Figure 7.14] 
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Figure TS.19 | Specific direct and lifecycle emissions (gCO2eq / kilowatt hour (kWh)) and levelized cost of electricity (LCOE in USD2010 / MWh) for various power-generating technolo-
gies (see Annex III.2 for data and assumptions and Annex II.3.1 and II.9.3 for methodological issues). The upper left graph shows global averages of specific direct CO2 emissions 
(gCO2 / kWh) of power generation in 2030 and 2050 for the set of about 450 to about 500 (430 – 530) ppm CO2eq scenarios that are contained in the WG III AR5 Scenario Database 
(see Annex II.10). The global average of specific direct CO2 emissions (gCO2 / kWh) of power generation in 2010 is shown as a vertical line. Note: The inter-comparability of LCOE is 
limited. For details on general methodological issues and interpretation see Annexes as mentioned above. CCS: CO2 capture and storage; IGCC: Integrated coal gasification com-
bined cycle; PC: Pulverized hard coal; PV: Photovoltaic; WACC: Weighted average cost of capital. [Figure 7.7]
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TS.3.2.3 Transport
Since AR4, emissions in the global transport sector have grown 
in spite of more efficient vehicles (road, rail, watercraft, and 
aircraft) and policies being adopted (robust evidence, high agree-
ment). Road transport dominates overall emissions but aviation could 
play an increasingly important role in total CO2 emissions in the future. 
[8.1, 8.3, 8.4]
The global transport sector accounted for 27 % of final energy 
use and 6.7 GtCO2 direct emissions in 2010, with baseline CO2 
emissions projected to increase to 9.3 – 12 GtCO2 / yr in 2050 
(25 – 75th percentile; full range 6.2 – 16 GtCO2 / yr); most of the 
baseline scenarios assessed in WGIII AR5 foresee a significant 
increase (medium evidence / medium agreement) (Figure TS.15). With-
out aggressive and sustained mitigation policies being implemented, 
transport sector emissions could increase faster than in the other 
energy end-use sectors and could lead to more than a doubling of CO2 
emissions by 2050. [6.8, 8.9, 8.10]
While the continuing growth in passenger and freight activity 
constitutes a challenge for future emission reductions, analyses 
of both sectoral and integrated studies suggest a higher mitiga-
tion potential in the transport sector than reported in the AR4 
(medium evidence, medium agreement). Transport energy demand 
per capita in developing and emerging economies is far lower than 
in OECD countries but is expected to increase at a much faster rate in 
the next decades due to rising incomes and the development of infra-
structure. Baseline scenarios thus show increases in transport energy 
demand from 2010 out to 2050 and beyond. However, sectoral and 
Table TS.4 | Overview of potential co-benefits (green arrows) and adverse side-effects (orange arrows) of the main mitigation measures in the energy supply sector; arrows pointing 
up / down denote a positive / negative effect on the respective objective or concern; a question mark (?) denotes an uncertain net effect. Co-benefits and adverse side-effects depend 
on local circumstances as well as on the implementation practice, pace, and scale. For possible upstream effects of biomass supply for bioenergy, see Table TS.8. For an assessment 
of macroeconomic, cross-sectoral effects associated with mitigation policies (e. g., on energy prices, consumption, growth, and trade), see e. g., Sections 3.9, 6.3.6, 13.2.2.3 and 
14.4.2. The uncertainty qualifiers in brackets denote the level of evidence and agreement on the respective effects (see TS.1). Abbreviations for evidence: l=limited, m=medium, 
r=robust; for agreement: l=low, m=medium, h=high. [Table 7.3]
Energy Supply
Effect on additional objectives / concerns
Economic Social Environmental Other
Nuclear 
replacing 
coal power
↑ 
↑ 
↑
Energy security (reduced exposure 
to fuel price volatility) (m / m)
Local employment impact (but 
uncertain net effect) (l / m)
Legacy cost of waste and 
abandoned reactors (m / h)
 
↓ 
 
↑ 
 
↑
Health impact via 
Air pollution and coal 
mining accidents (m / h)
Nuclear accidents and waste 
treatment, uranium
mining and milling (m / l)
Safety and waste concerns (r / h)
 
↓ 
 
↑
Ecosystem impact via 
Air pollution (m / h) and 
coal mining (l / h)
Nuclear accidents (m / m)
Proliferation 
risk (m / m)
RE (wind, PV, 
concentrated 
solar power 
(CSP), hydro, 
geothermal, 
bioenergy) 
replacing coal 
↑ 
 
↑ 
↑ 
 
 
↑
Energy security (resource 
sufficiency, diversity in the 
near / medium term) (r / m)
Local employment impact (but 
uncertain net effect) (m / m)
Irrigation, flood control, 
navigation, water availability (for 
multipurpose use of reservoirs 
and regulated rivers) (m / h)
Extra measures to match demand 
(for PV, wind and some CSP) (r / h)
 
↓ 
 
↓
↑ 
? 
↑
Health impact via 
Air pollution (except 
bioenergy) (r / h)
Coal mining accidents (m / h)
Contribution to (off-grid) 
energy access (m / l)
Project-specific public acceptance 
concerns (e. g., visibility of wind) (l / m)
Threat of displacement (for 
large hydro) (m / h)
 
↓ 
 
↓ 
↑ 
 
↑ 
↓
↑
Ecosystem impact via 
Air pollution (except 
bioenergy) (m / h)
Coal mining (l / h)
Habitat impact (for some 
hydro) (m / m)
Landscape and wildlife 
impact (for wind) m / m)
Water use (for wind and PV) (m / m)
Water use (for bioenergy, CSP, 
geothermal, and reservoir hydro) (m / h)
Higher use of critical 
metals for PV and 
direct drive wind 
turbines (r / m)
Fossil CCS 
replacing coal 
↑ ↑ Preservation vs. lock-in of 
human and physical capital in 
the fossil industry (m / m)
 
↑ 
↑ 
↑
Health impact via
Risk of CO2 leakage (m / m)
Upstream supply-chain 
activities (m / h)
Safety concerns (CO2 storage 
and transport) (m / h)
↑ 
↑
Ecosystem impact via upstream 
supply-chain activities (m / m)
Water use (m / h)
Long-term 
monitoring of CO2 
storage (m / h)
BECCS 
replacing coal
See fossil CCS where applicable. For possible upstream effect of biomass supply, see Table TS.8. 
Methane 
leakage 
prevention, 
capture or 
treatment
↑ Energy security (potential to 
use gas in some cases) (l / h)
↓ 
↑
Health impact via reduced 
air pollution (m / m)
Occupational safety at 
coal mines (m / m)
↓ Ecosystem impact via reduced 
air pollution (l / m)
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integrated mitigation scenarios indicate that energy demand reduc-
tions of 10 – 45 % are possible by 2050 relative to baseline (Figure 
TS.20, left panel) (medium evidence, medium agreement). [6.8.4, 8.9.1, 
8.9.4, 8.12, Figure 8.9.4]
A combination of low-carbon fuels, the uptake of improved 
vehicle and engine performance technologies, behavioural 
change leading to avoided journeys and modal shifts, invest-
ments in related infrastructure and changes in the built environ-
ment, together offer a high mitigation potential (high confidence) 
[8.3, 8.8]. Direct (tank-to-wheel) GHG emissions from passenger and 
freight transport can be reduced by: 
•	 using fuels with lower carbon intensities (CO2eq / megajoule (MJ));
•	 lowering vehicle energy intensities   
(MJ / passenger-km or MJ / tonne-km); 
•	 encouraging modal shift to lower-carbon passenger and freight 
transport systems coupled with investment in infrastructure and 
compact urban form; and
•	 avoiding journeys where possible (Table TS.3). 
Other short-term mitigation strategies include reducing black carbon 
(BC), aviation contrails, and nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions. [8.4]
Strategies to reduce the carbon intensities of fuel and the rate 
of reducing carbon intensity are constrained by challenges 
associated with energy storage and the relatively low energy 
density of low-carbon transport fuels; integrated and sectoral 
studies broadly agree that opportunities for fuel switching 
exist in the short term and will grow over time (medium evi-
dence, medium agreement) (Figure TS.20, right panel). Electric, hydro-
gen, and some biofuel technologies could help reduce the carbon 
intensity of fuels, but their total mitigation potentials are very uncer-
tain (medium evidence, medium agreement). Methane-based fuels 
are already increasing their share for road vehicles and waterborne 
craft. Electricity produced from low-carbon sources has near-term 
potential for electric rail and short- to medium-term potential as elec-
tric buses, light-duty and 2-wheel road vehicles are deployed. Hydro-
gen fuels from low-carbon sources constitute longer-term options. 
Commercially available liquid and gaseous biofuels already provide 
co-benefits together with mitigation options that can be increased 
by technology advances, particularly drop-in biofuels for aircraft. 
Reducing transport emissions of particulate matter (including BC), 
tropospheric ozone and aerosol precursors (including NOx) can have 
human health and mitigation co-benefits in the short term (medium 
evidence, medium agreement). Up to 2030, the majority of integrated 
studies expect a continued reliance on liquid and gaseous fuels, sup-
ported by an increase in the use of biofuels. During the second half 
of the century, many integrated studies also show substantial shares 
of electricity and / or hydrogen to fuel electric and fuel-cell light-duty 
vehicles (LDVs). [8.2, 8.3, 11.13]
Energy efficiency measures through improved vehicle and 
engine designs have the largest potential for emissions reduc-
        
Figure TS.20 | Final energy demand reduction relative to baseline (left panel) and development of final low-carbon energy carrier share in final energy (including electricity, hydro-
gen, and liquid biofuels; right panel) in transport by 2030 and 2050 in mitigation scenarios from three different CO2eq concentrations ranges shown in boxplots (see Section 6.3.2) 
compared to sectoral studies shown in shapes assessed in Chapter 8. Filled circles correspond to sectoral studies with full sectoral coverage. [Figures 6.37 and 6.38]
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tions in the short term (high confidence). Potential energy efficiency 
and vehicle performance improvements range from 30 – 50 % relative 
to 2010 depending on transport mode and vehicle type (Figures TS.21, 
TS.22). Realizing this efficiency potential will depend on large invest-
ments by vehicle manufacturers, which may require strong incentives 
and regulatory policies in order to achieve GHG emissions reduction 
goals (medium evidence, medium agreement). [8.3, 8.6, 8.9, 8.10]
Shifts in transport mode and behaviour, impacted by new 
infrastructure and urban (re)development, can contribute to 
the reduction of transport emissions (medium evidence, low 
agreement). Over the medium term (up to 2030) to long term (to 
2050 and beyond), urban redevelopment and investments in new 
infrastructure, linked with integrated urban planning, transit-oriented 
development, and more compact urban form that supports cycling 
and walking can all lead to modal shifts. Such mitigation measures 
are challenging, have uncertain outcomes, and could reduce trans-
port GHG emissions by 20 – 50 % compared to baseline (limited evi-
dence, low agreement). Pricing strategies, when supported by pub-
lic acceptance initiatives and public and non-motorized transport 
infrastructures, can reduce travel demand, increase the demand for 
more efficient vehicles (e. g., where fuel economy standards exist) 
and induce a shift to low-carbon modes (medium evidence, medium 
agreement). While infrastructure investments may appear expensive 
at the margin, the case for sustainable urban planning and related 
policies is reinforced when co-benefits, such as improved health, 
accessibility, and resilience, are accounted for (Table TS.5). Busi-
ness initiatives to decarbonize freight transport have begun but will 
need further support from fiscal, regulatory, and advisory policies to 
encourage shifting from road to low-carbon modes such as rail or 
waterborne options where feasible, as well as improving logistics 
(Figure TS.22). [8.4, 8.5, 8.7, 8.8, 8.9, 8.10] 
Sectoral and integrated studies agree that substantial, sus-
tained, and directed policy interventions could limit transport 
emissions to be consistent with low concentration goals, but 
the societal mitigation costs (USD / tCO2eq avoided) remain 
uncertain (Figures TS.21, TS.22, TS.23). There is good potential to 
reduce emissions from LDVs and long-haul heavy-duty vehicles (HDVs) 
from both lower energy intensity vehicles and fuel switching, and the 
levelized costs of conserved carbon (LCCC) for efficiency improvements 
can be very low and negative (limited evidence, low agreement). Rail, 
buses, two-wheel motorbikes, and waterborne craft for freight already 
have relatively low emissions so their emissions reduction potential is 
limited. The mitigation cost of electric vehicles is currently high, espe-
cially if using grid electricity with a high emissions factor, but their 
LCCC are expected to decline by 2030. The emissions intensity of avia-
tion could decline by around 50 % in 2030 but the LCCC, although 
uncertain, are probably over USD  100 / tCO2eq. While it is expected 
that mitigation costs will decrease in the future, the magnitude of such 
reductions is uncertain. (limited evidence, low agreement) [8.6, 8.9]
Barriers to decarbonizing transport for all modes differ across 
regions but can be overcome, in part, through economic 
incentives (medium evidence, medium agreement). Financial, insti-
tutional, cultural, and legal barriers constrain low-carbon technol-
ogy uptake and behavioural change. They include the high invest-
ment costs needed to build low-emissions transport systems, the 
slow turnover of stock and infrastructure, and the limited impact of 
a carbon price on petroleum fuels that are already heavily taxed. 
Regional differences are likely due to cost and policy constraints. Oil 
price trends, price instruments on GHG emissions, and other mea-
sures such as road pricing and airport charges can provide strong 
economic incentives for consumers to adopt mitigation measures. 
[8.8]
There are regional differences in transport mitigation pathways 
with major opportunities to shape transport systems and infra-
structure around low-carbon options, particularly in develop-
ing and emerging countries where most future urban growth 
will occur (robust evidence, high agreement). Possible transforma-
tion pathways vary with region and country due to differences in the 
dynamics of motorization, age and type of vehicle fleets, existing infra-
structure, and urban development processes. Prioritizing infrastructure 
for pedestrians, integrating non-motorized and transit services, and 
managing excessive road speed for both urban and rural travellers can 
create economic and social co-benefits in all regions. For all econo-
mies, especially those with high rates of urban growth, investments 
in public transport systems and low-carbon infrastructure can avoid 
lock-in to carbon-intensive modes. Established infrastructure may limit 
the options for modal shift and lead to a greater reliance on advanced 
vehicle technologies; a slowing of growth in LDV demand is already 
evident in some OECD countries. (medium evidence, medium agree-
ment) [8.4, 8.9]
A range of strong and mutually supportive policies will be 
needed for the transport sector to decarbonize and for the 
co-benefits to be exploited (robust evidence, high agreement). 
Transport mitigation strategies associated with broader non-climate 
policies at all government levels can usually target several objec-
tives simultaneously to give lower travel costs, improved access and 
mobility, better health, greater energy security, improved safety, and 
increased time savings. Activity reduction measures have the largest 
potential to realize co-benefits. Realizing the co-benefits depends on 
the regional context in terms of economic, social, and political fea-
sibility as well as having access to appropriate and cost-effective 
advanced technologies (Table TS.5). (medium evidence, high agree-
ment) Since rebound effects can reduce the CO2 benefits of efficiency 
improvements and undermine a particular policy, a balanced package 
of policies, including pricing initiatives, could help to achieve stable 
price signals, avoid unintended outcomes, and improve access, mobil-
ity, productivity, safety, and health (medium evidence, medium agree-
ment). [8.4, 8.7, 8.10] 
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Figure TS.21 | Indicative emissions intensity (tCO2eq / p-km) and levelized costs of conserved carbon (LCCC in USD2010 / tCO2eq saved) of selected passenger transport technologies. 
Variations in emissions intensities stem from variation in vehicle efficiencies and occupancy rates. Estimated LCCC for passenger road transport options are point estimates ± 100 
USD2010 / tCO2eq based on central estimates of input parameters that are very sensitive to assumptions (e. g., specific improvement in vehicle fuel economy to 2030, specific biofuel CO2eq 
intensity, vehicle costs, fuel prices). They are derived relative to different baselines (see legend for colour coding) and need to be interpreted accordingly. Estimates for 2030 are based 
on projections from recent studies, but remain inherently uncertain. LCCC for aviation are taken directly from the literature. Table 8.3 provides additional context (see Annex III.3 for data 
and assumptions on emissions intensities and cost calculations and Annex II.3.1 for methodological issues on levelized cost metrics). WACC: Weighted average cost of capital. [Table 8.3]
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Figure TS.22 | Indicative emissions intensity (tCO2eq / t-km) and levelized costs of conserved carbon (LCCC in USD2010 / tCO2eq saved) of selected freight transport technologies. 
Variations in emissions intensities largely stem from variation in vehicle efficiencies and load rates. Levelized costs of conserved carbon are taken directly from the literature and are 
very sensitive to assumptions (e. g., specific improvement in vehicle fuel economy to 2030, specific biofuel CO2eq intensity, vehicle costs, and fuel prices). They are expressed relative 
to current baseline technologies (see legend for colour coding) and need to be interpreted accordingly. Estimates for 2030 are based on projections from recent studies but remain 
inherently uncertain. Table 8.3 provides additional context (see Annex III.3 for data and assumptions on emissions intensities and cost calculations and Annex II.3.1 for method-
ological issues on levelized cost metrics). LNG: Liquefied natural gas; WACC: Weighted average cost of capital. [Table 8.3]
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Figure TS.23 | Direct global CO2 emissions from all passenger and freight transport are indexed relative to 2010 values for each scenario with integrated model studies grouped by 
CO2eq concentration levels by 2100, and sectoral studies grouped by baseline and policy categories. [Figure 8.9]
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Table TS.5 | Overview of potential co-benefits (green arrows) and adverse side-effects (orange arrows) of the main mitigation measures in the transport sector; arrows pointing 
up / down denote a positive / negative effect on the respective objective or concern; a question mark (?) denotes an uncertain net effect. Co-benefits and adverse side-effects depend 
on local circumstances as well as on implementation practice, pace and scale. For possible upstream effects of low-carbon electricity, see Table TS.4. For possible upstream effects 
of biomass supply, see Table TS.8. For an assessment of macroeconomic, cross-sectoral effects associated with mitigation policies (e. g., on energy prices, consumption, growth, 
and trade), see e. g., Sections 3.9, 6.3.6, 13.2.2.3 and 14.4.2. The uncertainty qualifiers in brackets denote the level of evidence and agreement on the respective effects (see TS.1). 
Abbreviations for evidence: l = limited, m = medium, r = robust; for agreement: l = low, m = medium, h = high. [Table 8.4]
Transport
Effect on additional objectives / concerns
Economic Social Environmental
Reduction of fuel 
carbon intensity: 
electricity, 
hydrogen (H2), 
compressed natural 
gas (CNG), biofuels, 
and other fuels
↑ 
 
↑
Energy security (diversification, 
reduced oil dependence and exposure 
to oil price volatility) (m / m)
Technological spillovers (e. g., battery 
technologies for consumer electronics) (l / l)
 
? 
↓ 
↑ 
↓ 
↓
Health impact via urban air pollution by
CNG, biofuels: net effect unclear (m / l)
Electricity, H2: reducing most pollutants (r / h)
Shift to diesel: potentially 
increasing pollution (l / m)
Health impact via reduced noise 
(electricity and fuel cell LDVs) (l / m)
Road safety (silent electric LDVs at low speed) (l / l)
 
 
↓ 
↑ 
?
Ecosystem impact of electricity 
and hydrogen via
Urban air pollution (m / m)
Material use (unsustainable 
resource mining) (l / l)
Ecosystem impact of biofuels: see AFOLU
Reduction of 
energy intensity
↑ Energy security (reduced oil dependence 
and exposure to oil price volatility) (m / m)
↓
↑
Health impact via reduced urban air pollution (r / h)
Road safety (via increased crash-worthiness) (m / m)
↓ Ecosystem and biodiversity impact via 
reduced urban air pollution (m / h)
Compact urban 
form and improved 
transport 
infrastructure
Modal shift 
↑ 
↑ 
 
?
Energy security (reduced oil dependence 
and exposure to oil price volatility) (m / m)
Productivity (reduced urban congestion 
and travel times, affordable and 
accessible transport) (m / h)
Employment opportunities in the public 
transport sector vs. car manufacturing (l / m)
 
↓ 
↑ 
↓
↑ 
 
↑
Health impact for non-motorized modes via 
Increased physical activity (r / h)
Potentially higher exposure to air pollution (r / h)
Noise (modal shift and travel reduction) (r / h)
Equitable mobility access to 
employment opportunities, particularly 
in developing countries (r / h)
Road safety (via modal shift and / or infrastructure 
for pedestrians and cyclists) (r / h)
 
↓ 
↓
Ecosystem impact via 
Urban air pollution (r / h)
Land-use competition (m / m)
Journey distance 
reduction and 
avoidance
↑ 
↑
Energy security (reduced oil dependence 
and exposure to oil price volatility) (r / h)
Productivity (reduced urban congestion, 
travel times, walking) (r / h)
↓ Health impact (for non-motorized 
transport modes) (r / h)
 
↓ 
↑
↓
Ecosystem impact via 
Urban air pollution (r / h)
New / shorter shipping routes (r / h)
Land-use competition from 
transport infrastructure (r / h)
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TS.3.2.4 Buildings 
GHG emissions from the buildings secto r 15 have more than dou-
bled since 1970, accounting for 19 % of global GHG emissions 
in 2010, including indirect emissions from electricity genera-
tion. The share rises to 25 % if AFOLU emissions are excluded from the 
total. The buildings sector also accounted for 32 % of total global final 
energy use, approximately one-third of black carbon emissions, and an 
eighth to a third of F-gases, with significant uncertainty (medium evi-
dence, medium agreement). (Figure TS.3) [9.2]
Direct and indirect CO2 emissions from buildings are projected 
to increase from 8.8 GtCO2 / yr in 2010 to 13 – 17 GtCO2 / yr in 
2050 (25 – 75th percentile; full range 7.9 – 22 GtCO2 / yr) in base-
line scenarios; most of the baseline scenarios assessed in WGIII 
AR5 show a significant increase (medium evidence, medium agree-
ment) (Figure TS.15) [6.8]. The lower end of the full range is dominated 
by scenarios with a focus on energy intensity improvements that go 
well beyond the observed improvements over the past 40 years. With-
out further policies, final energy use of the buildings sector may grow 
from approximately 120 exajoules per year (EJ / yr) in 2010 to 270 EJ / yr 
in 2050 [9.9].
Significant lock-in risks arise from the long lifespans of build-
ings and related infrastructure (robust evidence, high agreement). 
If only currently planned policies are implemented, the final energy use 
in buildings that could be locked-in by 2050, compared to a scenario 
where today’s best practice buildings become the standard in newly 
built structures and retrofits, is equivalent to approximately 80 % of 
the final energy use of the buildings sector in 2005. [9.4]
Improvements in wealth, lifestyle change, the provision of 
access to modern energy services and adequate housing, and 
urbanization will drive the increases in building energy demand 
(robust evidence, high agreement). The manner in which those without 
access to adequate housing (about 0.8 billion people), modern energy 
carriers, and sufficient levels of energy services including clean cooking 
and heating (about 3 billion people) meet these needs will influence 
the development of building-related emissions. In addition, migration 
to cities, decreasing household size, increasing levels of wealth, and 
lifestyle changes, including increasing dwelling size and number and 
use of appliances, all contribute to considerable increases in building 
energy services demand. The substantial amount of new construction 
taking place in developing countries represents both a risk and oppor-
tunity from a mitigation perspective. [9.2, 9.4, 9.9]
Recent advances in technologies, know-how, and policies in the 
buildings sector, however, make it feasible that the global total 
sector final energy use stabilizes or even declines by mid-century 
(robust evidence, medium agreement). Recent advances in technology, 
15 The buildings sector covers the residential, commercial, public and services sectors; 
emissions from construction are accounted for in the industry sector.
design practices and know-how, coupled with behavioural changes, can 
achieve a two to ten-fold reduction in energy requirements of individual 
new buildings and a two to four-fold reduction for individual existing 
buildings largely cost-effectively or sometimes even at net negative 
costs (see Box TS.12) (robust evidence, high agreement). [9.6]
Advances since AR4 include the widespread demonstration 
worldwide of very low, or net zero energy buildings both in 
new construction and retrofits (robust evidence, high agreement). 
In some jurisdictions, these have already gained important market 
shares with, for instance, over 25 million m2 of building floorspace in 
Europe complying with the ‘Passivehouse’ standard in 2012. However, 
zero energy / carbon buildings may not always be the most cost-optimal 
solution, nor even be feasible in certain building types and locations. 
[9.3]
High-performance retrofits are key mitigation strategies in 
countries with existing building stocks, as buildings are very 
long-lived and a large fraction of 2050 developed country 
buildings already exists (robust evidence, high agreement). Reduc-
tions of heating / cooling energy use by 50 – 90 % have been achieved 
using best practices. Strong evidence shows that very low-energy con-
struction and retrofits can be economically attractive. [9.3]
With ambitious policies it is possible to keep global building 
energy use constant or significantly reduce it by mid-century 
compared to baseline scenarios which anticipate an increase of 
more than two-fold (medium evidence, medium agreement) (Figure 
TS.24). Detailed building sector studies indicate a larger energy sav-
ings potential by 2050 than do integrated studies. The former indicate 
a potential of up to 70 % of the baseline for heating and cooling only, 
and around 35 – 45 % for the whole sector. In general, deeper reduc-
tions are possible in thermal energy uses than in other energy services 
mainly relying on electricity. With respect to additional fuel switching 
as compared to baseline, both sectoral and integrated studies find 
modest opportunities. In general, both sectoral and integrated studies 
indicate that electricity will supply a growing share of building energy 
demand over the long term, especially if heating demand decreases 
due to a combination of efficiency gains, better architecture, and cli-
mate change. [6.8.4, 9.8.2, Figure 9.19]
The history of energy efficiency programmes in buildings shows 
that 25 – 30 % efficiency improvements have been available at 
costs substantially lower than those of marginal energy sup-
ply (robust evidence, high agreement). Technological progress enables 
the potential for cost-effective energy efficiency improvements to be 
maintained, despite continuously improving standards. There has been 
substantial progress in the adoption of voluntary and mandatory stan-
dards since AR4, including ambitious building codes and targets, vol-
untary construction standards, and appliance standards. At the same 
time, in both new and retrofitted buildings, as well as in appliances 
and information, communication and media technology equipment, 
there have been notable performance and cost improvements. Large 
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Figure TS.24 | Final energy demand reduction relative to baseline (left panel) and development of final low-carbon energy carrier share in final energy (from electricity; right panel) 
in buildings by 2030 and 2050 in mitigation scenarios from three different CO2eq concentrations ranges shown in boxplots (see Section 6.3.2) compared to sectoral studies shown 
in shapes assessed in Chapter 9. Filled circles correspond to sectoral studies with full sectoral coverage while empty circles correspond to studies with only partial sectoral coverage 
(e. g., heating and cooling). [Figures 6.37 and 6.38]
Min 
75th Percentile
Max 
Median
25th Percentile
N= 126 189 126 189
2030 2050
Buildings
Fi
na
l E
ne
rg
y 
D
em
an
d 
Re
du
ct
io
n 
Re
la
ti
ve
 t
o 
Ba
se
lin
e 
[%
]
100
80
60
40
20
0
N= 124 103 110 124 103 110
100
     2030      2050
0
20
40
60
80
Buildings
Lo
w
 C
ar
bo
n 
En
er
gy
 C
ar
ri
er
 S
ha
re
 in
 F
in
al
 E
ne
rg
y 
[%
]
Sectoral Studies (Base)
Sectoral Studies (Policy)
Historic Data 2010
Baselines
530−650 ppm CO2eq
430−530 ppm CO2eq
Sectoral Studies (Partial)
Sectoral Studies (Full)
Box TS.12 | Negative private mitigation costs
A persistent issue in the analysis of mitigation options and costs 
is whether there are mitigation opportunities that are privately 
beneficial — generating private benefits that more than offset the 
costs of implementation — but which consumers and firms do 
not voluntarily undertake. There is some evidence of unrealized 
mitigation opportunities that would have negative private cost. 
Possible examples include investments in vehicles [8.1], lighting 
and heating technology in homes and commercial buildings [9.3], 
as well as industrial processes [10.1].
Examples of negative private costs imply that firms and indi-
viduals do not take opportunities to save money. This might be 
explained in a number of ways. One is that status-quo bias can 
inhibit the switch to new technologies or products [2.4, 3.10.1]. 
Another is that firms and individuals may focus on short-term 
goals and discount future costs and benefits sharply; consumers 
have been shown to do this when choosing energy conservation 
measures or investing in energy-efficient technologies [2.4.3, 
2.6.5.3, 3.10.1]. Risk aversion and ambiguity aversion may also 
account for this behaviour when outcomes are uncertain [2.4.3, 
3.10.1]. Other possible explanations include: insufficient informa-
tion on opportunities to conserve energy; asymmetric informa-
tion — for example, landlords may be unable to convey the value 
of energy efficiency improvements to renters; split incentives, 
where one party pays for an investment but another party reaps 
the benefits; and imperfect credit markets, which make it difficult 
or expensive to obtain finance for energy savings [3.10.1, 16.4]. 
Some engineering studies show a large potential for negative-cost 
mitigation. The extent to which such negative-cost opportunities 
can actually be realized remains a matter of contention in the 
literature. Empirical evidence is mixed. [Box 3.10]
reductions in thermal energy use in buildings are possible at costs 
lower than those of marginal energy supply, with the most cost-effec-
tive options including very high-performance new commercial build-
ings; the same holds for efficiency improvements in some appliances 
and cooking equipment. [9.5, 9.6, 9.9]
Lifestyle, culture, and other behavioural changes may lead 
to further large reductions in building and appliance energy 
requirements beyond those achievable through technologies 
and architecture. A three- to five-fold difference in energy use 
has been shown for provision of similar building-related energy 
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service levels in buildings. (limited evidence, high agreement) For 
developed countries, scenarios indicate that lifestyle and behavioural 
changes could reduce energy demand by up to 20 % in the short term 
and by up to 50 % of present levels by mid-century (medium evidence, 
medium agreement). There is a high risk that emerging countries 
follow the same path as developed economies in terms of building-
related architecture, lifestyle, and behaviour. But the literature sug-
gests that alternative development pathways exist that provide high 
levels of building services at much lower energy inputs, incorporating 
strategies such as learning from traditional lifestyles, architecture, and 
construction techniques. [9.3]
Most mitigation options in the building sector have consider-
able and diverse co-benefits (robust evidence, high agreement). 
These include, but are not limited to: energy security; less need for 
energy subsidies; health and environmental benefits (due to reduced 
indoor and outdoor air pollution); productivity and net employment 
gains; the alleviation of fuel poverty; reduced energy expenditures; 
increased value for building infrastructure; and improved comfort and 
services. (Table TS.6) [9.6, 9.7]
Especially strong barriers in this sector hinder the market-
based uptake of cost-effective technologies and practices; as 
a consequence, programmes and regulation are more effective 
than pricing instruments alone (robust evidence, high agreement). 
Barriers include imperfect information and lack of awareness, princi-
pal / agent problems and other split incentives, transaction costs, lack 
of access to financing, insufficient training in all construction-related 
trades, and cognitive / behavioural barriers. In developing countries, the 
large informal sector, energy subsidies, corruption, high implicit dis-
count rates, and insufficient service levels are further barriers. There-
fore, market forces alone are not expected to achieve the necessary 
transformation without external stimuli. Policy intervention addressing 
all stages of the building and appliance lifecycle and use, plus new 
business and financial models, are essential. [9.8, 9.10]
A large portfolio of building-specific energy efficiency poli-
cies was already highlighted in AR4, but further considerable 
advances in available instruments and their implementation 
have occurred since (robust evidence, high agreement). Evidence 
shows that many building energy efficiency policies worldwide have 
Table TS.6 | Overview of potential co-benefits (green arrows) and adverse side-effects (orange arrows) of the main mitigation measures in the buildings sector; arrows pointing 
up / down denote a positive / negative effect on the respective objective or concern. Co-benefits and adverse side-effects depend on local circumstances as well as on implementation 
practice, pace and scale. For possible upstream effects of fuel switching and RE, see Tables TS.4 and TS.8. For an assessment of macroeconomic, cross-sectoral effects associated with 
mitigation policies (e. g., on energy prices, consumption, growth, and trade), see e. g., Sections 3.9, 6.3.6, 13.2.2.3 and 14.4.2. The uncertainty qualifiers in brackets denote the level of 
evidence and agreement on the respective effects (see TS.1). Abbreviations for evidence: l = limited, m = medium, r = robust; for agreement: l = low, m = medium, h = high. [Table 9.7]
Buildings
Effect on additional objectives / concerns
Economic Social Environmental Other
Fuel 
switching, RES 
incorporation, 
green roofs, 
and other 
measures 
reducing GHG 
emissions 
intensity 
↑
↑
↑
↑
Energy security (m / h)
Employment impact (m / m)
Lower need for energy subsidies (l / l)
Asset values of buildings (l / m)
 
↓ 
↑
↓ 
↑
Fuel poverty (residential) via
Energy demand (m / h)
Energy cost (l / m)
Energy access (for higher 
energy cost) (l / m)
Productive time for women / children (for 
replaced traditional cookstoves) (m / h)
 
↓ 
↓ 
 
↓
↓ 
↑
Health impact in residential buildings via
Outdoor air pollution (r / h)
Indoor air pollution (in 
developing countries) (r / h)
Fuel poverty (r / h)
Ecosystem impact (less outdoor 
air pollution) (r / h)
Urban biodiversity (for 
green roofs) (m / m)
Reduced Urban Heat 
Island (UHI) effect (l / m)
Retrofits 
of existing 
buildings 
(e. g., cool 
roof, passive 
solar, etc.)
Exemplary new 
buildings 
Efficient 
equipment 
↑
↑
↑ 
↑
↑
↑
Energy security (m / h)
Employment impact (m / m)
Productivity (for commercial 
buildings) (m / h)
Lower need for energy subsidies (l / l)
Asset values of buildings (l / m)
Disaster resilience (l / m)
↓ 
↓ 
↑ 
↑
Fuel poverty (for retrofits and 
efficient equipment) (m / h)
Energy access (higher cost for housing 
due to the investments needed) (l / m)
Thermal comfort (for retrofits and 
exemplary new buildings) (m / h)
Productive time for women 
and children (for replaced 
traditional cookstoves) (m / h)
 
↓ 
↓ 
 
↓ 
 
↓ 
↓
↓ 
↓
Health impact via
Outdoor air pollution (r / h)
Indoor air pollution (for 
efficient cookstoves) (r / h)
Improved indoor environmental 
conditions (m / h)
Fuel poverty (r / h)
Insufficient ventilation (m / m)
Ecosystem impact (less outdoor 
air pollution) (r / h)
Water consumption and 
sewage production (l / l)
Reduced UHI effect 
(for retrofits and 
new exemplary 
buildings) (l / m)
Behavioural 
changes 
reducing 
energy demand
↑
↑
Energy security (m / h)
Lower need for energy subsidies (l / l)
↓ 
 
↓
Health impact via less outdoor air 
pollution (r / h) and improved indoor 
environmental conditions (m / h)
Ecosystem impact (less outdoor 
air pollution) (r / h)
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already been saving GHG emissions at large negative costs. Among the 
most environmentally and cost-effective policies are regulatory instru-
ments such as building and appliance energy performance standards 
and labels, as well as public leadership programmes and procurement 
policies. Progress in building codes and appliance standards in some 
developed countries over the last decade have contributed to stabi-
lizing or even reducing total building energy use, despite growth in 
population, wealth, and corresponding energy service level demands. 
Developing countries have also been adopting different effective 
policies, most notably appliance standards. However, in order to reach 
ambitious climate goals, these standards need to be substantially 
strengthened and adopted in further jurisdictions, and to other build-
ing and appliance types. Due to larger capital requirements, financing 
instruments are essential both in developed and developing countries 
to achieve deep reductions in energy use. [9.10]
TS.3.2.5 Industry 
In 2010, the industry sector accounted for around 28 % of final 
energy use, and direct and indirect GHG emissions (the latter 
being associated with electricity consumption) are larger than 
the emissions from either the buildings or transport end-use 
sectors and represent just over 30 % of global GHG emissions 
in 2010 (the share rises to 40 % if AFOLU emissions are excluded 
from the total) (high confidence). Despite the declining share of indus-
try in global GDP, global industry and waste / wastewater GHG emis-
sions grew from 10 GtCO2eq in 1990 to 13 GtCO2eq in 2005 and to 
15 GtCO2eq in 2010 (of which waste / wastewater accounted for 
1.4 GtCO2eq). [10.3]
Carbon dioxide emissions from industry, including direct and 
indirect emissions as well as process emissions, are projected 
to increase from 13 GtCO2 / yr in 2010 to 20 – 24 GtCO2 / yr in 2050 
(25 – 75th percentile; full range 9.5 – 34 GtCO2 / yr) in baseline 
scenarios; most of the baseline scenarios assessed in WGIII AR5 
show a significant increase (medium evidence, medium agreement) 
(Figure TS.15) [6.8]. The lower end of the full range is dominated by 
scenarios with a focus on energy intensity improvements that go well 
beyond the observed improvements over the past 40 years. 
The wide-scale upgrading, replacement and deployment of best 
available technologies, particularly in countries where these are 
not in practice, and in non-energy intensive industries, could 
directly reduce the energy intensity of the industry sector by 
about 25 % compared to the current level (robust evidence, high 
agreement). Despite long-standing attention to energy efficiency in 
industry, many options for improved energy efficiency still remain. 
Through innovation, additional reductions of about 20 % in energy 
intensity may potentially be realized (limited evidence, medium agree-
Figure TS.25 | A schematic illustration of industrial activity over the supply chain. Options for mitigation in the industry sector are indicated by the circled numbers: (1) energy 
efficiency; (2) emissions efficiency; (3a) material efficiency in manufacturing; (3b) material efficiency in product design; (4) product-service efficiency; (5) service demand reduction. 
[Figure 10.2]
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Figure TS.26 | Final energy demand reduction relative to baseline (left panel) and development of final low-carbon energy carrier share in final energy (including electricity, heat, 
hydrogen, and bioenergy; right panel) in industry by 2030 and 2050 in mitigation scenarios from three different CO2eq concentration ranges shown in boxplots (see Section 6.3.2) 
compared to sectoral studies shown in shapes assessed in Chapter 10. Filled circles correspond to sectoral studies with full sectoral coverage. [Figures 6.37 and 6.38]
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ment). Barriers to implementing energy efficiency relate largely to 
the initial investment costs and lack of information. Information pro-
grammes are a prevalent approach for promoting energy efficiency, 
followed by economic instruments, regulatory approaches, and volun-
tary actions. [10.4, 10.7, 10.9, 10.11]
An absolute reduction in emissions from the industry sector will 
require deployment of a broad set of mitigation options that 
go beyond energy efficiency measures (medium evidence, high 
agreement) [10.4, 10.7]. In the context of continued overall growth in 
industrial demand, substantial reductions from the sector will require 
parallel efforts to increase emissions efficiency (e. g., through fuel and 
feedstock switching or CCS); material use efficiency (e. g., less scrap, 
new product design); recycling and re-use of materials and products; 
product-service efficiency (e. g., more intensive use of products through 
car sharing, longer life for products); radical product innovations (e. g., 
alternatives to cement); as well as service demand reductions. Lack of 
policy and experiences in material and product-service efficiency are 
major barriers. (Table TS.3, Figure TS.25) [10.4, 10.7, 10.11] 
While detailed industry sector studies tend to be more conser-
vative than integrated studies, both identify possible industrial 
final energy demand savings of around 30 % by 2050 in mitiga-
tion scenarios not exceeding 650 ppm CO2eq by 2100 relative 
to baseline scenarios (medium evidence, medium agreement) (Fig-
ure TS.26). Integrated models in general treat the industry sector in a 
more aggregated fashion and mostly do not explicitly provide detailed 
sub-sectoral material flows, options for reducing material demand, 
and price-induced inter-input substitution possibilities. Due to the het-
erogeneous character of the industry sector, a coherent comparison 
between sectoral and integrated studies remains difficult. [6.8.4, 10.4, 
10.7, 10.10.1, Figure 10.14]
Mitigation in the industry sector can also be achieved by 
reducing material and fossil fuel demand by enhanced waste 
use, which concomitantly reduces direct GHG emissions from 
waste disposal (robust evidence, high agreement). The hierarchy 
of waste management places waste reduction at the top, followed 
by re-use, recycling, and energy recovery. As the share of recycled or 
reused material is still low, applying waste treatment technologies 
and recovering energy to reduce demand for fossil fuels can result in 
direct emission reductions from waste disposal. Globally, only about 
20 % of municipal solid waste (MSW) is recycled and about 14 % is 
treated with energy recovery while the rest is deposited in open dump-
sites or landfills. About 47 % of wastewater produced in the domestic 
and manufacturing sectors is still untreated. The largest cost range is 
for reducing GHG emissions from landfilling through the treatment 
of waste by anaerobic digestion. The costs range from negative (see 
Box TS.12) to very high. Advanced wastewater treatment technologies 
may enhance GHG emissions reduction in wastewater treatment but 
they are clustered among the higher cost options (medium evidence, 
medium agreement). (Figure TS.29) [10.4, 10.14] 
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Figure TS.27 | Indicative CO2 emission intensities for cement (upper panel) and steel (lower panel) production, as well as indicative levelized cost of conserved carbon (LCCC) 
shown for various production practices / technologies and for 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios of a limited selection of integrated models (for data and methodology, see Annex III). DRI: 
Direct reduced iron; EAF: Electric arc furnace. [Figures 10.7, 10.8]
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Waste policy and regulation have largely influenced material 
consumption, but few policies have specifically pursued mate-
rial efficiency or product-service efficiency (robust evidence, high 
agreement) [10.11]. Barriers to improving material efficiency include 
lack of human and institutional capacities to encourage management 
decisions and public participation. Also, there is a lack of experience 
and often there are no clear incentives either for suppliers or consum-
ers to address improvements in material or product-service efficiency, 
or to reduce product demand. [10.9]
CO2 emissions dominate GHG emissions from industry, but there 
are also substantial mitigation opportunities for non-CO2 gases 
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Figure TS.28 | Indicative global CO2eq emissions for chemicals production (upper panel) and indicative global CO2 emission intensities for paper production (lower panel) as well 
as indicative levelized cost of conserved carbon (LCCC) shown for various production practices / technologies and for 450 ppm CO2eq scenarios of a limited selection of integrated 
models (for data and methodology, see Annex III). [Figures 10.9, 10.10]
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(robust evidence, high agreement). Methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) 
and fluorinated gases (F-gases) from industry accounted for emissions of 
0.9 GtCO2eq in 2010. Key mitigation opportunities comprise, e. g., reduc-
tion of hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) emissions by leak repair, refrigerant 
recovery and recycling, and proper disposal and replacement by alter-
native refrigerants (ammonia, HC, CO2). N2O emissions from adipic and 
nitric acid production can be reduced through the implementation of 
thermal destruction and secondary catalysts. The reduction of non-CO2 
GHGs also faces numerous barriers. Lack of awareness, lack of economic 
incentives and lack of commercially available technologies (e. g., for HFC 
recycling and incineration) are typical examples. [Table 10.2, 10.7]
Systemic approaches and collaborative activities across compa-
nies (large energy-intensive industries and Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs)) and sectors can help to reduce GHG emis-
sions (robust evidence, high agreement). Cross-cutting technologies 
such as efficient motors, and cross-cutting measures such as reducing 
air or steam leaks, help to optimize performance of industrial processes 
and improve plant efficiency very often cost-effectively with both 
energy savings and emissions benefits. Industrial clusters also help 
to realize mitigation, particularly from SMEs. [10.4] Cooperation and 
cross-sectoral collaboration at different levels — for example, sharing 
of infrastructure, information, waste heat, cooling, etc. — may provide 
further mitigation potential in certain regions / industry types [10.5].
Several emission-reducing options in the industrial sector are 
cost-effective and profitable (medium evidence, medium agree-
ment). While options in cost ranges of 0 – 20 and 20 – 50 USD / tCO2eq 
and even below 0 USD / tCO2eq exist, achieving near-zero emissions 
intensity levels in the industry sector would require the additional real-
ization of long-term step-change options (e. g., CCS), which are asso-
ciated with higher levelized costs of conserved carbon (LCCC) in the 
range of 50 – 150 USD / tCO2eq. Similar cost estimates for implement-
ing material efficiency, product-service efficiency, and service demand 
reduction strategies are not available. With regard to long-term options, 
some sector-specific measures allow for significant reductions in spe-
cific GHG emissions but may not be applicable at scale, e. g., scrap-
based iron and steel production. Decarbonized electricity can play an 
important role in some subsectors (e. g., chemicals, pulp and paper, 
and aluminium), but will have limited impact in others (e. g., cement, 
iron and steel, waste). In general, mitigation costs vary regionally and 
depend on site-specific conditions. (Figures TS.27, TS.28, TS.29) [10.7]
Mitigation measures are often associated with co-benefits (robust 
evidence, high agreement). Co-benefits include enhanced competitive-
ness through cost-reductions, new business opportunities, better envi-
ronmental compliance, health benefits through better local air and water 
quality and better work conditions, and reduced waste, all of which pro-
vide multiple indirect private and social benefits (Table TS.7). [10.8]
There is no single policy that can address the full range of miti-
gation measures available for industry and overcome associ-
ated barriers. Unless barriers to mitigation in industry are resolved, 
the pace and extent of mitigation in industry will be limited and even 
profitable measures will remain untapped (robust evidence, high 
agreement). [10.9, 10.11]
Figure TS.29 | Indicative CO2eq emission intensities for waste (upper panel) and wastewater (lower panel) of various practices as well as indicative levelized cost of conserved 
carbon (for data and methodology, see Annex III). MSW: Municipal solid waste. [Figures 10.19 and 10.20]
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TS.3.2.6 Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use 
(AFOLU)
Since AR4, GHG emissions from the AFOLU sector have sta-
bilized but the share of total anthropogenic GHG emissions 
has decreased (robust evidence, high agreement). The average 
annual total GHG flux from the AFOLU sector was 10 – 12 GtCO2eq in 
2000 – 2010, with global emissions of 5.0 – 5.8 GtCO2eq / yr from agri-
culture on average and around 4.3 – 5.5 GtCO2eq / yr from forestry and 
other land uses. Non-CO2 emissions derive largely from agriculture, 
dominated by N2O emissions from agricultural soils and CH4 emissions 
from livestock enteric fermentation, manure management, and emis-
sions from rice paddies, totalling 5.0 – 5.8 GtCO2eq / yr in 2010 (robust 
evidence, high agreement). Over recent years, most estimates of FOLU 
CO2 fluxes indicate a decline in emissions, largely due to decreasing 
deforestation rates and increased afforestation (limited evidence, 
medium agreement). The absolute levels of emissions from deforesta-
tion and degradation have fallen from 1990 to 2010 (robust evidence, 
high agreement). Over the same time period, total emissions for high-
income countries decreased while those of low-income countries 
increased. In general, AFOLU emissions from high-income countries 
are dominated by agriculture activities while those from low-income 
countries are dominated by deforestation and degradation. [Figure 
1.3, 11.2]
Net annual baseline CO2 emissions from AFOLU are projected to 
decline over time with net emissions potentially less than half of 
the 2010 level by 2050, and the possibility of the AFOLU sector 
becoming a net sink before the end of century. However, the uncer-
tainty in historical net AFOLU emissions is larger than for other sectors, 
and additional uncertainties in projected baseline net AFOLU emissions 
exist. (medium evidence, high agreement) (Figure TS.15) [6.3.1.4, 6.8, 
Figure 6.5] As in AR4, most projections suggest declining annual net CO2 
emissions in the long run. In part, this is driven by technological change, 
as well as projected declining rates of agriculture area expansion related 
to the expected slowing in population growth. However, unlike AR4, 
none of the more recent scenarios projects growth in the near-term. 
There is also a somewhat larger range of variation later in the century, 
with some models projecting a stronger net sink starting in 2050 (lim-
ited evidence, medium agreement). There are few reported projections 
of baseline global land-related N2O and CH4 emissions and they indicate 
an increase over time. Cumulatively, land CH4 emissions are projected to 
be 44 – 53 % of total CH4 emissions through 2030, and 41 – 59 % through 
2100, and land N2O emissions 85 – 89 % and 85 – 90 %, respectively (lim-
ited evidence, medium agreement). [11.9]
Opportunities for mitigation in the AFOLU sector include sup-
ply- and demand-side mitigation options (robust evidence, high 
agreement). Supply-side measures involve reducing emissions arising 
Table TS.7 | Overview of potential co-benefits (green arrows) and adverse side-effects (orange arrows) of the main mitigation measures in the industry sector; arrows pointing 
up / down denote a positive / negative effect on the respective objective or concern. Co-benefits and adverse side-effects depend on local circumstances as well as on the implemen-
tation practice, pace and scale. For possible upstream effects of low-carbon energy supply (includes CCS), see Table TS.4. For possible upstream effects of biomass supply, see Table 
TS.8. For an assessment of macroeconomic, cross-sectoral, effects associated with mitigation policies (e. g., on energy prices, consumption, growth, and trade), see e. g., Sections 3.9, 
6.3.6, 13.2.2.3 and 14.4.2. The uncertainty qualifiers in brackets denote the level of evidence and agreement on the respective effects (see TS.1). Abbreviations for evidence: l = 
limited, m = medium, r = robust; for agreement: l = low, m = medium, h = high. [Table 10.5]
Industry
Effect on additional objectives / concerns
Economic Social Environmental
CO2 and non-CO2 
GHG emissions 
intensity reduction
↑ Competitiveness and productivity (m / h) ↓ Health impact via reduced local air 
pollution and better work conditions (for 
perfluorocarbons from aluminium) (m / m)
↓ 
↑
Ecosystem impact via reduced local air 
pollution and reduced water pollution (m / m)
Water conservation (l / m)
Technical energy 
efficiency improvements 
via new processes 
and technologies
↑ 
↑
↑
↑
Energy security (via lower 
energy intensity) (m / m)
Employment impact (l / l)
Competitiveness and productivity (m / h)
Technological spillovers in developing 
countries (due to supply chain linkages) (l / l)
↓ 
↑
↑
↑
Health impact via reduced 
local pollution (l / m)
New business opportunities (m / m)
Water availability and quality (l / l)
Safety, working conditions and 
job satisfaction (m / m)
 
↓ 
↓
Ecosystem impact via: 
     Fossil fuel extraction (l / l)
     Local pollution and waste (m / m)
Material efficiency 
of goods, recycling
↓ 
↑ 
↑
↑
National sales tax revenue 
in medium term (l / l) 
Employment impact in waste 
recycling market (l / l)
Competitiveness in manufacturing (l / l)
New infrastructure for industrial clusters (l / l)
↓
↑
↓
Health impacts and safety concerns (l / m)
New business opportunities (m / m)
Local conflicts (reduced resource 
extraction) (l / m)
↓ 
 
↓
Ecosystem impact via reduced local 
air and water pollution and waste 
material disposal (m / m)
Use of raw / virgin materials and 
natural resources implying reduced 
unsustainable resource mining (l / l)
Product demand 
reductions
↓ National sales tax revenue 
in medium term (l / l) 
↑ Wellbeing via diverse lifestyle choices (l / l) ↓ Post-consumption waste (l / l)
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from land-use change, in particular reducing deforestation, and land 
and livestock management, increasing carbon stocks by sequestration 
in soils and biomass, or the substitution of fossil fuels by biomass for 
energy production (Table TS.3). Further new supply-side technologies 
not assessed in AR4, such as biochar or wood products for energy-
intensive building materials, could contribute to the mitigation poten-
tial of the AFOLU sector, but there are still few studies upon which to 
make robust estimates. Demand-side measures include dietary change 
and waste reduction in the food supply chain. Increasing forestry and 
agricultural production without a commensurate increase in emissions 
(i. e., one component of sustainable intensification; Figure TS.30) also 
reduces emissions intensity (i. e., the GHG emissions per unit of prod-
uct), a mitigation mechanism largely unreported for AFOLU in AR4, 
which could reduce absolute emissions as long as production volumes 
do not increase. [11.3, 11.4]
Among supply-side measures, the most cost-effective forestry 
options are afforestation, sustainable forest management and 
reducing deforestation, with large differences in their relative 
importance across regions; in agriculture, low carbon prices16 
(20 USD / tCO2eq) favour cropland and grazing land manage-
ment and high carbon prices (100 USD / tCO2eq) favour restora-
tion of organic soils (medium evidence, medium agreement). When 
considering only studies that cover both forestry and agriculture and 
include agricultural soil carbon sequestration, the economic mitiga-
tion potential in the AFOLU sector is estimated to be 7.18 to 10.6 (full 
range of all studies: 0.49 – 10.6) GtCO2eq / yr in 2030 for mitigation 
efforts consistent with carbon prices up to 100 USD / tCO2eq, about 
a third of which can be achieved at < 20 USD / tCO2eq (medium evi-
dence, medium agreement). The range of global estimates at a given 
carbon price partly reflects uncertainty surrounding AFOLU mitigation 
16 In many models that are used to assess the economic costs of mitigation, carbon 
price is used as a proxy to represent the level of effort in mitigation policies (see 
Glossary).
potentials in the literature and the land-use assumptions of the sce-
narios considered. The ranges of estimates also reflect differences in 
the GHGs and options considered in the studies. A comparison of esti-
mates of economic mitigation potential in the AFOLU sector published 
since AR4 is shown in Figure TS.31. [11.6]
While demand-side measures are under-researched, changes 
in diet, reductions of losses in the food supply chain, and other 
measures have a significant, but uncertain, potential to reduce 
GHG emissions from food production (0.76 – 8.55 GtCO2eq / yr by 
2050) (Figure TS.31) (limited evidence, medium agreement). Barriers to 
implementation are substantial, and include concerns about jeopardizing 
health and well-being, and cultural and societal resistance to behavioural 
change. However, in countries with a high consumption of animal protein, 
co-benefits are reflected in positive health impacts resulting from changes 
in diet (robust evidence, high agreement). [11.4.3, 11.6, 11.7, 11.9]
The mitigation potential of AFOLU is highly dependent on 
broader factors related to land-use policy and patterns (medium 
evidence, high agreement). The many possible uses of land can com-
pete or work in synergy. The main barriers to mitigation are institu-
tional (lack of tenure and poor governance), accessibility to financ-
ing mechanisms, availability of land and water, and poverty. On the 
other hand, AFOLU mitigation options can promote innovation, and 
many technological supply-side mitigation options also increase agri-
cultural and silvicultural efficiency, and can reduce climate vulner-
ability by improving resilience. Multifunctional systems that allow the 
delivery of multiple services from land have the capacity to deliver to 
many policy goals in addition to mitigation, such as improving land 
tenure, the governance of natural resources, and equity [11.8] (lim-
ited evidence, high agreement). Recent frameworks, such as those for 
assessing environmental or ecosystem services, could provide tools for 
valuing the multiple synergies and tradeoffs that may arise from miti-
gation actions (Table TS.8) (medium evidence, medium agreement). 
[11.7, 11.8]
Figure TS.30 | GHG emissions intensities of selected major AFOLU commodities for decades 1960s – 2000s. (1) Cattle meat, defined as GHG (enteric fermentation + manure man-
agement of cattle, dairy and non-dairy) / meat produced; (2) pig meat, defined as GHG (enteric fermentation + manure management of swine, market and breeding) / meat produced; 
(3) chicken meat, defined as GHG (manure management of chickens) / meat produced; (4) milk, defined as GHG (enteric fermentation + manure management of cattle, dairy) / milk 
produced; (5) eggs, defined as GHG (manure management of chickens, layers) / egg produced; (6) rice, defined as GHG (rice cultivation) / rice produced; (7) cereals, defined as GHG 
(synthetic fertilizers) / cereals produced; (8) wood, defined as GHG (carbon loss from harvest) / roundwood produced. [Figure 11.15]
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Policies governing practices in agriculture as well as forest con-
servation and management need to account for the needs of 
both mitigation and adaptation (medium evidence, high agree-
ment). Some mitigation options in the AFOLU sector (such as soil and 
forest carbon stocks) may be vulnerable to climate change. Economic 
incentives (e. g., special credit lines for low-carbon agriculture, sustain-
able agriculture and forestry practices, tradable credits, payment for 
ecosystem services) and regulatory approaches (e. g., enforcement of 
environmental law to protect forest carbon stocks by reducing defor-
estation, set-aside policies, air and water pollution control reducing 
nitrate load and N2O emissions) have been effective in different cases. 
Investments in research, development, and diffusion (e. g., increase of 
resource use-efficiency (fertilizers), livestock improvement, better for-
estry management practices) could result in synergies between adap-
tation and mitigation. Successful cases of deforestation reduction in 
different regions are found to combine different policies such as land 
planning, regulatory approaches and economic incentives (limited evi-
dence, high agreement). [11.3.2, 11.10, 15.11]
Figure TS.31 | Estimates of economic mitigation potentials in the AFOLU sector published since AR4 (AR4 estimates shown for comparison, denoted by black arrows), includ-
ing bottom-up, sectoral studies, and top-down, multi-sector studies. Supply-side mitigation potentials are estimated for around 2030, ranging from 2025 to 2035, and are for 
agriculture, forestry or both sectors combined. Studies are aggregated for potentials up to ~20 USD / tCO2eq (actual range 1.64 – 21.45), up to ~50 USD / tCO2eq (actual range 
31.39 – 50.00), and up to ~100 USD / tCO2eq (actual range 70.0 – 120.91). Demand-side measures (shown on the right hand side of the figure) are for ~2050 and are not assessed 
at a specific carbon price, and should be regarded as technical potentials. Smith et al. (2013) values are the mean of the range. Not all studies consider the same measures or the 
same GHGs. [11.6.2, Figure 11.14]
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Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD+)17 can be a very cost-effective policy option for mitigat-
ing climate change, if implemented in a sustainable manner (lim-
ited evidence, medium agreement). REDD+ includes: reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation; conservation of forest carbon 
stocks; sustainable management of forests; and enhancement of forest 
carbon stocks. It could supply a large share of global abatement of emis-
sions from the AFOLU sector, especially through reducing deforestation 
in tropical regions, with potential economic, social and other environ-
mental co-benefits. To assure these co-benefits, the implementation of 
national REDD+ strategies would need to consider financing mecha-
nisms to local stakeholders, safeguards (such as land rights, conserva-
tion of biodiversity and other natural resources), and the appropriate 
scale and institutional capacity for monitoring and verification. [11.10]
Bioenergy can play a critical role for mitigation, but there are 
issues to consider, such as the sustainability of practices and 
the efficiency of bioenergy systems (robust evidence, medium 
17 UN Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
in developing countries, including conservation, sustainable management of forests 
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.
agreement) [11.4.4, Box 11.5, 11.13.6, 11.13.7]. Barriers to large-
scale deployment of bioenergy include concerns about GHG emis-
sions from land, food security, water resources, biodiversity conserva-
tion and livelihoods. The scientific debate about the overall climate 
impact related to land-use competition effects of specific bioenergy 
pathways remains unresolved (robust evidence, high agreement). 
[11.4.4, 11.13] Bioenergy technologies are diverse and span a wide 
range of options and technology pathways. Evidence suggests that 
options with low lifecycle emissions (e. g., sugar cane, Miscanthus, 
fast growing tree species, and sustainable use of biomass residues), 
some already available, can reduce GHG emissions; outcomes are 
site-specific and rely on efficient integrated ‘biomass-to-bioenergy 
systems’, and sustainable land-use management and governance. 
In some regions, specific bioenergy options, such as improved cook-
stoves, and small-scale biogas and biopower production, could 
reduce GHG emissions and improve livelihoods and health in the con-
text of sustainable development (medium evidence, medium agree-
ment). [11.13]
Table TS.8 | Overview of potential co-benefits (green arrows) and adverse side-effects (orange arrows) of the main mitigation measures in the AFOLU sector; arrows pointing 
up / down denote a positive / negative effect on the respective objective or concern. These effects depend on the specific context (including bio-physic, institutional and socio-
economic aspects) as well as on the scale of implementation. For an assessment of macroeconomic, cross-sectoral effects associated with mitigation policies (e. g., on energy prices, 
consumption, growth, and trade), see e. g., Sections 3.9, 6.3.6, 13.2.2.3 and 14.4.2. The uncertainty qualifiers in brackets denote the level of evidence and agreement on the 
respective effects (see TS.1). Abbreviations for evidence: l = limited, m = medium, r = robust; for agreement: l  = low, m = medium, h = high. [Tables 11.9 and 11.12]
AFOLU
Effect on additional objectives / concerns
Economic Social Environmental Institutional
Supply side: 
Forestry, land-
based agriculture, 
livestock, 
integrated 
systems, and 
bioenergy 
(marked by *)
Demand side: 
Reduced losses 
in the food 
supply chain, 
changes in human 
diets, changes 
in demand 
for wood and 
forestry products
* 
↑ 
 
↓ 
 
↑* 
 
↑* 
 
↑*
↑* 
↑ 
 
↑
Employment impact via
Entrepreneurship 
development (m / h)
Use of less labour-
intensive technologies 
in agriculture (m / m)
Diversification of income 
sources and access 
to markets (r / h)
Additional income to 
(sustainable) landscape 
management (m / h)
Income concentration (m / m)
Energy security (resource 
sufficiency) (m / h)
Innovative financing 
mechanisms for sustainable 
resource management (m / h)
Technology innovation 
and transfer (m / m)
↑* 
 
↓* 
 
↑ 
 
↑* 
 
 
↓* 
 
* 
 
↑ 
 
↑
Food-crops production through 
integrated systems and sustainable 
agriculture intensification (r / m)
Food production (locally) due 
to large-scale monocultures 
of non-food crops (r / l)
Cultural habitats and recreational 
areas via (sustainable) forest 
management and conservation (m / m)
Human health and animal welfare e. g., 
through less pesticides, reduced burning 
practices, and practices like agroforestry 
and silvo-pastoral systems (m / h)
Human health when using 
burning practices (in agriculture 
or bioenergy) (m / m)
Gender, intra- and inter-
generational equity via
Participation and fair 
benefit sharing (r / h)
Concentration of benefits (m / m)
 
 
↑ 
 
 
 
 
 
↓* 
↑*
↑
↓
↑
↑
Provision of ecosystem 
services via 
Ecosystem 
conservation and
sustainable 
management as well
as sustainable 
agriculture (r / h)
Large scale 
monocultures (r / h)
Land-use competition (r / m)
Soil quality (r / h)
Erosion (r / h)
Ecosystem resilience (m / h)
Albedo and 
evaporation (r / h)
↑ ↓* 
 
 
 
 
 
↑ ↓ 
 
↑
Tenure and use rights 
at the local level (for 
indigenous people and 
local communities) 
especially when 
implementing activities 
in natural forests (r / h)
Access to participative 
mechanisms for land 
management decisions (r / h)
Enforcement of existing 
policies for sustainable 
resource management (r / h)
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TS.3.2.7 Human settlements, infrastructure, and spatial 
planning
Urbanization is a global trend transforming human settlements, 
societies, and energy use (robust evidence, high agreement). In 
1900, when the global population was 1.6 billion, only 13 % of the 
population, or some 200 million, lived in urban areas. As of 2011, more 
than 52 % of the world’s population — roughly 3.6 billion — lives in 
urban areas. By 2050, the urban population is expected to increase to 
5.6 – 7.1 billion, or 64 – 69 % of the world population. [12.2]
Urban areas account for more than half of global primary energy 
use and energy-related CO2 emissions (medium evidence, high 
agreement). The exact share of urban energy and GHG emissions varies 
with emission accounting frameworks and definitions. Taking account 
of direct and indirect emissions, urban areas account for 67 – 76 % of 
global energy use (central estimate) and 71 – 76 % of global energy-
related CO2 emissions. Taking account of direct emissions only, the 
urban share of emissions is 44 % (Figure TS.32). [12.2, 12.3] 
No single factor explains variations in per-capita emissions 
across cities, and there are significant differences in per capita 
GHG emissions between cities within a single country (robust 
evidence, high agreement). Urban GHG emissions are influenced by a 
variety of physical, economic and social factors, development levels, 
and urbanization histories specific to each city. Key influences on urban 
GHG emissions include income, population dynamics, urban form, loca-
tional factors, economic structure, and market failures. Per capita final 
energy use and CO2 emissions in cities of Annex I countries tend to be 
lower than national averages, in cities of non-Annex I countries they 
tend to be higher. [12.3]
The majority of infrastructure and urban areas have yet to be 
built (limited evidence, high agreement). Accounting for trends in 
declining population densities, and continued economic and popula-
tion growth, urban land cover is projected to expand by 56 – 310 % 
between 2000 and 2030. If the global population increases to 9.3 bil-
lion by 2050 and developing countries expand their built environment 
and infrastructure to current global average levels using available 
technology of today, the production of infrastructure materials alone 
would generate about 470 GtCO2 emissions. Currently, average per 
capita CO2 emissions embodied in the infrastructure of industrialized 
countries is five times larger than those in developing countries. [12.2, 
12.3]
Infrastructure and urban form are strongly interlinked, and 
lock in patterns of land use, transport choice, housing, and 
behaviour (medium evidence, high agreement). Urban form and 
infrastructure shape long-term land-use management, influence 
individual transport choice, housing, and behaviour, and affect the 
system-wide efficiency of a city. Once in place, urban form and 
infrastructure are difficult to change (Figure TS.33). [12.2, 12.3, 
12.4]
Mitigation options in urban areas vary by urbanization trajecto-
ries and are expected to be most effective when policy instru-
ments are bundled (robust evidence, high agreement). For rapidly 
developing cities, options include shaping their urbanization and 
infrastructure development towards more sustainable and low-carbon 
pathways. In mature or established cities, options are constrained by 
existing urban forms and infrastructure and the potential for refur-
bishing existing systems and infrastructures. Key mitigation strategies 
include co-locating high residential with high employment densities, 
Figure TS.32 | Estimated shares of direct (Scope 1) and indirect urban CO2 emissions in 
total emissions across world regions (GtCO2). Indirect emissions (Scope 2) allocate emis-
sions from thermal power plants to urban areas. CPA: Centrally Planned Asia and China; 
EEU: Central and Eastern Europe; FSU: Former Soviet Union; LAM: Latin America and 
Caribbean; MNA: Middle East and North Africa; NAM: North America; PAS: South-East 
Asia and Pacific; POECD: Pacific OECD; SAS: South Asia; SSA: Sub Saharan Africa; WEU: 
Western Europe. [12.2.2, Figure 12.4]
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achieving high diversity and integration of land uses, increasing acces-
sibility and investing in public transit and other supportive demand-
management measures (Figure TS.33). Bundling these strategies can 
reduce emissions in the short term and generate even higher emissions 
savings in the long term. [12.4, 12.5] 
The largest opportunities for future urban GHG emissions 
reduction might be in rapidly urbanizing countries where urban 
form and infrastructure are not locked-in but where there are 
often limited governance, technical, financial, and institutional 
capacities (robust evidence, high agreement). The bulk of future 
infrastructure and urban growth is expected in small- to medium-size 
cities in developing countries, where these capacities can be limited or 
weak. [12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 12.7]
Thousands of cities are undertaking climate action plans, but 
their aggregate impact on urban emissions is uncertain (robust 
evidence, high agreement). Local governments and institutions pos-
sess unique opportunities to engage in urban mitigation activities and 
local mitigation efforts have expanded rapidly. However, little system-
atic assessment exists regarding the overall extent to which cities are 
implementing mitigation policies and emissions reduction targets are 
being achieved, or emissions reduced. Climate action plans include a 
range of measures across sectors, largely focused on energy efficiency 
rather than broader land-use planning strategies and cross-sectoral 
measures to reduce sprawl and promote transit-oriented development 
(Figure TS.34). [12.6, 12.7, 12.9]
The feasibility of spatial planning instruments for climate 
change mitigation is highly dependent on a city’s financial and 
governance capability (robust evidence, high agreement). Drivers 
of urban GHG emissions are interrelated and can be addressed by a 
number of regulatory, management, and market-based instruments. 
Many of these instruments are applicable to cities in both developed 
and developing countries, but the degree to which they can be imple-
mented varies. In addition, each instrument varies in its potential to 
generate public revenues or require government expenditures, and the 
administrative scale at which it can be applied (Figure TS.35). A bun-
Figure TS.33 | Four key aspects of urban form and structure (density, land-use mix, connectivity, and accessibility), their vehicle kilometers travelled (VKT) elasticities, commonly 
used metrics, and stylized graphics. The dark blue row segments under the VKT elasticities column provide the range of elasticities for the studies included. CBD: Central business 
district. [Figure 12.14]
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dling of instruments and a high level of coordination across institu-
tions can increase the likelihood of achieving emissions reductions and 
avoiding unintended outcomes. [12.6, 12.7]
For designing and implementing climate policies effectively, 
institutional arrangements, governance mechanisms, and 
financial resources should be aligned with the goals of reduc-
ing urban GHG emissions (high confidence). These goals will reflect 
the specific challenges facing individual cities and local governments. 
The following have been identified as key factors: (1) institutional 
arrangements that facilitate the integration of mitigation with other 
high-priority urban agendas; (2) a multilevel governance context that 
empowers cities to promote urban transformations; (3) spatial plan-
ning competencies and political will to support integrated land-use 
and transportation planning; and (4) sufficient financial flows and 
incentives to adequately support mitigation strategies. [12.6, 12.7]
Successful implementation of urban climate change mitigation 
strategies can provide co-benefits (robust evidence, high agree-
ment). Urban areas throughout the world continue to struggle with 
challenges, including ensuring access to energy, limiting air and water 
pollution, and maintaining employment opportunities and competi-
tiveness. Action on urban-scale mitigation often depends on the ability 
to relate climate change mitigation efforts to local co-benefits. The co-
benefits of local climate change mitigation can include public savings, 
air quality and associated health benefits, and productivity increases in 
urban centres, providing additional motivation for undertaking mitiga-
tion activities. [12.5, 12.6, 12.7, 12.8]
Figure TS.34 | Common mitigation measures in Climate Action Plans. [Figure 12.22]
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Figure TS.35 | Key spatial planning tools and effects on government revenues and expenditures across administrative scales. Figure shows four key spatial planning tools (coded in 
colours) and the scale of governance at which they are administered (x-axis) as well as how much public revenue or expenditure the government generates by implementing each 
instrument (y-axis). [Figure 12.20]
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TS.4 Mitigation policies 
and institutions
The previous section shows that since AR4 the scholarship on mitiga-
tion pathways has begun to consider in much more detail how a variety 
of real-world considerations — such as institutional and political con-
straints, uncertainty associated with climate change risks, the availabil-
ity of technologies and other factors — affect the kinds of policies and 
measures that are adopted. Those factors have important implications 
for the design, cost, and effectiveness of mitigation action. This sec-
tion focuses on how governments and other actors in the private and 
public sectors design, implement, and evaluate mitigation policies. It 
considers the ‘normative’ scientific research on how policies should 
be designed to meet particular criteria. It also considers research on 
how policies are actually designed and implemented  a field known as 
‘positive’ analysis. The discussion first characterizes fundamental con-
ceptual issues, and then presents a summary of the main findings from 
WGIII AR5 on local, national, and sectoral policies. Much of the practical 
policy effort since AR4 has occurred in these contexts. From there the 
summary looks at ever-higher levels of aggregation, ultimately ending 
at the global level and cross-cutting investment and finance issues.
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TS.4.1 Policy design, behaviour and political 
economy
There are multiple criteria for evaluating policies. Policies are fre-
quently assessed according to four criteria [3.7.1, 13.2.2, 15.4.1]:
•	 Environmental effectiveness — whether policies achieve intended 
goals in reducing emissions or other pressures on the environment 
or in improving measured environmental quality.
•	 Economic effectiveness — the impact of policies on the overall 
economy. This criterion includes the concept of economic effi-
ciency, the principle of maximizing net economic benefits. Eco-
nomic welfare also includes the concept of cost-effectiveness, the 
principle of attaining a given level of environmental performance 
at lowest aggregate cost. 
•	 Distributional and social impacts — also known as ‘distributional 
equity,’ this criterion concerns the allocation of costs and benefits 
of policies to different groups and sectors within and across econo-
mies over time. It includes, often, a special focus on impacts on the 
least well-off members of societies within countries and around 
the world. 
•	 Institutional and political feasibility — whether policies can be 
implemented in light of available institutional capacity, the politi-
cal constraints that governments face, and other factors that are 
essential to making a policy viable.
All criteria can be applied with regard to the immediate ‘static’ impacts 
of policies and from a long-run ‘dynamic’ perspective that accounts for 
the many adjustments in the economic, social and political systems. 
Criteria may be mutually reinforcing, but there may also be conflicts 
or tradeoffs among them. Policies designed for maximum environmen-
tal effectiveness or economic performance may fare less well on other 
criteria, for example. Such tradeoffs arise at multiple levels of govern-
ing systems. For example, it may be necessary to design international 
agreements with flexibility so that it is feasible for a large number of 
diverse countries to accept them, but excessive flexibility may under-
mine incentives to invest in cost-effective long-term solutions.
Policymakers make use of many different policy instruments 
at the same time. Theory can provide some guidance on the norma-
tive advantages and disadvantages of alternative policy instruments 
in light of the criteria discussed above. The range of different policy 
instruments includes [3.8, 15.3]: 
•	 Economic incentives, such as taxes, tradable allowances, fines, and 
subsidies
•	 Direct regulatory approaches, such as technology or performance 
standards
•	 Information programmes, such as labelling and energy audits
•	 Government provision, for example of new technologies or in state 
enterprises
•	 Voluntary actions, initiated by governments, firms, and non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs)
Since AR4, the inventory of research on these different instruments 
has grown, mostly with reference to experiences with policies adopted 
within particular sectors and countries as well as the many interactions 
between policies. One implication of that research has been that inter-
national agreements that aim to coordinate across countries reflect the 
practicalities on the particular policy choices of national governments 
and other jurisdictions. 
The diversity in policy goals and instruments highlights dif-
ferences in how sectors and countries are organized eco-
nomically and politically as well as the multi-level nature of 
mitigation. Since AR4, one theme of research in this area has been 
that the success of mitigation measures depends in part on the pres-
ence of institutions capable of designing and implementing regu-
latory policies and the willingness of respective publics to accept 
these policies. Many policies have effects, sometimes unanticipated, 
across multiple jurisdictions — across cities, regions and coun-
tries — because the economic effects of policies and the technologi-
cal options are not contained within a single jurisdiction. [13.2.2.3, 
14.1.3, 15.2, 15.9]
Interactions between policy instruments can be welfare-enhanc-
ing or welfare-degrading. The chances of welfare-enhancing inter-
actions are particularly high when policy instruments address multiple 
different market failures — for example, a subsidy or other policy instru-
ment aimed at boosting investment in R&D on less emission-intensive 
technologies can complement policies aimed at controlling emissions, 
as can regulatory intervention to support efficient improvement of end-
use energy efficiency. By contrast, welfare-degrading interactions are 
particularly likely when policies are designed to achieve identical goals. 
Narrowly targeted policies such as support for deployment (rather 
than R&D) of particular energy technologies that exist in tandem with 
broader economy-wide policies aimed at reducing emissions (for exam-
ple, a cap-and-trade emissions scheme) can have the effect of shifting 
the mitigation effort to particular sectors of the economy in ways that 
typically result in higher overall costs. [3.8.6, 15.7, 15.8]
There are a growing number of countries devising policies for 
adaptation, as well as mitigation, and there may be benefits 
to considering the two within a common policy framework 
(medium evidence, low agreement). However, there are divergent 
views on whether adding adaptation to mitigation measures in the 
policy portfolio encourages or discourages participation in interna-
tional cooperation [1.4.5, 13.3.3]. It is recognized that an integrated 
approach can be valuable, as there exist both synergies and tradeoffs 
[16.6].
Traditionally, policy design, implementation, and evaluation has 
focused on governments as central designers and implementers 
of policies, but new studies have emerged on government act-
ing in a coordinating role (medium confidence). In these cases, gov-
ernments themselves seek to advance voluntary approaches, especially 
when traditional forms of regulation are thought to be inadequate or 
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the best choices of policy instruments and goals is not yet apparent. 
Examples include voluntary schemes that allow individuals and firms 
to purchase emission credits that offset the emissions associated with 
their own activities such as flying and driving. Since AR4, a substantial 
new literature has emerged to examine these schemes from positive 
and normative perspectives. [13.12, 15.5.7] 
The successful implementation of policy depends on many fac-
tors associated with human and institutional behaviour (very 
high confidence). One of the challenges in designing effective instru-
ments is that the activities that a policy is intended to affect — such as 
the choice of energy technologies and carriers and a wide array of agri-
cultural and forestry practices — are also influenced by social norms, 
decision-making rules, behavioural biases, and institutional processes 
[2.4, 3.10]. There are examples of policy instruments made more effec-
tive by taking these factors into account, such as in the case of financ-
ing mechanisms for household investments in energy efficiency and 
renewable energy that eliminate the need for up-front investment [2.4, 
2.6.5.3]. Additionally, the norms that guide acceptable practices could 
have profound impacts on the baselines against which policy interven-
tions are evaluated, either magnifying or reducing the required level of 
policy intervention [1.2.4, 4.3, 6.5.2].
Climate policy can encourage investment that may otherwise 
be suboptimal because of market imperfections (very high con-
fidence). Many of the options for energy efficiency as well as low-
carbon energy provision require high up-front investment that is often 
magnified by high-risk premiums associated with investments in new 
technologies. The relevant risks include those associated with future 
market conditions, regulatory actions, public acceptance, and technol-
ogy cost and performance. Dedicated financial instruments exist to 
lower these risks for private actors — for example, credit insurance, 
feed-in tariffs (FITs), concessional finance, or rebates [16.4]. The design 
of other mitigation policies can also incorporate elements to help 
reduce risks, such as a cap-and-trade regime that includes price floors 
and ceilings [2.6.5, 15.5, 15.6].
TS.4.2 Sectoral and national policies
There has been a considerable increase in national and sub-
national mitigation plans and strategies since AR4 (Figure TS.36). 
These plans and strategies are in their early stages of development 
and implementation in many countries, making it difficult to assess 
whether and how they will result in appropriate institutional and 
policy change, and therefore, their impact on future GHG emissions. 
However, to date these policies, taken together, have not yet achieved 
a substantial deviation in GHG emissions from the past trend. Theories 
of institutional change suggest they might play a role in shaping incen-
tives, political contexts, and policy paradigms in a way that encourages 
Figure TS.36 | National climate legislation and strategies in 2007 and 2012. Regions include NAI (Non Annex I countries — developing countries), AI (Annex I countries — devel-
oped countries), LAM (Latin America), MAF (Middle East and Africa), ASIA (Asia), EIT (Economies in Transition), OECD-1990; see Annex II.2 for more details. In this figure, climate 
legislation is defined as mitigation-focused legislation that goes beyond sectoral action alone. Climate strategy is defined as a non-legislative plan or framework aimed at mitigation 
that encompasses more than a small number of sectors, and that includes a coordinating body charged with implementation. International pledges are not included, nor are sub-
national plans and strategies. The panel shows proportion of GHG emissions covered. [Figure 15.1]
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GHG emissions reductions in the future [15.1, 15.2]. However, many 
baseline scenarios (i. e., those without additional mitigation policies) 
show concentrations that exceed 1000 ppm CO2eq by 2100, which is 
far from a concentration with a likely probability of maintaining tem-
perature increases below 2 °C this century. Mitigation scenarios sug-
gest that a wide range of environmentally effective policies could be 
enacted that would be consistent with such goals [6.3]. In practice, 
climate strategies and the policies that result are influenced by politi-
cal economy factors, sectoral considerations, and the potential for real-
izing co-benefits. In many countries, mitigation policies have also been 
actively pursued at state and local levels. [15.2, 15.5, 15.8]
Since AR4, there is growing political and analytical attention to 
co-benefits and adverse side-effects of climate policy on other 
objectives and vice versa that has resulted in an increased focus 
on policies designed to integrate multiple objectives (high confi-
dence). Co-benefits are often explicitly referenced in climate and sectoral 
plans and strategies and often enable enhanced political support [15.2]. 
However, the analytical and empirical underpinnings for many of these 
interactive effects, and particularly for the associated welfare impacts, 
are under-developed [1.2, 3.6.3, 4.2, 4.8, 6.6]. The scope for co-benefits 
is greater in low-income countries, where complementary policies for 
other objectives, such as air quality, are often weak [5.7, 6.6, 15.2].
The design of institutions affects the choice and feasibility of 
policy options as well as the sustainable financing of mitigation 
measures. Institutions designed to encourage participation by repre-
sentatives of new industries and technologies can facilitate transitions 
to low-GHG emissions pathways [15.2, 15.6]. Policies vary in the extent 
to which they require new institutional capabilities to be implemented. 
Carbon taxation, in most settings, can rely mainly on existing tax infra-
structure and is administratively easier to implement than many other 
alternatives such as cap-and-trade systems [15.5]. The extent of insti-
tutional innovation required for policies can be a factor in instrument 
choice, especially in developing countries.
Sector-specific policies have been more widely used than econ-
omy-wide, market-based policies (medium evidence, high agree-
ment). Although economic theory suggests that market-based, economy-
wide policies for the singular objective of mitigation would generally 
be more cost-effective than sector-specific policies, political economy 
considerations often make economy-wide policies harder to design and 
implement than sector-specific policies [15.2.3, 15.2.6, 15.5.1]. In some 
countries, emission trading and taxes have been enacted to address the 
market externalities associated with GHG emissions, and have contrib-
uted to the fulfilment of sector-specific GHG reduction goals (medium 
evidence, medium agreement) [7.12]. In the longer term, GHG pricing 
can support the adoption of low-GHG energy technologies. Even if 
economy-wide policies were implemented, sector-specific policies may 
be needed to overcome sectoral market failures. For example, building 
codes can require energy-efficient investments where private invest-
ments would otherwise not exist [9.10]. In transport, pricing policies 
that raise the cost of carbon-intensive forms of private transport are 
more effective when backed by public investment in viable alternatives 
[8.10]. Table TS.9 presents a range of sector-specific policies that have 
been implemented in practice. [15.1, 15.2, 15.5, 15.8, 15.9]
Carbon taxes have been implemented in some countries 
and — alongside technology and other policies — have contrib-
uted to decoupling of emissions from GDP (high confidence). Dif-
ferentiation by sector, which is quite common, reduces cost-effective-
ness that arises from the changes in production methods, consumption 
patterns, lifestyle shifts, and technology development, but it may 
increase political feasibility, or be preferred for reasons of competitive-
ness or distributional equity. In some countries, high carbon and fuel 
taxes have been made politically feasible by refunding revenues or by 
lowering other taxes in an environmental fiscal reform. Mitigation poli-
cies that raise government revenue (e. g., auctioned emission allow-
ances under a cap-and-trade system or emission taxes) generally have 
lower social costs than approaches that do not, but this depends on 
how the revenue is used [3.6.3]. [15.2, 15.5.2, 15.5.3]
Fuel taxes are an example of a sector-specific policy and are 
often originally put in place for objectives such as reve-
nue — they are not necessarily designed for the purpose of miti-
gation (high confidence). In Europe, where fuel taxes are highest, they 
have contributed to reductions in carbon emissions from the trans-
port sector of roughly 50 % for this group of countries. The short-run 
response to higher fuel prices is often small, but long-run price elas-
ticities are quite high, or roughly – 0.6 to – 0.8. This means that in the 
long run, 10 % higher fuel prices correlate with 7 % reduction in fuel 
use and emissions. In the transport sector, taxes have the advantage of 
being progressive or neutral in most countries and strongly progressive 
in low-income countries. [15.5.2]
Cap-and-trade systems for GHG emissions are being established 
in a growing number of countries and regions. Their environmen-
tal effect has so far been limited because caps have either been loose 
or have not yet been binding (limited evidence, medium agreement). 
There appears to have been a tradeoff between the political feasibil-
ity and environmental effectiveness of these programmes, as well as 
between political feasibility and distributional equity in the allocation 
of permits. Greater environmental effectiveness through a tighter cap 
may be combined with a price ceiling that improves political feasibility. 
[14.4.2, 15.5.3]
Different factors reduced the price of European Union Emissions 
Trading System (EU ETS) allowances below anticipated levels, 
thereby slowing investment in mitigation (high confidence). While 
the European Union demonstrated that a cross-border cap-and-trade 
system can work, the low price of EU ETS allowances in recent years 
provided insufficient incentives for significant additional investment in 
mitigation. The low price is related to unexpected depth and duration of 
the economic recession, uncertainty about the long-term reduction tar-
gets for GHG  emissions, import of credits from the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), and the interaction with other policy instruments, 
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Table TS.9 | Sector policy instruments. The table brings together evidence on mitigation policy instruments discussed in Chapters 7 to 12. [Table 15.2]
Policy Instruments Energy [7.12] Transport [8.10] Buildings [9.10] Industry [10.11] AFOLU [11.10]
Human Settlements 
and Infrastructure
Economic Instru-
ments — Taxes 
(Carbon taxes may 
be economy-wide)
•	Carbon taxes •	Fuel taxes
•	Congestion charges, 
vehicle registration 
fees, road tolls
•	Vehicle taxes
•	Carbon and / or energy 
taxes (either sectoral 
or economy wide)
•	Carbon tax or 
energy tax
•	Waste disposal 
taxes or charges
•	Fertilizer or Nitrogen 
taxes to reduce 
nitrous oxide
•	Sprawl taxes, Impact 
fees, exactions, split-
rate property taxes, 
tax increment finance, 
betterment taxes, 
congestion charges
Economic Instru-
ments — Tradable 
Allowances 
(May be econ-
omy-wide)
•	Emissions trading 
(e. g., EU ETS)
•	Emission credits 
under CDM
•	Tradable Green 
Certificates
•	Fuel and vehicle 
standards
•	Tradable certificates 
for energy efficiency 
improvements 
(white certificates) 
•	Emissions trading
•	Emission credit 
under CDM
•	Tradable Green 
Certificates 
•	Emission credits under 
the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)
•	Compliance schemes 
outside Kyoto protocol 
(national schemes)
•	Voluntary carbon 
markets
•	Urban-scale Cap 
and Trade
Economic Instru-
ments — Subsidies
•	Fossil fuel subsidy 
removal
•	Feed-in-tariffs for 
renewable energy
•	Capital subsidies 
and insurance for 1st 
generation Carbon 
Dioxide Capture 
and Storage (CCS)
•	Biofuel subsidies
•	Vehicle purchase 
subsidies
•	Feebates 
•	Subsidies or Tax 
exemptions for 
investment in efficient 
buildings, retrofits 
and products
•	Subsidized loans
•	Subsidies (e. g., for 
energy audits)
•	Fiscal incentives (e. g., 
for fuel switching)
•	Credit lines for low 
carbon agriculture, 
sustainable forestry.
•	Special Improvement 
or Redevelopment 
Districts
Regulatory 
Approaches
•	Efficiency or 
environmental 
performance standards
•	Renewable Portfolio 
standards for 
renewable energy 
•	Equitable access 
to electricity grid
•	Legal status of long 
term CO2 storage
•	Fuel economy 
performance standards
•	Fuel quality standards
•	GHG emission 
performance standards
•	Regulatory restrictions 
to encourage modal 
shifts (road to rail) 
•	Restriction on 
use of vehicles in 
certain areas
•	Environmental capacity 
constraints on airports
•	Urban planning and 
zoning restrictions
•	Building codes 
and standards
•	Equipment and 
appliance standards
•	Mandates for energy 
retailers to assist 
customers invest in 
energy efficiency
•	Energy efficiency 
standards for 
equipment
•	 Energy management 
systems (also 
voluntary)
•	Voluntary agreements 
(where bound 
by regulation)
•	Labelling and 
public procurement 
regulations
•	National policies 
to support REDD+ 
including monitoring, 
reporting and 
verification
•	Forest law to reduce 
deforestation
•	Air and water pollution 
control GHG precursors
•	Land-use planning 
and governance 
•	Mixed use zoning
•	Development 
restrictions
•	Affordable housing 
mandates
•	Site access controls
•	Transfer development 
rights
•	Design codes
•	Building codes
•	Street codes
•	Design standards
Information 
Programmes
•	Fuel labelling
•	Vehicle efficiency 
labelling
•	Energy audits
•	Labelling programmes
•	Energy advice 
programmes
•	Energy audits
•	Benchmarking
•	Brokerage for 
industrial cooperation
•	Certification schemes 
for sustainable 
forest practices
•	 Information policies 
to support REDD+ 
including monitoring, 
reporting and 
verification
Government 
Provision of Public 
Goods or Services
•	Research and 
development
•	 Infrastructure 
expansion (district 
heating / cooling or 
common carrier)
•	 Investment in 
transit and human 
powered transport
•	 Investment in 
alternative fuel 
infrastructure
•	Low emission vehicle 
procurement
•	Public procurement 
of efficient buildings 
and appliances
•	Training and education
•	Brokerage for 
industrial cooperation
•	Protection of national, 
state, and local forests.
•	 Investment in 
improvement and 
diffusion of innovative 
technologies in 
agriculture and forestry
•	Provision of utility 
infrastructure such as 
electricity distribution, 
district heating / cooling 
and wastewater 
connections, etc.
•	Park improvements
•	Trail improvements
•	Urban rail 
Voluntary Actions
•	Labelling programmes 
for efficient buildings
•	Product eco-labelling
•	Voluntary agreements 
on energy targets or 
adoption of energy 
management systems, 
or resource efficiency
•	Promotion of 
sustainability by 
developing standards 
and educational 
campaigns
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Box TS.13 | The rebound effect can reduce energy savings from technological improvement
Technological improvements in energy efficiency (EE) have direct 
effects on energy consumption and thus GHG emissions, but can 
cause other changes in consumption, production, and prices that 
will, in turn, affect GHG emissions. These changes are generally 
called ‘rebound’ or ‘takeback’ because in most cases they reduce 
the net energy or emissions reduction associated with the effi-
ciency improvement. The size of EE rebound is controversial, with 
some research papers suggesting little or no rebound and others 
concluding that it offsets most or all reductions from EE policies 
[3.9.5, 5.7.2].
Total EE rebound can be broken down into three distinct parts: 
substitution-effect, income-effect, and economy-wide effect 
[3.9.5]. In end-use consumption, substitution-effect rebound, or 
‘direct rebound’ assumes that a consumer will make more use 
of a device if it becomes more energy efficient because it will be 
cheaper to use. Income-effect rebound or ‘indirect rebound’, arises 
if the improvement in EE makes the consumer wealthier and leads 
her to consume additional products that require energy. Economy-
wide rebound refers to impacts beyond the behaviour of the entity 
benefiting directly from the EE improvement, such as the impact of 
EE on the price of energy.
Analogous rebound effects for EE improvements in production are 
substitution towards an input with improved energy efficiency, and 
substitution among products by consumers when an EE improve-
ment changes the relative prices of goods, as well as an income 
effect when an EE improvement lowers production costs and cre-
ates greater wealth.
Rebound is sometimes confused with the concept of carbon leak-
age, which often describes the incentive for emissions-intensive 
economic activity to migrate away from a region that restricts 
GHGs (or other pollutants) towards areas with fewer or no restric-
tions on such emissions [5.4.1, 14.4]. Energy efficiency rebound 
can occur regardless of the geographic scope of the adopted pol-
icy. As with leakage, however, the potential for significant rebound 
illustrates the importance of considering the full equilibrium effects 
of a mitigation policy [3.9.5, 15.5.4].
particularly related to the expansion of renewable energy as well as 
regulation on energy efficiency. It has proven to be politically difficult 
to address this problem by removing GHG emission permits temporar-
ily, tightening the cap, or providing a long-term mitigation goal. [14.4.2]
Adding a mitigation policy to another may not necessarily 
enhance mitigation. For instance, if a cap-and-trade system has a 
sufficiently stringent cap then other policies such as renewable sub-
sidies have no further impact on total GHG emissions (although they 
may affect costs and possibly the viability of more stringent future tar-
gets). If the cap is loose relative to other policies, it becomes ineffec-
tive. This is an example of a negative interaction between policy instru-
ments. Since other policies cannot be ‘added on’ to a cap-and-trade 
system, if it is to meet any particular target, a sufficiently low cap is 
necessary. A carbon tax, on the other hand, can have an additive envi-
ronmental effect to policies such as subsidies to renewables. [15.7]
Reduction of subsidies to fossil energy can achieve significant 
emission reductions at negative social cost (very high confidence). 
Although political economy barriers are substantial, many countries have 
reformed their tax and budget systems to reduce fuel subsidies that actu-
ally accrue to the relatively wealthy, and utilized lump-sum cash trans-
fers or other mechanisms that are more targeted to the poor. [15.5.3]
Direct regulatory approaches and information measures are 
widely used, and are often environmentally effective, though 
debate remains on the extent of their environmental impacts 
and cost-effectiveness (medium confidence). Examples of regula-
tory approaches include energy efficiency standards; examples of 
information programmes include labelling programmes that can help 
consumers make better-informed decisions. While such approaches 
often work at a net social benefit, the scientific literature is divided 
on whether such policies are implemented with negative private costs 
(see Box TS.12) to firms and individuals [3.9.3, 15.5.5, 15.5.6]. Since 
AR4 there has been continued investigation into the ‘rebound’ effects 
(see Box TS.13) that arise when higher efficiency leads to lower energy 
costs and greater consumption. There is general agreement that such 
rebound effects exist, but there is low agreement in the literature on 
the magnitude [3.9.5, 5.7.2, 15.5.4].
There is a distinct role for technology policy as a complement to 
other mitigation policies (high confidence). Properly implemented 
technology policies reduce the cost of achieving a given environmental 
target. Technology policy will be most effective when technology-push 
policies (e. g., publicly funded R&D) and demand-pull policies (e. g., 
governmental procurement programmes or performance regulations) 
are used in a complementary fashion. While technology-push and 
demand-pull policies are necessary, they are unlikely to be sufficient 
without complementary framework conditions. Managing social chal-
lenges of technology policy change may require innovations in policy 
and institutional design, including building integrated policies that 
make complementary use of market incentives, authority, and norms 
(medium confidence). Since AR4, a large number of countries and sub-
national jurisdictions have introduced support policies for renewable 
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energy such as feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards. These 
have promoted substantial diffusion and innovation of new energy 
technologies such as wind turbines and photovoltaic panels, but have 
raised questions about their economic efficiency, and introduced chal-
lenges for grid and market integration. [2.6.5, 7.12, 15.6.5]
Worldwide investment in research in support of mitigation is 
small relative to overall public research spending (medium con-
fidence). The effectiveness of research support will be greatest if it is 
increased slowly and steadily rather than dramatically or erratically. It is 
important that data collection for program evaluation is built into tech-
nology policy programmes, because there is limited empirical evidence 
on the relative effectiveness of different mechanisms for supporting the 
invention, innovation and diffusion of new technologies. [15.6.2, 15.6.5]
Government planning and provision can facilitate shifts to less 
energy- and GHG-intensive infrastructure and lifestyles (high 
confidence). This applies particularly when there are indivisibilities in 
the provision of infrastructure as in the energy sector [7.6] (e. g., for 
electricity transmission and distribution or district heating networks); 
in the transport sector [8.4] (e. g., for non-motorized or public trans-
port); and in urban planning [12.5]. The provision of adequate infra-
structure is important for behavioural change [15.5.6].
Successful voluntary agreements on mitigation between gov-
ernments and industries are characterized by a strong institu-
tional framework with capable industrial associations (medium 
confidence). The strengths of voluntary agreements are speed and flex-
ibility in phasing measures, and facilitation of barrier removal activi-
ties for energy efficiency and low-emission technologies. Regulatory 
threats, even though the threats are not always explicit, are also an 
important factor for firms to be motivated. There are few environmen-
tal impacts without a proper institutional framework. [15.5.7] 
TS.4.3 Development and regional cooperation
Regional cooperation offers substantial opportunities for mitiga-
tion due to geographic proximity, shared infrastructure and policy 
frameworks, trade, and cross-border investment that would be 
difficult for countries to implement in isolation (high confidence). 
Examples of possible regional cooperation policies include regionally-
linked development of renewable energy power pools, networks of natu-
ral gas supply infrastructure, and coordinated policies on forestry. [14.1]
At the same time, there is a mismatch between opportunities 
and capacities to undertake mitigation (medium confidence). The 
regions with the greatest potential to leapfrog to low-carbon devel-
opment trajectories are the poorest developing regions where there 
are few lock-in effects in terms of modern energy systems and urban-
ization patterns. However, these regions also have the lowest finan-
cial, technological, and institutional capacities to embark on such 
low-carbon development paths (Figure TS.37) and their cost of wait-
ing is high due to unmet energy and development needs. Emerging 
economies already have more lock-in effects but their rapid build-up of 
modern energy systems and urban settlements still offers substantial 
opportunities for low-carbon development. Their capacity to reorient 
themselves to low-carbon development strategies is higher, but also 
faces constraints in terms of finance, technology, and the high cost of 
delaying the installation of new energy capacity. Lastly, industrialized 
economies have the largest lock-in effects, but the highest capacities 
to reorient their energy, transport, and urbanizations systems towards 
low-carbon development. [14.1.3, 14.3.2]
Regional cooperation has, to date, only had a limited (positive) 
impact on mitigation (medium evidence, high agreement). Nonethe-
less, regional cooperation could play an enhanced role in promoting 
mitigation in the future, particularly if it explicitly incorporates miti-
gation objectives in trade, infrastructure and energy policies and pro-
motes direct mitigation action at the regional level. [14.4.2, 14.5]
Most literature suggests that climate-specific regional coopera-
tion agreements in areas of policy have not played an important 
role in addressing mitigation challenges to date (medium confi-
dence). This is largely related to the low level of regional integration and 
associated willingness to transfer sovereignty to supra-national regional 
bodies to enforce binding agreements on mitigation. [14.4.2, 14.4.3]
Climate-specific regional cooperation using binding regulation-
based approaches in areas of deep integration, such as EU direc-
tives on energy efficiency, renewable energy, and biofuels, have 
had some impact on mitigation objectives (medium confidence). 
Nonetheless, theoretical models and past experience suggest that 
there is substantial potential to increase the role of climate-specific 
regional cooperation agreements and associated instruments, includ-
ing economic instruments and regulatory instruments. In this context it 
is important to consider carbon leakage of such regional initiatives and 
ways to address it. [14.4.2, 14.4.1]
In addition, non-climate-related modes of regional coopera-
tion could have significant implications for mitigation, even if 
mitigation objectives are not a component (medium confidence). 
Regional cooperation with non-climate-related objectives but pos-
sible mitigation implications, such as trade agreements, cooperation 
on technology, and cooperation on infrastructure and energy, has to 
date also had negligible impacts on mitigation. Modest impacts have 
been found on the level of GHG emissions of members of regional 
preferential trade areas if these agreements are accompanied with 
environmental agreements. Creating synergies between adaptation 
and mitigation can increase the cost-effectiveness of climate change 
actions. Linking electricity and gas grids at the regional level has 
also had a modest impact on mitigation as it facilitated greater use 
of low-carbon and renewable technologies; there is substantial fur-
ther mitigation potential in such arrangements. [14.4.2]
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TS.4.4 International cooperation 
Climate change mitigation is a global commons problem that 
requires international cooperation, but since AR4, scholarship 
has emerged that emphasizes a more complex and multi-fac-
eted view of climate policy (very high confidence). Two character-
istics of climate change necessitate international cooperation: climate 
change is a global commons problem, and it is characterized by a high 
degree of heterogeneity in the origins of GHG emissions, mitigation 
opportunities, climate impacts, and capacity for mitigation and adapta-
tion [13.2.1.1]. Policymaking efforts to date have primarily focused on 
international cooperation as a task centrally focused on the coordina-
tion of national policies that would be adopted with the goal of miti-
gation. More recent policy developments suggest that there is a more 
complicated set of relationships between national, regional, and global 
policymaking, based on a multiplicity of goals, a recognition of policy 
co-benefits, and barriers to technological innovation and diffusion [1.2, 
6.6, 15.2]. A major challenge is assessing whether decentralized policy 
action is consistent with and can lead to total mitigation efforts that 
are effective, equitable, and efficient [6.1.2.1, 13.13].
Figure TS.37 | Economic and governance indicators affecting regional capacities to embrace mitigation policies. Regions include EAS (East Asia), EIT (Economies in Transition), LAM 
(Latin America and Caribbean), MNA (Middle East and North Africa), NAM (North America), POECD (Pacific Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)-1990 
members), PAS (South East Asia and Pacific), SAS (South Asia), SSA (sub-Saharan Africa), WEU (Western Europe), LDC (least-developed countries). Statistics refer to the year 2010 
or the most recent year available. Note: The lending interest rate refers to the average interest rate charged by banks to private sector clients for short- to medium-term financing 
needs. The governance index is a composite measure of governance indicators compiled from various sources, rescaled to a scale of 0 to 1, with 0 representing weakest governance 
and 1 representing strongest governance. [Figure 14.2]
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International cooperation on climate change has become more 
institutionally diverse over the past decade (very high confidence). 
Perceptions of fairness can facilitate cooperation by increasing the 
legitimacy of an agreement [3.10, 13.2.2.4]. UNFCCC remains a primary 
international forum for climate negotiations, but other institutions have 
emerged at multiple scales, namely: global, regional, national, and local 
[13.3.1, 13.4.1.4, 13.5]. This institutional diversity arises in part from 
the growing inclusion of climate change issues in other policy arenas 
(e. g., sustainable development, international trade, and human rights). 
These and other linkages create opportunities, potential co-benefits, or 
harms that have not yet been thoroughly examined. Issue linkage also 
creates the possibility for countries to experiment with different forums 
of cooperation (‘forum shopping’), which may increase negotiation 
costs and potentially distract from or dilute the performance of interna-
tional cooperation toward climate goals. [13.3, 13.4, 13.5] Finally, there 
has been an emergence of new transnational climate-related institu-
tions not centred on sovereign states (e. g., public-private partnerships, 
private sector governance initiatives, transnational NGO programmes, 
and city level initiatives) [13.3.1, 13.12].
Existing and proposed international climate agreements vary 
in the degree to which their authority is centralized. As illus-
trated in Figure TS.38, the range of centralized formalization spans 
strong multilateral agreements (such as the Kyoto Protocol targets), 
harmonized national policies (such as the Copenhagen / Cancún 
pledges), and decentralized but coordinated national policies (such 
as planned linkages of national and sub-national emissions trading 
schemes) [13.4.1, 13.4.3]. Four other design elements of international 
agreements have particular relevance: legal bindingness, goals and 
targets, flexible mechanisms, and equitable methods for effort-shar-
Figure TS.38 | Alternative forms of international cooperation. The figure represents a compilation of existing and possible forms of international cooperation, based upon a survey 
of published research, but is not intended to be exhaustive of existing or potential policy architectures, nor is it intended to be prescriptive. Examples in orange are existing agree-
ments. Examples in blue are structures for agreements proposed in the literature. The width of individual boxes indicates the range of possible degrees of centralization for a particu-
lar agreement. The degree of centralization indicates the authority an agreement confers on an international institution, not the process of negotiating the agreement. [Figure 13.2]
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Loose coordination of policies: examples include transnational city networks and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs); 
R&D technology cooperation: examples include the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF), Global Methane Initiative (GMI), 
or Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP); Other international organization (IO) GHG regulation: 
examples include the Montreal Protocol, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Maritime Organization (IMO). 
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Table TS.10 | Summary of performance assessments of existing and proposed forms of cooperation. Forms of cooperation are evaluated along the four evaluation criteria described 
in Sections 3.7.1 and 13.2.2. [Table 13.3]
Mode of International 
Cooperation
Assessment Criteria
Environmental 
Effectiveness
Aggregate Economic 
Performance
Distributional Impacts Institutional Feasibility
Existing 
Cooperation 
[13.13.1]
UNFCCC Aggregate GHG emis-
sions in Annex I countries 
declined by 6.0 to 9.2 % 
below 1990 levels by 2000, 
a larger reduction than the 
apparent ‘aim’ of returning 
to 1990 levels by 2000.
Authorized joint fulfilment 
of commitments, multi-gas 
approach, sources and sinks, 
and domestic policy choice. 
Cost and benefit estimates 
depend on baseline, discount 
rate, participation, leak-
age, co-benefits, adverse 
effects, and other factors.
Commitments distinguish 
between Annex I (indus-
trialized) and non-Annex I 
countries. Principle of 
‘common but differentiated 
responsibility.’ Commitment 
to ‘equitable and appropriate 
contributions by each [party].’
Ratified (or equivalent) by 195 
countries and regional organi-
zations. Compliance depends 
on national communications.
The Kyoto Protocol (KP) Aggregate emissions in Annex I 
countries were reduced by 8.5 
to 13.6 % below 1990 levels by 
2011, more than the first com-
mitment period (CP1) collective 
reduction target of 5.2 %. Reduc-
tions occurred mainly in EITs; 
emissions; increased in some 
others. Incomplete participation 
in CP1 (even lower in CP2).
Cost-effectiveness improved 
by flexible mechanisms (Joint 
Implementation (JI), CDM, 
International Emissions 
Trading (IET)) and domestic 
policy choice. Cost and benefit 
estimates depend on baseline, 
discount rate, participation, 
leakage, co-benefits, adverse 
effects, and other factors.
Commitments distinguish 
between developed and 
developing countries, but 
dichotomous distinction 
correlates only partly (and 
decreasingly) with historical 
emissions trends and with 
changing economic circum-
stances. Intertemporal equity 
affected by short-term actions.
Ratified (or equivalent) by 
192 countries and regional 
organizations, but took 7 years 
to enter into force. Compli-
ance depends on national 
communications, plus KP 
compliance system. Later 
added approaches to enhance 
measurement, reporting, 
and verification (MRV).
The Kyoto Mechanisms About 1.4 billion tCO2eq 
credits under the CDM, 0.8 
billion under JI, and 0.2 bil-
lion under IET (through July 
2013). Additionality of CDM 
projects remains an issue but 
regulatory reform underway.
CDM mobilized low cost 
options, particularly indus-
trial gases, reducing costs. 
Underperformance of some 
project types. Some evidence 
that technology is transferred 
to non-Annex I countries.
Limited direct investment from 
Annex I countries. Domestic 
investment dominates, leading 
to concentration of CDM 
projects in few countries. 
Limited contributions to local 
sustainable development.
Helped enable political 
feasibility of Kyoto Protocol. 
Has multi-layered governance. 
Largest carbon markets to date. 
Has built institutional capacity 
in developing countries.
Further Agreements 
under the UNFCCC
Pledges to limit emissions made 
by all major emitters under 
Cancun Agreements. Unlikely 
sufficient to limit temperature 
change to 2 °C. Depends on 
treatment of measures beyond 
current pledges for mitigation 
and finance. Durban Platform 
calls for new agreement 
by 2015, to take effect in 
2020, engaging all parties.
Efficiency not assessed. 
Cost-effectiveness might be 
improved by market-based 
policy instruments, inclusion of 
forestry sector, commitments 
by more nations than Annex I 
countries (as envisioned 
in Durban Platform).
Depends on sources of financ-
ing, particularly for actions 
of developing countries.
Cancún Conference of the 
Parties (COP) decision; 97 
countries made pledges of 
emission reduction targets 
or actions for 2020.
Agreements 
outside the 
UNFCCC
G8, G20, 
Major
Economies 
Forum on 
Energy and 
Climate (MEF)
G8 and MEF have recom-
mended emission reduction by 
all major emitters. G20 may 
spur GHG reductions by phas-
ing out of fossil fuel subsidies.
Action by all major emitters 
may reduce leakage and 
improve cost-effectiveness, if 
implemented using flexible 
mechanisms. Potential efficiency 
gains through subsidy removal. 
Too early to assess economic 
performance empirically.
Has not mobilized climate 
finance. Removing fuel 
subsidies would be progressive 
but have negative effects 
on oil-exporting countries 
and on those with very low 
incomes unless other help 
for the poorest is provided.
Lower participation of countries 
than UNFCCC, yet covers 70 % 
of global emissions. Opens 
possibility for forum-shopping, 
based on issue preferences.
Montreal 
Protocol on 
Ozone-
Depleting 
Substances 
(ODS)
Spurred emission reductions 
through ODS phaseouts 
approximately 5 times the 
magnitude of Kyoto CP1 
targets. Contribution may 
be negated by high-GWP 
substitutes, though efforts to 
phase out HFCs are growing.
Cost-effectiveness supported 
by multi-gas approach. Some 
countries used market-based 
mechanisms to imple-
ment domestically.
Later compliance period for 
phaseouts by developing 
countries. Montreal Protocol 
Fund provided finance to 
developing countries.
Universal participation. 
but the timing of required 
actions vary for developed 
and developing countries
Voluntary 
Carbon 
Market
Covers 0.13 billion tCO2eq, but 
certification remains an issue
Credit prices are het-
erogeneous, indicating 
market inefficiencies
[No literature cited.] Fragmented and non-
transparent market.
⇒
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ing [13.4.2]. Existing and proposed modes of international coopera-
tion are assessed in Table TS.10. [13.13]
The UNFCCC is currently the only international climate policy 
venue with broad legitimacy, due in part to its virtually univer-
sal membership (high confidence). The UNFCCC continues to evolve 
institutions and systems for governance of climate change. [13.2.2.4, 
13.3.1, 13.4.1.4, 13.5] 
Incentives for international cooperation can interact with other 
policies (medium confidence). Interactions between proposed and 
existing policies, which may be counterproductive, inconsequential, or 
beneficial, are difficult to predict, and have been understudied in the 
literature [13.2, 13.13, 15.7.4]. The game-theoretic literature on cli-
mate change agreements finds that self-enforcing agreements engage 
and maintain participation and compliance. Self-enforcement can be 
derived from national benefits due to direct climate benefits, co-bene-
fits of mitigation on other national objectives, technology transfer, and 
climate finance. [13.3.2]
Decreasing uncertainty concerning the costs and benefits of 
mitigation can reduce the willingness of states to make com-
mitments in forums of international cooperation (medium con-
fidence). In some cases, the reduction of uncertainty concerning the 
costs and benefits of mitigation can make international agreements 
less effective by creating a disincentive for states to participate [13.3.3, 
2.6.4.1]. A second dimension of uncertainty, that concerning whether 
the policies states implement will in fact achieve desired outcomes, 
can lessen the willingness of states to agree to commitments regard-
ing those outcomes [2.6.3].
International cooperation can stimulate public and private 
investment and the adoption of economic incentives and direct 
regulations that promote technological innovation (medium con-
fidence). Technology policy can help lower mitigation costs, thereby 
increasing incentives for participation and compliance with interna-
tional cooperative efforts, particularly in the long run. Equity issues can 
be affected by domestic intellectual property rights regimes, which can 
alter the rate of both technology transfer and the development of new 
technologies. [13.3, 13.9]
In the absence of — or as a complement to — a binding, interna-
tional agreement on climate change, policy linkages between 
and among existing and nascent international, regional, 
national, and sub-national climate policies offer potential cli-
mate change mitigation and adaptation benefits (medium confi-
dence). Direct and indirect linkages between and among sub-national, 
national, and regional carbon markets are being pursued to improve 
market efficiency. Linkage between carbon markets can be stimulated 
by competition between and among public and private governance 
regimes, accountability measures, and the desire to learn from pol-
icy experiments. Yet integrating climate policies raises a number of 
concerns about the performance of a system of linked legal rules and 
economic activities. [13.3.1, 13.5.3, 13.13.2.3] Prominent examples 
of linkages are among national and regional climate initiatives (e. g., 
planned linkage between the EU ETS and the Australian Emission 
Trading Scheme, international offsets planned for recognition by a 
number of jurisdictions), and national and regional climate initiatives 
with the Kyoto Protocol (e. g., the EU ETS is linked to international 
carbon markets through the project-based Kyoto Mechanisms) [13.6, 
13.7, Figure 13.4, 14.4.2].
International trade can promote or discourage international 
cooperation on climate change (high confidence). Developing 
constructive relationships between international trade and climate 
agreements involves considering how existing trade policies and rules 
Mode of International 
Cooperation
Assessment Criteria
Environmental 
Effectiveness
Aggregate Economic 
Performance
Distributional Impacts Institutional Feasibility
Proposed 
Cooperation
[13.13.2]
Proposed 
architectures
Strong mul-
tilateralism
Tradeoff between ambi-
tion (deep) and par-
ticipation (broad).
More cost-effectivewith greater 
reliance on market mechanisms.
Multilateralism facilitates 
integrating distributional 
impacts into negotiations 
and may apply equity-based 
criteria as outlined in Ch. 4
Depends on number of 
parties; degree of ambition
Harmonized 
national 
policies
Depends on net aggre-
gate change in ambition 
across countries resulting 
from harmonization.
More cost-effectivewith greater 
reliance on market mechanisms.
Depends on specific 
national policies
Depends on similarity of 
national policies; more similar 
may support harmonization but 
domestic circumstances may 
vary. National enforcement.
Decentralized 
architectures, 
coordinated 
national 
policies
Effectiveness depends on 
quality of standards and 
credits across countries
Often (though not necessarily) 
refers to linkage of national 
cap-and-trade systems, in 
which case cost effective.
Depends on specific 
national policies
Depends on similar-
ity of national policies. 
National enforcement.
Effort (burden)  sharing 
arrangements
Refer to Sections 4.6.2 for discussion of the principles on which effort (burden) sharing arrangements may be based, and Section 6.3.6.6 
for quantitative evaluation.
104
TS
Technical Summary
can be modified to be more climate-friendly; whether border adjust-
ment measures or other trade measures can be effective in meeting 
the goals of international climate policy, including participation in and 
compliance with climate agreements; or whether the UNFCCC, World 
Trade Organization (WTO), a hybrid of the two, or a new institution is 
the best forum for a trade-and-climate architecture. [13.8]
The Montreal Protocol, aimed at protecting the stratospheric 
ozone layer, achieved reductions in global GHG emissions (very 
high confidence). The Montreal Protocol set limits on emissions of 
ozone-depleting gases that are also potent GHGs, such as chlorofluo-
rocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs). Substitutes 
for those ozone-depleting gases (such as hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
which are not ozone-depleting) may also be potent GHGs. Lessons 
learned from the Montreal Protocol, for example about the effect of 
financial and technological transfers on broadening participation in 
an international environmental agreement, could be of value to the 
design of future international climate change agreements (see Table 
TS.10). [13.3.3, 13.3.4, 13.13.1.4] 
The Kyoto Protocol was the first binding step toward imple-
menting the principles and goals provided by the UNFCCC, but 
it has had limited effects on global GHG emissions because 
some countries did not ratify the Protocol, some Parties did not 
meet their commitments, and its commitments applied to only a 
portion of the global economy (medium evidence, low agreement). 
The Parties collectively surpassed their collective emission reduction 
target in the first commitment period, but the Protocol credited emis-
sions reductions that would have occurred even in its absence. The 
Kyoto Protocol does not directly influence the emissions of non-Annex 
I countries, which have grown rapidly over the past decade. [5.2, 
13.13.1.1] 
The flexible mechanisms under the Protocol have cost-saving 
potential, but their environmental effectiveness is less clear 
(medium confidence). The CDM, one of the Protocol’s flexible mecha-
nisms, created a market for GHG emissions offsets from developing 
countries, generating credits equivalent to nearly 1.4 GtCO2eq as of 
October 2013. The CDM’s environmental effectiveness has been mixed 
due to concerns about the limited additionality of projects, the valid-
ity of baselines, the possibility of emissions leakage, and recent credit 
price decreases. Its distributional impact has been unequal due to the 
concentration of projects in a limited number of countries. The Proto-
col’s other flexible mechanisms, Joint Implementation (JI) and Inter-
national Emissions Trading (IET), have been undertaken both by gov-
ernments and private market participants, but have raised concerns 
related to government sales of emission units. (Table TS.10) [13.7.2, 
13.13.1.2, 14.3.7.1]
Recent UNFCCC negotiations have sought to include more ambi-
tious contributions from the countries with commitments under 
the Kyoto Protocol, mitigation contributions from a broader 
set of countries, and new finance and technology mechanisms. 
Under the 2010 Cancún Agreement, developed countries formalized 
voluntary pledges of quantified, economy-wide GHG emission reduc-
tion targets and some developing countries formalized voluntary 
pledges to mitigation actions. The distributional impact of the agree-
ment will depend in part on the magnitude and sources of financ-
ing, although the scientific literature on this point is limited, because 
financing mechanisms are evolving more rapidly than respective scien-
tific assessments (limited evidence, low agreement). Under the 2011 
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, delegates agreed to craft a 
future legal regime that would be ‘applicable to all Parties […] under 
the Convention’ and would include substantial new financial support 
and technology arrangements to benefit developing countries, but the 
delegates did not specify means for achieving those ends. [13.5.1.1, 
13.13.1.3, 16.2.1]
TS.4.5 Investment and finance 
A transformation to a low-carbon economy implies new pat-
terns of investment. A limited number of studies have examined 
the investment needs for different mitigation scenarios. Information 
is largely limited to energy use with global total annual investment 
in the energy sector at about 1200 billion USD. Mitigation scenarios 
that reach atmospheric CO2eq concentrations in the range from 430 to 
530 ppm CO2eq by 2100 (without overshoot) show substantial shifts 
in annual investment flows during the period 2010 – 2029 if compared 
to baseline scenarios (Figure TS.39): annual investment in the exist-
ing technologies associated with the energy supply sector (e. g., con-
ventional fossil fuelled power plants and fossil fuel extraction) would 
decline by 30 (2 to 166) billion USD per year (median: – 20 % compared 
to 2010) (limited evidence, medium agreement). Investment in low-
emissions generation technologies (renewables, nuclear, and power 
plants with CCS) would increase by 147 (31 to 360) billion USD per year 
(median: +100 % compared to 2010) during the same period (limited 
evidence, medium agreement) in combination with an increase by 336 
(1 to 641) billion USD in energy efficiency investments in the building, 
transport and industry sectors (limited evidence, medium agreement). 
Higher energy efficiency and the shift to low-emission generation tech-
nologies contribute to a reduction in the demand for fossil fuels, thus 
causing a decline in investment in fossil fuel extraction, transformation 
and transportation. Scenarios suggest that average annual reduction 
of investment in fossil fuel extraction in 2010 – 2029 would be 116 (– 8 
to 369) billion USD (limited evidence, medium agreement). Such spill-
over effects could yield adverse effects on the revenues of countries 
that export fossil fuels. Mitigation scenarios also reduce deforestation 
against current deforestation trends by 50 % reduction with an invest-
ment of 21 to 35 billion USD per year (low confidence). [16.2.2]
Estimates of total climate finance range from 343 to 385 billion 
USD per year between 2010 and 2012 (medium confidence). The 
range is based on 2010, 2011, and 2012 data. Climate finance was 
almost evenly invested in developed and developing countries. Around 
95 % of the total was invested in mitigation (medium confidence). The 
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figures reflect the total financial flow for the underlying investments, 
not the incremental investment, i. e., the portion attributed to the miti-
gation / adaptation cost increment (see Box TS.14). In general, quantita-
tive data on climate finance are limited, relate to different concepts, 
and are incomplete. [16.2.1.1]
Depending on definitions and approaches, climate finance flows 
to developing countries are estimated to range from 39 to 120 
billion USD per year during the period 2009 to 2012 (medium 
confidence). The range covers public and private flows for mitiga-
tion and adaptation. Public climate finance was 35 to 49 billion USD 
(2011 / 2012 USD) (medium confidence). Most public climate finance 
provided to developing countries flows through bilateral and multilat-
eral institutions usually as concessional loans and grants. Under the 
UNFCCC, climate finance is funding provided to developing countries 
by Annex II Parties and averaged nearly 10 billion USD per year from 
2005 to 2010 (medium confidence). Between 2010 and 2012, the ´fast 
start finance´ provided by some developed countries amounted to over 
10 billion USD per year (medium confidence). Estimates of interna-
tional private climate finance flowing to developing countries range 
from 10 to 72 billion USD (2009 / 2010 USD) per year, including foreign 
direct investment as equity and loans in the range of 10 to 37 billion 
USD (2010 USD and 2008 USD) per year over the period of 2008 – 2011 
(medium confidence). Figure TS.40 provides an overview of climate 
finance, outlining sources and managers of capital, financial instru-
ments, project owners, and projects. [16.2.1.1]
Within appropriate enabling environments, the private sec-
tor, along with the public sector, can play an important role in 
financing mitigation. The private sector contribution to total climate 
finance is estimated at an average of 267 billion USD (74 %) per year in 
the period 2010 to 2011 and at 224 billion USD (62 %) per year in the 
Figure TS.39 | Change of average annual investment flows in mitigation scenarios (2010 – 2029). Investment changes are calculated by a limited number of model studies and 
model comparisons for mitigation scenarios that reach concentrations within the range of 430 – 530 ppm CO2eq by 2100 compared to respective average baseline investments. The 
vertical bars indicate the range between minimum and maximum estimate of investment changes; the horizontal bar indicates the median of model results. Proximity to this median 
value does not imply higher likelihood because of the different degree of aggregation of model results, low number of studies available and different assumptions in the different 
studies considered. The numbers in the bottom row show the total number of studies assessed. [Figure 16.3]
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Figure TS.40 | Types of climate finance flows. ‘Capital’ includes all relevant financial flows. The size of the boxes is not related to the magnitude of the financial flow. [Figure 16.1]
Source of Capital
Carbon Taxes 
and Auction of 
Allowances
General Tax 
Revenue
International 
Levies
Funds from 
Capital Markets
Corporate 
Cash Flow
Household 
Income
Manager of Capital
Governments
National, 
Bilateral and 
Multilateral 
Financial 
Institutions
Commercial 
Financial
Institutions
Corporate 
Actors and 
Institutional 
Investors
(Private and 
Public)
Households
Financial Instrument
Grants
Project Debt 
(Market Based/
Concessional)
Project Level
Equity
Balance Sheet
Financing
Credit 
Enhancement / 
Risk 
Management
Project Owner/Sponsor
Governments, 
Corporations, 
and Households
(Developed and 
Developing 
Countries)
Project
Adaptation
Mitigation
(incl. REDD)
Box TS.14 | There are no agreed definitions of ´climate investment´ and ‘climate finance’
‘Total climate finance’ includes all financial flows whose expected 
effect is to reduce net GHG emissions and / or to enhance resilience 
to the impacts of climate variability and the projected climate 
change. This covers private and public funds, domestic and inter-
national flows, expenditures for mitigation and adaptation, and 
adaptation to current climate variability as well as future climate 
change. It covers the full value of the financial flow rather than 
the share associated with the climate change benefit. The share 
associated with the climate change benefit is the incremental cost. 
The ‘total climate finance flowing to developing countries’ is the 
amount of the total climate finance invested in developing coun-
tries that comes from developed countries. This covers private and 
public funds for mitigation and adaptation. ‘Public climate finance 
provided to developing countries’ is the finance provided by devel-
oped countries´ governments and bilateral institutions as well as 
multilateral institutions for mitigation and adaptation activities in 
developing countries. ‘Private climate finance flowing to develop-
ing countries’ is finance and investment by private actors in / from 
developed countries for mitigation and adaptation activities in 
developing countries. Under the UNFCCC, climate finance is not 
well-defined. Annex II Parties provide and mobilize funding for 
climate-related activities in developing countries.
The ‘incremental investment’ is the extra capital required for the 
initial investment for a mitigation or adaptation project in compar-
ison to a reference project. Incremental investment for mitigation 
and adaptation projects is not regularly estimated and reported, 
but estimates are available from models. The ‘incremental cost’ 
reflects the cost of capital of the incremental investment and the 
change of operating and maintenance costs for a mitigation or 
adaptation project in comparison to a reference project. It can be 
calculated as the difference of the net present values of the two 
projects. Many mitigation measures have higher investment costs 
and lower operating and maintenance costs than the measures 
displaced so incremental cost tends to be lower than the incre-
mental investment. Values depend on the incremental investment 
as well as projected operating costs, including fossil fuel prices, 
and the discount rate. The ‘macroeconomic cost of mitigation pol-
icy’ is the reduction of aggregate consumption or GDP induced 
by the reallocation of investments and expenditures induced by 
climate policy (see Box TS.9). These costs do not account for the 
benefit of reducing anthropogenic climate change and should 
thus be assessed against the economic benefit of avoided climate 
change impacts. [16.1]
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period 2011 to 2012 (limited evidence, medium agreement) [16.2.1]. In 
a range of countries, a large share of private sector climate investment 
relies on low-interest and long-term loans as well as risk guarantees 
provided by public sector institutions to cover the incremental costs 
and risks of many mitigation investments. The quality of a country’s 
enabling environment — including the effectiveness of its institutions, 
regulations and guidelines regarding the private sector, security of 
property rights, credibility of policies, and other factors — has a sub-
stantial impact on whether private firms invest in new technologies 
and infrastructure [16.3]. By the end of 2012, the 20 largest emitting 
developed and developing countries with lower risk country grades 
for private sector investments produced 70 % of global energy related 
CO2 emissions (low confidence). This makes them attractive for inter-
national private sector investment in low-carbon technologies. In many 
other countries, including most least-developed countries, low-carbon 
investment will often have to rely mainly on domestic sources or inter-
national public finance. [16.4.2]
A main barrier to the deployment of low-carbon technologies 
is a low risk-adjusted rate of return on investment vis-à-vis 
high-carbon alternatives (high confidence). Public policies and 
support instruments can address this either by altering the aver-
age rates of return for different investment options, or by creating 
mechanisms to lessen the risks that private investors face [15.12, 
16.3]. Carbon pricing mechanisms (carbon taxes, cap-and-trade sys-
tems), as well as renewable energy premiums, FITs, RPSs, investment 
grants, soft loans and credit insurance can move risk-return profiles 
into the required direction [16.4]. For some instruments, the pres-
ence of substantial uncertainty about their future levels (e. g., the 
future size of a carbon tax relative to differences in investment and 
operating costs) can lead to a lessening of the effectiveness and / or 
efficiency of the instrument. Instruments that create a fixed or 
immediate incentive to invest in low-emission technologies, such as 
investment grants, soft loans, or FITs, do not appear to suffer from 
this problem. [2.6.5]

